



TASHKENT

CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

A quarterly review of cultural developments in
the six Muslim republics of the Soviet Union.



Issued by the Central Asian Research Centre in association with
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BUKHARA

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CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW aims at presenting a coherent and objective picture of cultural developments in the six Muslim Soviet Socialist Republics of Azerbaydzhan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Kirgizia and Kazakhstan. The subjects treated include history, geography, demography, the arts, education, irrigation and communications.

In addition, the *REVIEW* analyses past and current Soviet publications on the countries bordering on or adjacent to these republics, namely, Persia, Afghanistan, the Indian sub-continent, Tibet and Sinkiang.

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Abbreviations used in the Review when referring to the Soviet Academies of Sciences, and to newspapers and periodicals etc. employed as sources, are as follows :-

AN/SSSR	Akademiya Nauk (Academy of Sciences) of USSR
AN/Az. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Azerbaydzhan SSR
AN/Kaz. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Kazakh SSR
AN/Kirg. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Kirgiz SSR
AN/Tad. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Tadzhik SSR
AN/Turk. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Turkmen SSR
AN/Uzb. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Uzbek SSR
SAGU	Sredneaziatskiy Gosudarstvennyy Universitet (Central Asian State University)
BR	Bakinskiy Rabochiy
I	Izvestiya
KP	Kazakhstanskaya Pravda
K	Kommunist
KT	Kommunist Tadzhikistana
KZ	Krasnaya Zvezda
NT	New Times
P	Pravda
PV	Pravda Vostoka
SK	Sovetskaya Kirgiziya
SU	Soviet Union
TI	Turkmenskaya Iskra
VVS	Vedemosti Verkhovnogo Soveta

CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

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EDITORIAL

From the findings so far published it seems that the 1959 census will provide fuller information about the nationalities of Soviet Central Asia and Kazakhstan than the 1939 census, although perhaps not so full as the 1926 census. There are still some important lacunae, which may perhaps be filled later. Thus, for instance, although about 99 per cent of the population of the RSFSR is covered by the statistics given, less than 88 per cent is accounted for in Kazakhstan. This is perhaps due to the fact that the repatriation of the Chechens, Ingush and others who have been living in Kazakhstan since 1944, is still not complete. On the other hand, 418,000 Chechens and 106,000 Ingush are now shown as living in the RSFSR.

The new census gives a much clearer idea of the extent of non-Asian (Russian, Ukrainian and Belo-Russian) settlement in the Muslim republics. The figures are as follows:

Uzbekistan	1,189,000
Kazakhstan	4,884,000
Azerbaydzhan	515,000
Kirgizia	761,000
Tadzhikistan	290,000
Turkmenistan	284,000.

This gives a total of 7,923,000 out of a total population in the six Muslim republics of 26,676,000.

The 1959 census shows a marked increase in the Turkic population of the USSR as a whole. In 1926 this was 17,193,741 (including the Yakuts, Chuvash and a number of smaller nationalities). In 1939 the total was 19,753,934, allowing for a 20 per cent increase in the

smaller nationalities not mentioned in the 1939 census. Making a similar allowance for small nationalities still not mentioned in 1959, the total of the Turkic Peoples in the USSR is now 23,202,000.

. . .

During 1958 and 1959 a number of articles appeared in Soviet periodicals about the forthcoming XXVth International Congress of Orientalists which is now to be held in Moscow next August. Most of these articles contained pointed references to the preoccupation of Soviet orientalists with "the collapse of imperialism" and "militant anti-colonialism". This naturally gave rise to some apprehension lest the Soviet hosts at the XXVth Congress should try to depart to some extent from the traditionally academic character of the Congress. As if to allay such apprehension, VESTNIK AKADEMII NAUK SSSR, No.1 of 1960, contained a brief article by B.G. Gafurov, the director of the Institute of Oriental Studies in the Academy, setting forth the aims of the coming Congress. This article was in marked contrast to previous articles on the subject and contained no mention whatever of colonialism, imperialism or any other theme with a political slant. It ended, however, with the following passage: "None of the Soviet scholars intends, of course, to force his own point of view on any of the foreign scholars or on the Congress as a whole. There can be no question of this. At the same time, Soviet orientalists do not conceal and do not intend to conceal the fact that in all their research work, and in their very approach to the various problems of orientalism, they are governed by Marxist-Leninist methodology and consider this methodology to be the only correct one."

. . .

During and immediately after the XXth Party Congress held in February 1956 the attention of Soviet orientalists was drawn to the mistakes they had made in underestimating the part played by the national bourgeoisie in the struggle for economic and political independence in eastern countries. It was pointed out that these mistakes had resulted in the dialectical conception of the dual nature of the national bourgeoisie being replaced by a one-sided conception of it as the faithful ally of imperialism in the struggle against the working masses. From such a stand-point the political activity of the national bourgeoisie could only be represented as a series of vituperations, betrayals, and demagogic manoeuvres. Since the XXth Party Congress there have been several indications of a further change in the Soviet attitude towards countries outside the USSR in respect of what the

Party regards as "bourgeois nationalism". A useful summary of the present line can be found in a recently published pamphlet called *OBNOVLENNYY VOSTOK* (The Changed East) by I.Y. Podkopayev. It reads as follows:

"The history of the post-war years provided convincing evidence of the fact that among the many-sided revolutionary processes taking place in the east, two lines could be clearly distinguished in the development of the nationally independent states - one under the direction of the proletariat and its advance guard, the Communist parties, and the other under the control of the national bourgeoisie. Where the proletariat is in control of a state, it uses its commanding position to carry out sound social changes which have everywhere undermined the basis of the control of foreign capital and internal reaction, and have cleared the way for a swift forward movement on the road to socialism. The development of countries where the state power is in the hands of the national bourgeoisie under whose control political independence was achieved is different. Here, even after the imperialist yoke had been done away with, the capitalists and landowners aim at profiting as far as possible at the expense of the workers. While the progressive forces in these countries aim at going along the road of socialist progress and the reinforcement of national independence against the wishes of the imperialists, the internal reactionary forces, often instigated from outside by the imperialists, pursue a directly opposite policy. The state structure in these countries is naturally quite different from the state structure which has been established in countries of the socialist type. But as N.S. Khrushchev showed in his concluding speech at the XXIst Party Congress, although these states are not socialist, they cannot be treated in the same way as the states of the imperialist system. Having acquired national independence as a result of their struggle for freedom, they wish to go their own way, by-passing the capitalist stage of development, in order to finish with the colonial yoke and to rebuild their society on new foundations. It is precisely for these reasons that many statesmen of the sovereign states of the East are well disposed towards the socialist countries. Not only do they not regard them as antagonists and opponents of their aspirations towards the construction of the new life, without the imperialists and without the colonial yoke, but they are establishing with them the most friendly relations."

A particularly interesting feature of Mr. Podkopayev's pamphlet is that in enumerating the People's Democracies of the East he makes no mention whatever of the Mongolian People's Republic.

. . .

VESTNIK AKADEMII NAUK SSSR, No.12 of 1959, gives details of the establishment of an Institute of Africa as part of the Academy's Department of Historical Sciences. The tasks of this Institute are described as including "the study of the development of African countries which have gained independence; the political and economic situation in African colonies as this is developing during the collapse of the colonial system of imperialism, and the struggle of the oppressed people for national liberation; the peasant and labour movements in African countries; the study of the contradictions and new forms of colonialism among the imperialist powers; and the exposure of reactionary ideological trends." Dr. I.I. Potekhin, the well-known Soviet expert on African affairs, has been appointed director of the Institute.

For the purpose of analysing the now considerable Soviet output on Africa, CARC is shortly adding an African section to its monthly MIZAN NEWSLETTER. It is hoped to start this new series in June this year.

. . .

One of the matters on which Kazakh writers are sometimes at variance with the Party authorities is the extent of the part which the Kazakhs themselves should or do in fact play in the affairs of their republic. An instance of this recently came to light in an article called "A Vigorous Programme of Action" in PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN' KAZAKHSTANA, No.1 of 1960, on the subject of the new lands campaign. It appears that a certain Shamshatov recently wrote a brochure called "The Struggle of the Party Organization of Kazakhstan for the Mastery of the Virgin Lands" in which "he confuses his readers by cruelly distorting generally known facts. In defiance of the truth, he tries to show that the mastery of the new lands in Kazakhstan began, not after the historic plenum of the Central Committee of the KPSS in 1953, but apparently a long time before that." The article goes on to say: "By this very statement I. Shamshatov casts aspersions on the enormous part and the self-evident organizing activity of the Central Committee of the KPSS under the leadership of Comrade N.S. Khrushchev, the originator of the virgin lands plan. I. Shamshatov tries to present the all-nation

assault on virgin lands as 'a purely Kazakh' phenomenon; but it is well-known that the former leaders of the republic not only failed to exercise themselves in the mastery of the new lands but actually resisted the realization of this vast agricultural and political enterprise."

In this connexion, it is of some interest to recall that at the time of his dismissal Mr. Khrushchev described Shayakhmetov, the Party First Secretary, as an honest official but too weak to be left in charge of such an important republic. There was never any suggestion that he had "resisted the realization" of the virgin lands campaign.

The article concludes with an apology by the editors for their "most serious mistake" in publishing in No.11 of PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN' (1959) a favourable review of I. Shamshatov's "vicious brochure".

. . .

On 11 March 1960, the Central Asian Research Centre received a visit from Mr. K.M. Abdullayev, President of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences, and a well-known geologist. Mr. Abdullayev spent over an hour in the Centre. He was introduced to all the members of the staff and was shown the Centre's publications in which he displayed considerable interest. He was able to carry away an impression of the wide scope of the Centre's activities, including as they do linguistics, and cartography.

During his visit of several weeks to the United Kingdom, Mr. Abdullayev delivered an informal address at St. Antony's College Oxford on the Uzbeks and other peoples of Central Asia. After his address, he answered a number of questions and those present were impressed with the wide range of his knowledge and with the vivid picture which he gave of developments in Central Asia.

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF HISTORICAL STUDIES IN AZERBAIDZHAN IN THE SOVIET PERIOD

Medieval history and archaeology - Modern and current history -
General historical studies - Difficulties of historiography -
History of the Party.

The present article is an attempt to trace the growth of the study of the history of Azerbaydzhan as carried out in the Republic itself. The source material used consists of two articles by A.S. Sumbat-zade, the vice-president of the Azerbaydzhan Academy of Sciences, published in VOPROSY ISTORII during 1957 and 1959,* and of certain articles in KOMMUNIST and the Azerbaydzhan press on the history of the Party.

. . .

Before the Revolution there was no territorial division of Russia known as Azerbaydzhan, nor were the Azerbaydzhanis recognized as a distinct nation or community. They were usually referred to as Caucasian Tatars, Musulmans of the Caucasus, or simply as Muslims. (See CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, Vol.VII, No.2, 1959, p.133.) The study of the history of Soviet Azerbaydzhan and of the Azerbaydzhanis of the Soviet Union did not therefore begin until after the Revolution with the founding of the Azerbaydzhan State University in 1920. The Oriental Faculty of this University then began to teach the history of the country.

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- * 1. The Development of Historical Science in the Azerbaydzhan SSR during the Soviet Regime - VOPROSY ISTORII, No.11, 1957.
2. Historical Science in Azerbaydzhan between the XXth and XXIst Party Congresses and prospects for the future - VOPROSY ISTORII, No.10, 1959.

In 1923 a society for research into and study of Azerbaydzhan was founded, and became an important centre of local historical studies. The Institute of the History of the Party, attached to the Central Committee of the Azerbaydzhan Communist Party, was set up in 1928 and devoted itself in the first place to the translation and publication of the "classics of Marxism-Leninism". The codification and publication of local historical sources was the concern of the Azerbaydzhan State Scientific Research Institute founded in 1929 until the latter's embodiment in the Azerbaydzhan department of the Transcaucasian branch of the All-Union Academy of Sciences. Historical research and the publication of historical works was further extended in 1935, when a special Azerbaydzhan branch (filial) of the All-Union Academy was established, later, in 1945, to become the separate Azerbaydzhan Academy of Sciences. According to Sumbat-zade historical and related studies are now mainly concentrated in various institutes of the Academy of Sciences and particularly those of history, oriental studies, language and literature, architecture and art, and philosophy. The history of the Party continues to be studied in the special institute created for the purpose.

To the brief survey of the historical work carried out by the Academy of Sciences which follows, there has been added a short account of the recent work done by the Institute of the History of the Party.

Medieval history and archaeology

In view of the antiquity of Azerbaydzhan, archaeology is an important branch of historical research. In 1926-7 archaeological expeditions were working in the Nakhichevan¹ ASSR and the autonomous oblast of Highland Karabakh. Excavations were carried out in the Mil'skaya Step², Mingechaur and the Khanlar rayon. At Mingechaur fourteen occupation levels were discovered showing that the site was inhabited from the second millennium B.C. until the Middle Ages. The earlier excavations led to the identification of a number of ancient cultures and gave some background for determining their mutual relationship and chronological setting. This provided a framework for subsequent research, whose scope widened with the growth of the number of archaeologists in the country. Considerable progress has taken place since the last war; results obtained from the excavations of Mingechaur are being published and excavations of Kyul'tepe in the Nakhichevan¹ ASSR are going on. The examination of the pictures engraved on the rocks of Kobystan near Baku is progressing. They were discovered in 1939 and are believed to include work executed at various times between the end of the Stone Age and the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries A.D. A number of works on ancient Azerbaydzhan have been published but the history of Atropatene (fourth to second

centuries B.C.) and Transcaucasian Albania is still largely a blank.

In the 1920s and early 1930s works on medieval Azerbaydzhan began to appear. One of the pioneers was Bartol'd, who gave a series of lectures at the Azerbaydzhan University. At the same time work started on the publication of historical sources which were to serve as a basis of more thorough research; oriental source materials are still being published. Archaeology also plays an important part in the study of medieval history and the excavations at Kabala, Old Gyandzha (Gan'eh), Oren-kala, the palace of the Shirvan shahs at Baku and other sites have yielded important information on the life of medieval Azerbaydzhan. The study of numismatics is also being extended.

The interpretation of medieval history reflects the Marxist interests of the historians. Priority is given to social and economic history, and particularly to that of the ninth to thirteenth centuries, which period, according to Sumbat-zade, is "noteworthy owing to the expansion of feudal economy and culture in the countries of Central and South-West Asia". (VOP. IST., 1959, No. 10, p. 124.) But religious history of the same period is neglected, as well as of the seventh and eighth centuries when Azerbaydzhan formed part of the Arab caliphate. The seriousness of this omission is emphasized by Sumbat-zade; in his early article he comments that "the medievalists of our republic are faced with the task of further widening and deepening their research into the development of the early feudal and medieval towns, particularly between the ninth and the beginning of the thirteenth centuries, the history of class struggle in medieval Azerbaydzhan and of the culture of the Azerbaydzhani people. Special interest is attached to the work on dividing feudal relations in Azerbaydzhan into periods." (VOP. IST., 1957, p. 215.)

Modern and current history

As regards modern and current history, the chief subjects of research are the "unification" with Russia together with the political and economic background serving to justify the need for it; conditions in Tsarist Azerbaydzhan regarded from the point of view of the inevitability of the Revolution; the Revolution itself together with the Civil War; and finally, the happiness and tremendous achievements of the Azerbaydzhani people under the benevolent Soviet Government. The propaganda value placed upon history is shown by the special attention devoted to the occupation of the country by the British, Germans and Turks in 1918-19. The "foreign occupation" theme was particularly emphasized during the last war: "During the war", says Sumbat-zade, "the attention of the historians of our republic was absorbed by the history of the centuries of heroic war waged by the Azerbaydzhani people against foreign invaders. Our historians, Z.I.

Azerbaijan SSR

State Frontiers.
 --- Union Republic frontiers.
 Autonomous oblast frontiers.
 — Railways.

Scale: 0 25 50 75

Map of the Azerbaijan SSR and surrounding regions, showing major cities, administrative boundaries, and geographical features. The map includes labels for neighboring countries (Georgia, Armenia, Dagestan) and various cities within the Azerbaijan SSR, such as Baku, Sumgait, and Ganja. The Caspian Sea is visible to the east. The map is dated J.P. 1958.

Union Republic Frontiers.

Autonomous oblast' frontiers

Railways.



J. P. - 1958.

Ibragimov, Ye.A. Tokarzhevskiy, I.A. Guseynov, M.A. Kaziyeu, Z.I. Yampol'skiy, P.N. Valuyev and others, produced works devoted to the valour and bravery of the Azerbaydzhanis in their struggle against foreign invaders in the Middle Ages, and to the years of the united revolutionary struggle of the nations of our country against Tsarism, landowners and capitalists, amidst the flames of class battles of 1917-1920 and in the days of the Great Patriotic War. These works have helped to inspire the toilers of Azerbaydzhan, and above all our youth, with the spirit of whole-hearted devotion to our socialist country and the Communist Party." (1957, p.209.)

The writing of such works was aided by the publications of historical sources, their character largely conveying the purpose which they were to serve. Very important among these is the two-volume set of documents edited by I.P. Petrushevskiy in 1936(1), which throws light on the agrarian problems and the colonial policy of Tsarism in Azerbaydzhan.

After the war, according to Sumbat-zade, the historians' interests remained very much the same: "Much attention was paid to the history of the union of Azerbaydzhan with Russia and its significance for the Azerbaydzhani people. Some aspects of this problem were dealt with in [university students'] theses. Although their authors correctly estimated the progressive historical value of the union of Azerbaydzhan with Russia, their unmasking of the colonial policy of Tsarism in Azerbaydzhan was unsatisfactory. Many works and articles of our researchers dealt with the social and economic history of Azerbaydzhan in the nineteenth century. One of the main fields of our historians' researches was the study of the revolutionary struggle in Azerbaydzhan at the turn of the nineteenth century. Between 1946 and 1950 the Azerbaydzhan branch of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism alone published sixteen volumes of Trudy (Miscellaneous Studies), a considerable number of which were devoted to this problem." (1957, pp.211-12.) These activities were further encouraged by the need to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the first Russian Revolution and the fortieth of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1955 and 1957 respectively - for which, says Sumbat-zade, the historians prepared with "tremendous enthusiasm", their main theme being "the history of Soviet Azerbaydzhan, the heroic struggle of the Azerbaydzhan toilers for the triumph of the Soviets and the participation of the Azerbaydzhani people together with the other peoples of the Soviet Union under the leadership of the Communist Party in the construction of socialism and the gradual transition to Communism." (1957, p.212.) The anniversaries were marked by the increased output of such works as Kh.O. Alimirzoyev's SOVIET AZERBAYDZHAN - THE CHILD OF THE GREAT OCTOBER REVOLUTION; but in spite of this Sumbat-zade complained in his 1957 article that "too few fundamental works on revolutionary struggle in Azerbaydzhan have

been compiled and published" (p.216).

The "union" with Russia continues to be one of the main subjects of interest. A major work on it recently published was written by G.B. Abdullayev:(2) commenting on it Sumbat-zade writes: "The author. . . conclusively proves that as early as the second half of the eighteenth century quite a strong tendency of the Azerbaydzhani people to join fortunes with the Russian people became observable. The disintegration after the death of Fatali-khan of Kuba of the political union he had created (Kuba, Derbent, Baku, Shemakha, Sal'-yan etc.) and the resumption of the Persian invasions from the middle 1790s rendered the joining of Azerbaydzhani territory with Russia a pressing necessity." (1959, p.125.)

According to Sumbat-zade, the agrarian situation in Azerbaydzhan at the turn of the nineteenth century has received much attention in the past few years, its various aspects - particularly the significance of the "peasant reform" of 1870 - being more critically analysed. But he considers that the economy of Azerbaydzhan at the beginning of the present century as well as the history of its industry, transport and towns, require further investigation. In addition, some problems relating to the working-class have not been adequately dealt with, for the historians, as a rule, are interested chiefly in revolutionary movements and the class war and they neglect the material situation and the process of formation of the working-class, particularly in the provinces. Another neglected field of study is the history of the Azerbaydzhani multi-national bourgeoisie, which is important for a better understanding of the revolutionary and post-revolutionary period. One of the shortcomings - inadequate knowledge of the struggle of Azerbaydzhani toilers for the triumph of socialism and the gradual transition to Communism - has lately been remedied as a result of the campaign against survivals of the personality cult and dogmatism initiated by the XXth Congress of the Party in 1956. (1959, pp.127-8.)

General historical studies

In the development of historical studies a stage is inevitably reached which requires their synthesis in the form of a more or less authoritative general history. The expansion of historical research outlined above provides a background of this process in Azerbaydzhan. The first works of this type, by Ye.A. Pakhomov and V.M. Sysoyev, appeared in Baku in 1923 and 1925 respectively(3); apart from their various weak points which could hardly be avoided in view of the fact that historical studies were only beginning to develop at that time, the authors "frequently did not observe Marxist methodology". In 1928 another general history, by R. Ismailov, followed(4), but instead of pointing out its shortcomings due to the still inadequate knowledge of

history, Sumbat-zade believes that its most important fault is that "this work reflects bourgeois nationalist ideas" (1957, p.209). Another attempt was made in 1941 but this time the fault was its low standard of scholarship.(5) In 1946 the Institute of History of the republican Academy of Sciences produced another general history but again it proved inadequate(6); although it contained considerable factual material, like its predecessors it did not cover the Soviet period, and had a number of methodological errors and other serious though unspecified shortcomings. Thus the task had to be undertaken once more and in 1954 a two-volume draft (maket) was produced. It was the first work of its type to include the Soviet period and although it dealt with a number of important subjects including the heroic struggle of the national masses of Azerbaydzhan against foreign invaders, the century-old connexions of the country with Russia, the struggle for the victory of the Soviet regime and the participation of the Azerbaydzhani in the construction of socialism, there were factual mistakes as well as "erroneous appreciation of numerous vitally important problems of the history of Azerbaydzhan, transcribed from some monographs and other works" (1957, p.213). Now at last a three-volume history of the country edited by I.A. Guseynov, Sumbat-zade and others is being produced. The first volume, published in 1958 and covering Azerbaydzhani history from antiquity up to the "union" with Russia, represents a "Marxist-Leninist elucidation" of the subject which has so far escaped serious criticism. But Sumbat-zade comments: "It is, however, necessary to state that the historians of Azerbaydzhan do not pay enough attention to the study of Soviet Azerbaydzhan and the problems of the present time. One of the examples of this attitude is, first of all, the fact that the collective of authors and the editorial board of the three-volume history of Azerbaydzhan have ignored all the dates set for the preparation and publication of the third volume which should deal with the history of Soviet society in Azerbaydzhan. This is the more regrettable because in the coming year, 1960, the Azerbaydzhani people will celebrate the fortieth anniversary of the establishment of the Soviet Government in the republic." (1959, p.132.)

Difficulties of historiography

Sumbat-zade's two articles throw considerable light on the difficulties under which historians in Azerbaydzhan, as elsewhere in the USSR, must labour. The interdependence between historiography and the frequent anniversaries it must honour naturally lowers the quality of the former, as regards both scholarship and technical standards. Historical literature is also adversely affected by its long-term planning as if it were an industry: thus Sumbat-zade gives a long list of works to be published, some as late as 1965 (1959, p. 132), though it is likely that some of them have not yet been started

by the historians to whom they are assigned. Whether such planning takes into account the individual needs and difficulties in preparing each of these works, factors which are bound to affect the time allowed for their production, it is difficult to say. Yet another inevitable complication is to be found in the need for the historian to adapt his interpretation to the Party resolutions - for example, he must re-interpret various problems of recent history because the XXth Party Congress has condemned dogmatism and survivals of the cult of personality. It is no doubt for this reason that scholars, such as those engaged in the preparation of the three-volume history of Azerbaydzhani, prudently resort to the interpretation of the country's more distant past and remain insensitive even to the approaching fortieth anniversary of Soviet rule in their republic.

History of the Party

Research into the recent history of Azerbaydzhani is clearly a delicate task and offenders may suddenly find themselves the object of attacks not only by the local but even by the all-Union press. This fate befell a number of works recently published by the Azerbaydzhani Institute of the History of the Party. The approach of the storm was heralded by the plenum of the Azerbaydzhani Central Committee in June 1959 which in rather general terms declared that "all Party, trade union and Komsomol organizations are required to improve their conduct of international education of the toilers and particularly youth and decisively oppose even insignificant manifestations of nationalism and chauvinism wherever they appear. Lectures and debates must be held more frequently on the Leninist nationalities policy of the Communist Party, friendship of the Soviet peoples and the great achievements of the brotherly Soviet republics. It must continually be impressed on the workers that the Azerbaydzhani people owe all their successes to the wise leadership of the Communist Party and the fraternal help of the great Russian people and other Soviet peoples." (7) From this the next step was to put under scrutiny the work of the Institute as one of the most important sources of correct opinions and V.Yu. Akhundov deplored the fact that "interpretation of the history of the Azerbaydzhani Communist Party and the revolutionary movement in the republic is not free from distortion of historical facts or from lack of objectivism in explaining the historical role of individual persons." His speech also revealed that escapism was not limited to historians since "in the work of some writers, painters and composers a tendency is evident to depart from contemporary subjects and idealize various aspects of the past." (8)

The Institute of the History of the Party, attached to the Azerbaydzhani Central Committee, since its foundation in 1928 until recently limited its activities to the publication of the "classics of

Marxism-Leninism" in the vernacular. Recently, however, it has made an attempt to satisfy better the requirements of the Party and has published a number of works, some in association with the republican Academy of Sciences and the Board of Archives (Arkhivnoye upravleniye). It is curious that though some of these works were published as early as 1957, for example NOTES ON THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT OF THE AZER-BAYDZHANI PROLETARIAT, no objection seems to have been made to them until 1959, when they were suddenly attacked at the Azerbaydzhani plenum and denounced in such authoritative periodicals as the official journal of the Soviet Central Committee, KOMMUNIST (No.14), and PROBLEMS OF THE HISTORY OF THE KPSS (No.5). The criticism was faithfully repeated and even added to by the Azerbaydzhani Central Committee and reported in BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY (the organ of the Communist Party of Azerbaydzhani). The first volume of the HISTORY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF AZERBAYDZHAN (author not given), and NOTES ON THE HISTORY OF THE STRUGGLE OF THE AZERBAYDZHANI COMMUNIST PARTY FOR THE VICTORY OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT by M.S. Iskenderov (director of the Institute), both published in 1958, have been found particularly offensive. The following is a brief summary of the main points of criticism contained in KOMMUNIST and BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY.

Although the criticism in both papers is broadly speaking on the same lines, the Communist Party of Azerbaydzhani is plus royaliste que le roi, and is much more outspoken than the KPSS, which even sees some merit in Iskenderov's work. The main point of difference is that whereas the KOMMUNIST article says that Iskenderov's book properly connects events in Azerbaydzhani with those outside it, and shows how the local Party organizations carried out the directions of all Party Conferences and the Central Committee, and propagated the great ideas of Lenin, the BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY article says exactly the opposite. Both articles find that there are manifestations of nationalist narrow-mindedness, distortions of historical truth and idealization of various aspects of the past. Both books give an inaccurate description of the social and economic situation of Azerbaydzhani at the turn of the nineteenth century, and exaggerate the capitalist development of the Azerbaydzhani village. The last-mentioned error results in the pre-revolutionary backwardness of the country being understated and consequently the benefits derived from the Revolution.

Iskenderov is charged with failing to associate the history of the Revolution closely enough with the situation in the whole of Transcaucasia and does not show clearly enough the effort of the Bolsheviks to organize the toilers for the purpose of the common revolutionary struggle. Both criticisms emphasize the failure of the Azerbaydzhani Institute of the History of the Party to do justice to the work of "distinguished Bolsheviks" such as Stalin, Ordzhonikidze, Shaumian, Dzhaparidze, Knunyantz, Mirzoyan and Kirov (with the

exception of Kirov, all these are Georgians and Armenians, although this fact is not mentioned), and its over-glorification of Nariman Narimanov, an Azerbaydzhani, who, KOMMUNIST points out, committed many mistakes in realizing the nationality policy of the Party.

The official Party view is that both these books minimize the role of the Baku proletariat and the Russian working-class in the struggle to establish proletarian dictatorship in Azerbaydzhan. The nationalist interests of the authors of both books make them depart from the principal of proletarian internationalism in the working-class movement, and this results in their exaggeration of the independent role of the Azerbaydzhani Hemmat Party. Neither Iskenderov's book nor the History show the extent to which Transcaucasian workers, whatever their nationality, were united in the revolutionary struggle.

These official criticisms of the Institute of the History of the Party make it abundantly clear that the only correct interpretation of the history of the revolutionary period is one which show Azerbaydzhan as an indivisible part of Transcaucasia, attached for better or worse to Russia. The unpalatability of this notion to many national historians is no doubt one reason why they feel more comfortable when dealing with the more remote past.

Notes

- (1) KOLONIAL'NAYA POLITIKA ROSSIYSKOGO TSARIZMA V AZERBAYDZHANE V 20-60kh GG. XIX V.
- (2) IZ ISTORII SEVERO-VOSTOCHNOGO AZERBAYDZHANA V 60-80kh GG. XVIII V. Baku, 1958.
- (3) Ye.A. Pakhomov, KRATKIY KURS ISTORII AZERBAYDZHANA, Baku, 1923; Sysoyev, NACHAL'NYY OCHERK ISTORII AZERBAYDZHANA, Baku, 1925.
- (4) ISTORIYA AZERBAYDZHANA, Baku, 1928.
- (5) ISTORIYA AZERBAYDZHANA; author not given.
- (6) OCHERKI ISTORII AZERBAYDZHANA.
- (7) BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, 25.6.59.
- (8) Ibid., 11.7.59.

I S L A M I N A Z E R B A Y D Z H A N

The Soviet attitude towards the Muslim religion as practised in Azerbaydzhan has been the same as in other Muslim territories of the USSR. After stating, in the famous declaration of 5 December 1917, that Muslim beliefs and customs, national and cultural institutions, were to be forever free and inviolate, the Soviet regime proceeded to pursue a policy of implacable hostility to Islam not only on account of its supernatural beliefs, but because of its way of life which militated against material progress and productivity. With only occasional lapses, such as during the Second World War and for a time during 1955 and 1956, anti-Islamic propaganda has been steadily maintained. It has, however, varied considerably in quality and intensity: it began with crude and violent denunciations and ridicule of Muslim beliefs and customs; this, however, was early disapproved of by Lenin, who advocated the exploding of what he regarded as religious fantasies and superstition by scientific argument and demonstration.

Islam reached what is now the Azerbaydzhan USSR in the middle of the seventh century. As elsewhere, it quickly ousted the existing religion, in this instance Zoroastrianism, but retained many of its superstitions and part of its mythology. Its development, however, differed in some respects from that in Central Asia. It was more inclined to fanaticism, partly because of the presence of Shiism and the violence associated with the Shii observance of the month of Moharram, and partly because of the close proximity of the Christian nations of Armenia and Georgia. Even before the Revolution, the more fanatical practices of Islam were disapproved of and condemned, not so much by the Russian rulers of Transcaucasia, as by the more enlightened element of the Muslim population. A pioneer in this respect was EGINCHI, a periodical which began publication in 1875, and this was joined later by another magazine, MOLLA NASREDDIN (see CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, Vol.VIII, No.1 p.14); but the traditional beliefs and practices of the population were difficult to suppress, and they survived to become an embarrassment to the Soviet regime.

The Soviet-Muslim rapprochement following on the declaration of 1917 did not last long. In 1922 the Commissariat of Nationalities divided the Muslim peoples into several categories according to their disposition to accept atheistic propaganda. The nomadic peoples were believed to be most suitable owing to the absence of religious

fanaticism among them, while those with a large bourgeoisie, such as the Uzbeks, were found to be the least susceptible; the Azerbaydzhanis occupied the fifth place after the Volga Tatars, Bashkirs, Kirgiz and Crimean Muslims.

The resistance of some republics to atheism was acknowledged in early Soviet legislation. The 1923 constitution of Azerbaydzhani included a clause concerning the separation of Church and State since the country was then part of the Transcaucasian Federation, but this clause was not modified by special decrees as it was in Armenia and Georgia. Voting rights were not uniform throughout the Soviet Union; while in the Christian republics the clergy could neither vote nor be elected, in Azerbaydzhani a special decree conferred this right on the mullas.⁽¹⁾ Muslim religious courts were not suppressed in Turkmenistan and the Caucasus until 1927 and this was the prelude to a general attack against religion in the ensuing period of collectivization and industrialization. It is interesting to note that a textbook on literature by Shaik, an Azerbaydzhani poet and teacher, which declared that "culture imbued with atheism is the greatest evil for mankind" continued to be used in the Azerbaydzhani schools until 1927. It was then attacked at the XVIth Party conference by Ali Gaydar Karayev⁽²⁾, who played an important part in the sovietization of the country. Karayev was liquidated in the purges of the 1930s.

Anti-religious propaganda had a difficult task before it. School-children covered their ears in order not to hear atheist harangues, and many Party members attended all religious services. Some teachers included religious knowledge in their lectures and there were peasants, especially in the Nakhichevan' ASSR, who either refused to take confiscated land or returned it to the rightful owners because they considered it immoral to accept illegally confiscated property. Such incidents were reported by the Azerbaydzhani press of 1928.⁽³⁾

As regards Muslim religious ceremonies, observance of Moharram was particularly difficult to suppress and the campaign against it was at its height in 1925-8, with the press as its main instrument. It is necessary in this connexion to remember the significance of Hosain in the Shiite cult - to swear by Hosain or his brother, Hazrat Abbas, was more than to take an oath in Allah's name. Thus the Bolsheviks had to destroy the belief in Hosain's sanctity, and the battle of Kerbela was exploited to interpret the origin and early history of Islam in purely materialistic and economic terms. Popular stories about the battle, which mixed fact with fiction, were now employed by the Bolsheviks to destroy its religious significance - for example, it was popularly believed that Ashura, the tenth day of the month of Moharram, lasted seventy-two hours - to emphasize Hosain's suffering - and this point was much ridiculed by "scientific atheists". Before the beginning of

Moharram special courses for propagandists were held in order to instruct them how to enlighten the population, and satirical periodicals, including MOLLA NASREDDIN, devoted their whole attention to the coming event. The campaign could boast a measure of success - thus ZARYA VOSTOKA of 25.7.25 reported that mourning processions in Gandzha had become much smaller, while on 12.8.25 BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY added that attendance at mosques had dropped by 50 per cent and there were no street processions in Baku. But the same paper of 3.8.25 stated that some old Party members had attended the Moharram ceremonies and said they had no idea that this was incompatible with their Party membership. The campaign widened in the following year when women began to take part in the activities of the Society of Atheists. By 1929, so far as can be inferred from the press, the most spectacular forms of mourning had largely disappeared, although some processions were held even in the Baku area and a procession at Bala Oglan, Kubin province, turned into an anti-Soviet demonstration. The authorities interpreted it as an attempt to help the mullas who were embittered by the confiscation of their "surplus bread", and the leader of the procession, Molla Daniar, was shot and twelve other men sentenced to forced labour.

Other religious observances were also attacked, though not as violently as Moharram. Chief among them was the fast of Ramazan (ninth month of the lunar year). Although the Koran excused the sick, travellers, children and pregnant women from this duty, the Bolsheviks condemned it outright, apparently because "in the Soviet republics, where human work and strength have a high value, such a harmful practice as orudzh (fast) cannot be tolerated any longer, for here the obligation of workers is clear: to develop our industry and to increase production in order to free us from the supremacy of foreign industry and not to bow before world capitalism." (K. 4.3.27.) Other religious feasts were also condemned, particularly Kurban-Bayram commemorating the sacrifice of a ram by Abraham ("that heritage of idolatry and paganism encouraged by the mullas" involving mass sacrifice of rams at Mecca) and Nauruz-Bayram which in fact was a pre-Islamic spring festival to celebrate the beginning of the new year.

The Azerbaydzhan branch of the Union of Militant Atheists (SVB) had been set up in the last months of 1924, and in the following March an SVB organization was set up in Baku in order to "unite all class-conscious workers and peasants in an active campaign to bring about the spiritual liberation of the workers from the narcotic of religion and to replace it with a scientific, materialistic outlook." (BR. 14.4.25.) But the SVB did not achieve any noticeable success, although its members kept increasing so that by the end of March 1926 these numbered between 1,200 and 1,400. The Azerbaydzhani evidently gave it little support since by May of the same year only 25 of them had completed its three-month anti-religious courses. (K. 9.5.26.) It was not until the

second half of 1928 that it could expand its activities in the countryside. The number of its native members also kept increasing and in 1927 the SVB could boast 25 per cent of Azerbaydzhanis (12 per cent in 1926) among its 3,000 members, and there were 36 of them among the 73 people who had completed the atheist courses. (K. 29.5.27.) After a large increase of membership in the early 1930s, the SVB seems to have declined in the following years and on 12.4.1937 BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY complained that "in a number of establishments, sovkhoses and kolkhoses, atheist cells no longer exist and the chairman of the Azerbaydzhani SVB, Khulufu, has turned out to be an enemy of the people". (BR. 12.4.37.) He was promptly liquidated. The contemporary press reveals that the situation was much the same throughout the Soviet Union. Literary anti-religious propaganda also left much to be desired and the Azerbaydzhani press criticized its quality: books and pamphlets were few and original works constituted a very insignificant proportion, for they were mainly translations unsuitable from the point of view of Muslim needs, with the exception of theoretical discussions on the nature of religion.

In 1921-2 the Komsomols had begun to close mosques, apparently with the authorities' approval, but such measures were condemned by the XIIIth Congress of the Party in 1924. Soon afterwards announcements began to appear in the press about the conversion of mosques into schools, clubs and other public institutions. The process was speeded up during the general attack on religion in the later 1920s; thus in 1928 in Shemakha 13 of those "nests of owls, centres of obscurantism", as they were officially branded, were demolished and the material used to build a theatre while in the Agdash rayon 36 mosques were turned into cultural establishments. (K. 30.12.28, 4.2.29.) This was allegedly done at the request of the Azerbaydzhani workers, but in KOMMUNIST of 19.10.29, S.M. Efendiyev, chairman of the Azerbaydzhani Central Committee thus described the campaign: "Instead of conducting a well-planned and normal struggle against religion, it all comes to the confiscation of mosques. On one occasion something like socialist competition was launched in the villages, namely 'who will confiscate the most mosques'." (K. 22.10.29.) But the process went on until the last war, the chief mosques of Baku, the Taza-Pir, Memedli, Khadzhi Baba and Kasim-bey preserving their religious character until 1935.

In 1928 a direct attack on Islam started under the leadership of Mustafa Kuliyeu, the well-known Commissar of Education. This campaign, described as a "cultural revolution", had the following objects: eradication of all religious sentiments among the Party members, extension of the anti-religious activities of the Party, reorganization and further development of the SVB, intensification of the struggle against the kulaks who upheld religion in the countryside, and the improvement of atheist instruction in the schools and of atheist

literature.

In June 1928 the press began to publish Kuliyeu's report on "The Cultural Revolution and Islam" where he "scientifically" refuted the dogmatic side of Islam. He also conducted public debates in which the mullas were invited to defend their beliefs; but most of them did not attend and their absence was ascribed to the barrenness of these beliefs.

At the same time the wearing of the Caucasian fur hats by men and of veils by women was condemned by Kuliyeu, and in October 1929 Efendiyev thus criticized the measures taken against the offending garments: "All these enforced reforms carried out by police measures, have created a very bad situation. Instead of destroying the medrasahs and maktabas which still survive in some parts of Azerbaydzhan (Zakataly okrug), our Peoples' Commissariat of Education forbids men in fur hats and veiled women to enter theatres. . . We are faced with the tremendous task of liberating the Turkic women (tyurchanki) and combating religious fanaticism; but our struggle against these manifestations has too often been conducted not by means of culture and enlightenment but by administrative measures. . . This [confiscation of mosques] together with the forcible unveiling of women and the solemn auto-da-fé of the peasant fur hats (in the Lenkoran' district), the unwilling substitution of a red kerchief for the veil and a cap for the fur hat - 'reforms' which the peasants could not understand - has produced discontent and passive resistance among the backward peasantry, and this has enabled the mullas and kulaks to mobilize dark forces against the Soviets." (K. 22.10.29.) He said further that in spite of all the propaganda, polygamy still flourished in the country, and marriages of minors and forced marriages, weddings before both the civil authorities and the mullas and other "survivals" were still practised. The press denounced some rayons whose population was particularly hostile to the anti-religious measures and in the Zakataly rayon the chairman of the rayon executive committee, a keen opponent of superstition, was assassinated.

After 1932-3 the attack on religion became less severe, only to be resumed in 1937 when a new wave of measures against the Christian and Muslim clergy started. The anti-religious campaign was called off during the last war but on 23.6.54 PRAVDA proclaimed the end of the truce which at one time had been necessary owing to the external situation. In a decree of 10 November 1954 it was emphasized that the campaign was to be continued on scientific lines.

The present position of religion in Azerbaydzhan is difficult to ascertain. Articles in the press are concerned chiefly with two problems: to represent the clergy as disreputable characters who, in

order not to work for a living, prey upon the credulity of the backward part of the population, and to ridicule the "mad fringe" of religion in the form of gross superstition which in fact can be associated with Islam as much as with any other creed or with no religion at all. Articles concerned with reasoned argument against the supernatural are few compared with the two types mentioned above and they usually contain some stereotyped political argument about religion - often a variation of the theme that "throughout the history of mankind religion has been used by the ruling classes to enslave and oppress the workers" and to this same end it is now employed by the enemies of socialism.

BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY of 14.12.58 criticizes the poor quality of the scientific-atheist propaganda in Azerbaydzhan and points out that the Baku branch of the Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge, founded in May 1956, has not achieved much success so far. "Our scientific-atheist propaganda is not systematic and does not consider the requirements of the listeners; in some establishments and kolkhozes it is not carried on at all and it has no clear plan. . . . Our propaganda does not competently and convincingly show how harmful religion is to the task of building Communism and it lacks a clear and factual method of proving that the revelations of science concerning the evolution of nature and society are irrefutable." These shortcomings are found to be largely due to the bad organization of the Baku branch of the Society: it does not choose proper topics for its lectures and only four of its lecturers can discuss such an important problem as the class nature of Islam. Many rayon scientific-atheist sections work very badly if at all - for example, no lectures are given in the settlements of the Apsheronskiy peninsula where religious ceremonies are quite frequent - while some rayons still do not have scientific-atheist sections of the Society. In the Il'khychy village (Khachmas rayon) even young people take part in the Moharram processions and observe Ramazan. (BR. 14.10.59.) In Baku itself propaganda is more efficient. Public lectures are given regularly, the scientific-atheist ones constituting 30 per cent of all those delivered during a period of eleven months (BR. 17.12.58), but their quality should be improved. In libraries, schools and clubs popular exhibitions are open to show the anti-scientific nature of religion and films of this type are demonstrated. But the higher educational establishments of the city do not do enough of this propaganda and some of the agitation stations (agitpunkty) neglect it. The same is true of the atheist education provided by crèches, schools, tekhnikums and VUZ. The Azerbaydzhan State University organizes scientific-atheist lectures both in its lecture rooms and in three students' hostels, but its work is hindered by the fact that some of its students, particularly the first year ones, are still "enslaved by religious superstitions" for which their families and the schools they come from are to blame.

The failure of atheist propaganda is responsible for the fact that superstitions still flourish, particularly in the country areas. Thus in the Safaraliyev rayon rumour spread that on the Pir-ilan mountain there lived a white viper which could cure all human illness. In order to secure its favour there had to be left on the mountain an offering consisting of a cake baked with the milk of a cow which had had one calf, together with a sum of money. In return for the latter a handful of herbs could be picked which would cure all human ills. People began to flock there from all over the Dzheyran-Chel'skaya steppe, the number of the supernatural inhabitants of the mountain meanwhile growing to two in their imagination, for it turned out that there was also a hairy black viper with a fiery tongue. It was not safe to ridicule the "miracles" for a local shepherd swore that one Mamed Ali of El'dara was punished for his disbelief by being fatally bitten by the white viper. (BR. 4.1.59.)

Some villages of the Kedabek rayon are hotbeds of obscurantism: in the village of Novo-Ivanovka there are five Christian sects, each with a house of prayer, and seven kilometres away, at Novo-Saratovka, the situation is the same. Local Muslims are also active: in 1958 the kolkhozes suffered from prolonged drought followed in the autumn by hailstorms. In these circumstances a "message from the Imamzade" (shrine) appeared in the form of a letter saying that the Imamzade demanded sacrifices in order to avert the coming plague; everybody who had received the "message" had to make and distribute seven copies of it. It also reached the Tauz rayon where in the Sabir kolkhoz it so profoundly impressed one Kara, an illiterate man with a shady past, that he became a mulla and now no funeral or Moharram procession can be held in the rayon without his competent help. During Moharram part of the population stop work in order to take part in the procession and the clergy can even induce women to burn themselves to death. (BR. 12.12.58.)

The case of Kara mentioned above is typical of the attitude of the press to the clergy and other people associated with religion: if the religion they represent cannot be destroyed, let the people see how disreputable the religious leaders are. The cult of the white viper was fostered by various women who told fortunes from coffee grains, and the result was that the Pir-ilan was littered with rags in which people had brought their offerings; but the offerings themselves promptly disappeared. Ali Allakhverdi ogly Ragimov, a lawyer by profession, wanted an easy living and had become a Baptist. By intrigue he supplanted a Russian woman, head of the Kirovabad Baptists, and himself became their "holy father". (BR. 19.5.59.) Magomed, the mulla of the Kirovabad mosque, used to be a cobbler; he knows little about religion and is invariably drunk while preaching in his mosque. Mir-Mamed Seidov and Aziz Babayev, mullas of the Nus-

Nus mosque at Ordubad, have extorted large sums of money from the faithful. (BR. 14.10.59.) There are even female mullas - Khadzhar Safarova of Baku is very popular with women who visit her in large numbers, particularly on religious feast days; she reads for them passages from the Koran which contain extravagant promises to the "humble" and on days of mourning she sheds tears with them. She charges 10-20 rubles for a "seance" and she appreciates such inventions of science as the radio or the tape-recorder. If she is too busy (for she "goes on tour" to various rayons), she puts the tape-recorder on and her clients piously listen as it recites, Bismillah arrahman arrahim. (BR. 26.9.59.)

Typical of this campaign of denigration of the Muslim clergy, and of the many charlatans who represent themselves as clergy, is the September issue of a satirical magazine called KIRPI, which is highly praised in BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY of 30.9.59. The cover of this carries a caricature showing the hypocrisy of the "modern mullas" who extort gifts from their flocks, while on the back is a picture showing "one of the Faithful" - a hooligan, speculator and drunkard whose lugubrious countenance is assumed in order to camouflage his sins. The issue contains some of Sabir's anti-clerical verses and various articles designed to unmask the moral decrepitude of the mullas. One in particular describes how a mulla invented a new "holy place" in order to extract gifts from his parishioners, his victims including the head of a kolkhoz and the headmaster of the village school.

It is not easy to reconcile the state of affairs apparently still existing in the relatively advanced republic of Azerbaydzhan with the Soviet claims to have eradicated illiteracy and to have advanced far beyond the primitive cultural conditions still prevailing in non-Soviet eastern countries. Two explanations of this contradiction are currently advanced by Western students of the Soviet-Muslim republics. One is that cultural regimentation has produced in many Soviet Muslims a kind of split personality. Thus, for instance, a Muslim Party official may see nothing illogical in secluding his own wife and at the same time carrying on a vigorous campaign against the seclusion of women in general. Another theory is that the Muslims obstinately adhere to out-of-date superstitions and customs not so much because they believe in them as because they feel, perhaps subconsciously, that this is the only way left to them of opposing the unwanted Soviet campaign of modernization.

Sources

1. See text and Notes below.
2. ANTIISLAMSKAYA PROPAGANDA I EYE METODY V AZERBAYDZHANE.
Dzheykhun Khadzhibeyli, Institute for the Study of the USSR,
Munich, 1959.

Notes

- (1) P.V. Gudulyanov, OTDELENIYE TSERKVI OT GOSUDARSTVA. Moscow,
1926, pp.277-80.
- (2) KOMMUNIST (an Azerbaydzhani paper of Baku), 3.1.27.
- (3) BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, 6.8.26; KOMMUNIST, 28.7.28.

New name for a mountain

By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Tadzhik SSR of 19 January 1960 a nameless peak of the Kukhi-Frush mountains, 4545 metres above sea-level, has been called Julius Fuchik, after the Czech national hero. I. 20.1.60

Excavator for Ethiopia

The first machine built in Azerbaydzhan to be sent to Ethiopia is a mechanical excavator (mekhanicheskiy yamokopatel'). Before being sold there it is to be exhibited in Addis-Ababa. In the first quarter of 1960 Azerbaydzhan is to send equipment of various kinds to six international fairs and exhibitions. BR. 24.1.60

THE KAZAKH EPIC wins a medal

KAZAKHSKIY EPOS (The Kazakh Epic), published by the Kazakh State Publishing House of Literature, won for Yevgeniy Sidorkin, who designed it, a bronze medal at the Leipzig International Exhibition of the Art of the Book. KP. 21.1.60

I R R I G A T I O N I N C E N T R A L A S I A

PART TWO

Part One of this article, which appeared in the last number of CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, gave a general description of the water resources of Central Asia. The following part describes major irrigation works which have been completed within the last three years or are still under construction. In some cases, however, it is difficult to decide whether the work described refers to the present or the future (for example, the Irtysh-Karaganda Canal), while in others schemes previously described as completed appear to be still in progress.

As is to be expected in areas where rapid development is in progress many of the places where construction is proceeding are too small to be mentioned in existing maps. Wherever possible some indication of their whereabouts is given.


A list of articles on irrigation in Central Asia which have previously appeared in CAR, and which may be of help to readers as in some instances they go into greater detail of individual projects (for example, the Karakum Canal), is given at the end.

. . .

I. Turkmenistan

The Karakum Canal

In February 1959 the Amu-Dar'ya waters reached the Murgab oasis through the first sector (400 km. long) of the Karakum Canal. Some of the obstacles to the efficient working of this sector (see "The Progress of the Kara-Kum Canal, 1957-8." CAR, Vol.VII, No.1), have now been solved. One of them is that of silt and sand. The Amu-Dar'ya carries 250m. cubic metres of deposits per year and 8m. of these enter the canal. This is why the canal starts in the form of three wide branches, which



Completed.
 Under construction.
 Projected.

KARAKUM CANAL

16 0 16 32 48 64 80 kms.

are more difficult to block up. A quarter of the deposits is detained in these branches and seventeen excavating pumps continually remove it. The rest of the silt settles in the Kelif lakes so that after Lake Chaksak, the last of them, the water of the canal is clear. Three of the lakes have already ceased to exist owing to the deposits. This is good because in the large area of the Kelif lakes much water is lost in evaporation. To remedy this it is also intended to narrow and straighten the bed of the canal, for at present the situation is that only a third of the Amu-Dar'ya waters enters the Murgab oasis, the rest being lost in irrigation, evaporation and filtration. The last takes place mainly in the sector below Lake Chaksak where the canal crosses an area of sand.

The maximum width of the canal is 50 metres but the part which passes through the Kelif lakes is much wider. The Kelif Uzboy is in fact the bed of an old tributary of the Amu-Dar'ya, the Balkh, which has been swallowed up by the Karakum so that only eight lakes connected by narrow channels remain. Now that the Amu-Dar'ya water has returned to them, life has reappeared on the lakes, which are overgrown with reeds and water-plants and swarm with birds. But the water plants are a serious problem: in the spring of 1958 the water nearly reached the Murgab delta, then turned back owing to the masses of water plants in the canal. One of them is a type of pondweed which, if allowed to spread, can stop the flow. Tractors were employed to pull it from the bed of the canal and special floating cutting machines were used. This proved very expensive and the following alternative method has been devised. In Chinese rivers there lives a species of fish, belyy amur (ctenopharyngodon idella), which feeds on water plants. Its peculiarity is a very short alimentary canal so that in summer an adult fish eats a kilogramme of plants per kilogramme of its own weight a day, and some specimens weigh 40 and 50 kilogrammes. In 1959, 100,000 young fish were to be imported from China and it has been calculated that by the summer of 1960 they will consume the same amount of plants per day. Not only will they clear the canal, but pisciculture will develop at the same time.

In the course of the present Seven-Year Plan (1958-65) work will start on the second sector of the canal (140 km.), between the Murgab and the Tedzhen. It will irrigate 100,000 ha. in the Tedzhen oasis and flow on towards the foothills of the Kopet-Dag.

Reservoirs

Sary-Yazy: In the coming years the irrigation network connected with the first sector of the Karakum canal will be completed. At the same time all works connected with the Sary-Yazy reservoir, con-

structed in 1958 on the Murgab near the Sary-Yazy railway station, will be finished. The reservoir (capacity 250m. cubic metres) will be fed from the Murgab and serve to irrigate cotton plantations. Together with the Karakum canal it will allow the further development of agriculture in the Mary oblast, which will then become one of the more important centres of production of fine fibre cotton in the Soviet Union.

Tedzhen: The Tedzhen river carries 90 per cent of its annual flow in spring when the snow melts in the mountains. To remedy the shortage of water in summer, the Tedzhen reservoir was constructed in 1950. This preserved the spring flood waters for irrigation in the following months. But the reservoir is too small and already full of sand and silt, and much good land in the area still lies waste owing to the shortage of water. A second Tedzhen reservoir holding 180m. cubic metres of water is under construction, and this will enable cotton production to be developed in the Tedzhen basin. It is expected to be finished about 1961.

Khor-Khor: The river will also feed two other reservoirs. One of these is the Khor-Khor in the Serakhs rayon, which in April 1959 was reported as almost completed. The rayon depended on the Tedzhen for water and owing to shortage the local kolkhozes had to plant their cotton in the Tedzhen rayon, 160-70 km. from home. This meant that from early spring until late in the autumn the kolkhozniks had to work in another rayon and the transportation of machinery and fertilizers was very expensive. The Khor-Khor reservoir will enable them to grow cotton in their own rayon and the kolkhozes in the Tedzhen rayon will have more arable land.

Khan-Khauz: The other reservoir is the Khan-Khauz, between the Murgab and the Tedzhen, which will be connected with the Karakum Canal. The canal carries the same amount of water throughout the year while the irrigation networks in the Murgab-Tedzhen zone need it mainly in spring and summer. As regards the Tedzhen, the two Tedzhen and the projected Pulli-Khatum reservoirs are not enough to keep the flow under control, especially in years particularly abundant in water. A "hydro-knot" above the first Tedzhen reservoir will direct the superfluous spring floodwater to the Khan-Khauz reservoir, which will also be fed by the winter flow of the Karakum Canal. Thus the canal and the Tedzhen will be fully exploited for irrigation. The Khan-Khauz will hold 1,300m. cubic metres of water, allow the irrigated zone to be expanded to 200-250,000 ha. and enable pisciculture to be started on a large scale; sovkhoses specializing in breeding waterfowl will also be founded. The reservoir will be completed during the next ten years.

II. Tadzhikistan

The Kayrak-Kum "hydro-knot"

The Friendship of Nations (Druzhba-Narodov) Kayrak-Kum hydroelectric power-station on the "Tadzhik sea" (Kayrak-Kum reservoir) (see Part One of this article, CAR, Vol.VIII, No.1, p.49), plays an extremely important part in the further development of irrigation in northern Tadzhikistan. The reservoir feeds twelve networks irrigating the lower-lying districts of Tadzhikistan and in the next few years the cultivated area will further expand in the Samgar and Dal'verzin regions as well as the lands on the lower reaches of the Khodzha-Bakirgan where the construction of canals is going on. In June 1956 the Soviet Tadzhikistan Canal in Dal'verzin began to function. A new administrative rayon - Matcha - has been set up in the newly reclaimed lands to which the inhabitants of the old mountain settlement of the same name have moved. For the first time in their history they have begun to plant cotton, vegetables and melons, and their success is apparent when the income of the Matcha kolkhozes in 1956, about 3m. rubles, is compared with that in the following year - 11m. rubles.

Between April 1958-May 1959 the Samgar pumping station on the Kayrak-Kum reservoir came into operation. It raises water to a height of 56 metres to irrigate the Samgar region. About the same time the Khodzha-Bakirgan floating pumping station was put into operation; it raises water to 51 metres and drives it to the last part of the Great Fergana Canal. It irrigates the Leninabad rayon where 10,000 ha. of waste land will be reclaimed. Previously the Great Fergana Canal irrigated the Leninabad and Kanibadam rayons in northern Tadzhikistan, but now all its water will be used by the latter rayon, the former being irrigated from the Kayrak-Kum. The Samgar region will be fully reclaimed after 250 km. of canals and 860 installations have been constructed. Eventually the Samgar pumping station will raise water to 134 metres and irrigate 10,000 ha., while the Khodzha-Bakirgan station, when completed, will pump water to the level of 120 metres and irrigate 23,000 ha. of new land; it will also adequately supply with water the kolkhozes of the Leninabad, Proletarsk and Nau rayons as well as the Lyaylyakskiy rayon of Kirgizia.

Reservoirs and canals

Muminabad: The Kulyab and Aral rayons in southern Tadzhikistan used to suffer from a shortage of water, for the Yakh-Su and the Kyzyl-Su rivers had very little water in summer while, on the other hand, there was a considerable wastage in spring. In 1957 work started on the Muminabad reservoir for conserving melted snow. It lies in a

hollow of the same name and is surrounded by the mountains except on the north-western side where the Obi-Shur, a tributary of the Yakh-Su flows through a deep canyon. A dam 1,338 metres long and up to 35 metres high has been constructed on the Obi-Shur and its reservoir holds 24m. cubic metres of water. It is fed from the Obi-Shur and the Obi-Surkh, another tributary of the Yakh-Su, via the Kylyulyu Canal which is 12 km. long. In the summer of 1959 the Muminabad reservoir was for the first time used to irrigate the cotton plantations of the local kolkhozes.


Dagana-Say reservoir and canal improvements: The Ura-Tyube rayon has good land and its grapes are very well known, but large areas lie waste owing to the shortage of water. The Bazandor Canal, fed from the river Dagana-Say, irrigates only 1,200 ha. The situation will be remedied by the new Dagana-Say reservoir near the village of Ganchi. A new dam is being built at the point where the Bazandor Canal joins the Dagana-Say and the reservoir will hold 3.5m. cubic meters of water. It will irrigate over 11,000 ha. of kolkhoz fields. The Bazandor Canal will carry enough water to irrigate 6,000 ha.; the existing Yukoroganchi Canal will be widened and extended to 12 km.; it will be fed from the Dagana-Say reservoir and irrigate 1,000 ha. instead of the present 120. The Gaz Canal will also receive water from the reservoir and irrigate 2,000 ha. Other irrigation networks will also be constructed in the Ura-Tyube and Shakhristan rayons, with the result that 28,000 ha. in the former and 6,000 in the latter will receive water; 70 per cent of the area will be put under orchards and vineyards.

Little Beshkent Canal: The Beshkent steppe in the Shaartuz rayon has very good soil which lay waste until at the beginning of 1959 reclamation started with the construction of the Little Beshkent Canal. By the end of the year this will already irrigate 2,000 ha. of virgin land. Reclamation will go on and by 1961, 5,000 ha. will have been brought under cultivation and irrigation will extend to 8,000 ha. of pasture.


III. Uzbekistan

The Great Fergana Canal

In 1957 the sector of the Great Fergana Canal between Kuygan-Yar and the Yaz"yavan break (sbros) was widened, with the result that 100 cubic metres of water per second instead of the former 70 began to flow through it. This allowed more water for 30,000 ha. of arable land in the Fergana oblast. In 1958 widening started between the Yaz"yavan break and the Pervomayskoye partitioning installation (peregrozhiyayush-chee sooruzheniye) in the Kuybyshevo rayon, a distance of 43 km.



Specialy drawn for the Central Asian Research Centre.-1956. - J.P.



By 25 February 1959 work was to be finished and in the following summer rayons in the Fergana and Kokand region were to have adequate water supplies. The widening is to continue and 100,000 ha. of waste land will be brought into cultivation during the current Seven-Year Plan. The amount of water will be further increased when a 15 km. canal, started in 1958, begins working. It starts at Uch-Kurgan and will feed both the irrigation networks in the Namangan oblast and the upper part of the Great Fergana Canal.

Amu-Karakul' Canal

Along the Zeravshan lie three fertile oases: Samarkand, Bukhara and Karakul', but the river cannot adequately irrigate them, particularly the Karakul' oasis. In 1959 construction began of the Amu-

Karakul' Canal which starts on the Amu-Dar'ya above Chardzhou railway bridge and crosses the Kyzylkum in the north-eastern direction towards Karakul', a distance of 54 km. It will carry 50 cubic metres per second of the Amu-Dar'ya waters, which is enough to irrigate 25,000 ha. of arable land in the Alat and Karakul' rayons as well as 15,000 ha. of waste land which is to be reclaimed.

The Kokand "hydro-knot"

The rayons in the Kokand region have very fertile soil which could not be adequately exploited owing to the shortage of water. The rayons depend on the river Sokh which does not provide enough water during the growing season. A solution has been found in the construction of the Kokand "hydro-knot" which collects all the Sokh water for irrigation. Construction started in 1957 with the erection of a dam and by March 1959 the "hydro-knot" was completed. It has a sedimentation reservoir which occupies an area of 20 ha. and can accommodate 640,000 cubic metres of deposits so that it will be usable for 25 years. The "hydro-knot" feeds the left- and right-bank canals. Water flows through the former at the rate of 120 cubic metres per second and enters four main canals which irrigate the Gorskoye, Frunze and Uzbekistanskiy rayons. The right-bank canal serves a wider area: its four branches water the Leningradskiy and Buvaydinskiy rayons and feed the Great Fergana Canal. The Kokand and "hydro-knot" will eventually irrigate over 60,000 ha.

Reservoirs

In the Chirchik-Angren basin irrigation will improve with the completion in 1960 of the Tyuya-Buguz reservoir (originally due to be ready in 1957 - see CAR, Vol.V, No.3, p.280). It will supply the cultivated lands with sufficient water from the Angren and allow 20,000 ha. to be reclaimed.

In the Surkhan-Dar'ya oblast the main source of water is the river Surkhan-Dar'ya which, again, floods in spring and has too little water in summer. In 1958 a reservoir to collect the floodwater was started near the Kzyl Oktyabr' railway station. It will hold 900m. cubic metres of water, its area being 64 square kilometres, and irrigate 150,000 ha. Cotton plantations will appear in what is now desert.

In the neighbouring Kashka-Dar'ya oblast the Chim-Kurgan reservoir is being built to regulate the flow of the river Kashka-Dar'ya. The oblast will be given additional water from the Zeravshan via the new Iski-Angar Canal. Work will probably be finished in 1960-1.

Other projects

In Khorezm and Kara-Kalpakia the Amu-Dar'ya causes great damage every year when it bursts its banks and dams, flooding fields and pastures in the adjoining rayons. The situation will be considerably improved by the straightening of the river-bed. At Yesbergen-Chaganak, where the river makes two big bends and destroys the dykes in summer, ditches are being dug through which it will flow. A cut 4 km. long, will replace the present 25 km. bend of the Amu-Dar'ya.

Underground waters also play an important part in the irrigation of the region: in the Fergana valley alone their utilization has made cultivable 50,000 ha.

IV. Kirgizia

General

In 1957 the press discussed the shortcomings in the irrigation of Kirgizia. The rivers of the republic provide water for the irrigation of the Fergana, Chu and Talass valleys as well as the higher-lying mountain valleys and the Issyk-Kul' basin. Their annual flow reaches 60 milliard cubic metres, of which only 15 per cent were used for irrigation. But even this amount was not used to the best advantage: in 1956 of the 1,155,000 ha. covered by irrigation networks only 816,000 ha. were adequately watered while the total area of pasture, 1m. ha., had no water thus hindering the expansion of cattle breeding. Underground waters, also, were largely neglected. Moreover, in the irrigated area much water was wasted by unnecessary flooding which injured the crops and caused deterioration to the soil; it became saturated and this affected a number of bast-growing sovkhozes in the Frunze oblast, the zone of the Fourth Party Congress Canal in the Osh oblast and the rice-growing kolkhozes in the south of the republic. But by 1959 the situation seemed to have improved: the plan of irrigation works was carried out by 103.6 per cent and the total cost was 126m. rubles.

Canals and reservoirs

The Isfana valley in the Lyaylyakskiy rayon has 3,500 ha. of cultivable land but only 500-700 ha. could be used as the existing Tuya-Dzhayloo Canal did not provide enough water. A canal has been constructed at a height of 3,200 metres to divert the river Sary-Kungey to the valley. It crosses a steep slope, flows under the Kok-

Bel' pass making a 400 metre waterfall. Five kilometres further it joins the Tuya-Dzhayloo Canal. It will enable the local kolkhozes to reclaim thousands of hectares for the cultivation of vegetables and tobacco.

In the autumn of 1957 the Otuz-Adyr Canal in southern Kirgizia was completed. It is 43 km. long and the main canals alone, which it feeds, reach a total length of 265 km. and irrigate 7,000 ha. of reclaimed land. At the same time the Bazar-Kurgan reservoir on a spur of the Fergana range was completed. It is fed from the river Kara-Ungur and holds 20m. cubic metres of water which irrigates thousands of hectares in the Bazar-Kurgan and Leninskiy rayons.

The rivers Kurshab, Ak-Bura and Aravan-Say flow parallel to one another from the Alayskiy range and irrigate the cotton plantations in a number of rayons of the Osh oblast and the Andizhan oblast of Uzbekistan. Sometimes in summer one or another of them does not provide enough water. In 1958 the three irrigation systems were connected: now when the Ak-Bura cannot adequately irrigate the lands lying between it and the Kurshab, the latter provides water, to which end the Otuz-Adyr Canal fed from it has been widened, while the shortage of water in the Aravan-Say is relieved by the Ak-Bura water via the Gul'bagarinskiy Canal. In spring the latter floods the surrounding land and apart from the damage, much water gets wasted. In 1958 construction started on a dam in its middle course at the point where it flows through a narrow canyon. The reservoir will both irrigate the arable lands and enable many thousands of hectares to be reclaimed.

Other projects

Livestock breeding is an important branch of the economy of Kirgizia, the development of which is constricted by lack of water. Measures being taken to overcome this and expand herds, flocks and fodder crops include the following:

Issyk-Kul' region: In 1958 a start was made to the sinking of artesian wells which should bring into use 12,000 ha. of pasture. In the Archaly region of the Tonskiy rayon two canals, six and 13 km. long, are being built in order to bring 1,000 ha. under fodder crops.

Karavan rayon, Osh oblast: Herds which winter in the valley of Kyzyl'dzhar will be considerably increased when the water pipe-line now under construction is finished; it lies 1,100 metres above sea level.

Southern Kirgizia: In 1958 in the meadowlands of the Batken, Lyaylyakskiy and Naukatskiy rayons, wells were being bored so that

flocks could be increased and fodder crops irrigated.

V. Kazakhstan

General

The exploitation of underground waters is particularly important in Kazakhstan as two-thirds of its territory have no surface water, though in fact it is practically everywhere under the surface (see CAR, Vol.VIII, No.1, p.45). Until recently exploration was in a deplorable state owing to lack of central planning. For example, the Alma-Ata region has big artesian reservoirs of fresh water whose total capacity reaches 270m. cubic metres, but in 1958 the city was still suffering from a shortage of good water. At the same time it could boast over 20 hydrogeological organizations attached to various ministries and departments, each working independently with the result that in some rayons exploratory wells were drilled a couple of metres from one another, each by a different authority. In Semipalatinsk the Ministry of Geology and the Protection of Mineral Resources had been entrusted with exploration of underground waters and at the same time another organization, the Kazgiprogorssel'stroy, was preparing to start prospecting. It took seven years to sink over twenty exploratory wells in the area of the Kyzylkum - far less than planned - though the same work could have been done in a year with more efficient planning. In 1957 it was intended to bring water to 6.5m. ha. while in fact only 2.4m. ha. received it - and at the same time a large number of republican and local authorities were concerned with a problem of watering pastures. Thus in the South-Kazakhstan oblast there were 2.4 ha. of pasture per sheep and only 1.4 ha. were watered while three organizations were in charge of such work in the oblast. There was no cooperation among them with the result that, for example, in the Karl Marx kolkhoz in the Arys' rayon a cluster of five wells were sunk near to one another while there was no other well within a radius of 25 km. The hydrological authorities were also making grand plans which were not carried out.

This unsatisfactory situation lasted until the early months of 1959 when the Kazakh Hydrogeological Trust was set up. It has united all such organizations, hitherto subject to regional geological boards, for the purpose of a coordinated all-republican hydrographic exploration. This will not only speed up the work but very considerably reduce its cost. The result will be seen in the coming years.

Though the exploration of the underground "seas" leaves much room for improvement, a good deal is being done to use the known water resources for irrigating pastures. The press complains, however, that


this is not enough and that large areas of good grazing land still cannot be used. In 1958 the situation was that of the total of 160-170m. ha. of pasture over 80m. ha. were not watered, and only 25-30 per cent of pasture in the deserts and semi-deserts was used. Huge areas of the Ustyurt, Naryn sands, Kyzylkum, Transural steppe, lands bordering upon the Urals and those between the Karakum and the river Sarysu, Bet-Pak-Dala, lower reaches of the Chu and Sarysu, Balkhash region as well as the southern and south-eastern parts of the Aktyubinsk, Kustanay and West-Kazakhstan oblasts lie waste. In the previous two years over 8,000 wells had been drilled bringing water to 12.4m. ha. of pasture-land, but the reclamation of pasture is far behind the needs of the developing cattle breeding. At the same time watering places created a few years ago often go out of use because the cattle have been removed elsewhere, while the newly-watered grazing lands are overcrowded with animals, with the result that after a year of exploitation they cannot be used again for several years.

Irtysh-Karaganda Canal

The route of the Irtysh-Karaganda Canal has at last been fixed. It has been taken into consideration that in 1960 the Karaganda coal basin alone will need 25 cubic metres of water per second and this has helped to determine the alignment of the canal. Starting at the village of Yermak (Pavlodar oblast) on the Irtysh, it will flow towards Ekibastuz, join the river Shiderty and follow the river valley to Karaganda. This route will make it possible to provide with water the coalfields of Ekibastuz, Kuushoky, Borly and others, the Boshchekul' copper mining region and the Kodzhanchad mining area, as well as the kolkhozes and sovkhoses along the course of the canal. Its total length will be 500 km. and the pumping stations will raise the water to the height of some 450 metres. (See also CAR, Vol.V, No.3, pp.278-9.)

The Kushum-Ural network

The river Kushum flows into the Ural, but it has changed its course and the lands bordering the old course have turned into desert. In 1957 in the Transural steppe construction started of a large Ural-Kushum irrigation network. The old, dry bed of the Kushum is being widened to serve as the central canal of the system and is to become a real river, five metres deep and 50 metres wide; 120 cubic metres of water per second are to flow at its starting point. The canal starts near the village of Bol'shoy Chagan and has four reservoirs along its route; they jointly hold 232m. cubic metres of water. The main canal is to be 400 km. long while the total length of the canals of the network will total 2,000 km. The main canal and the reservoirs will feed



five irrigation networks serving over 1m. ha. of arable land, and some 50,000 ha. of meadow land. It will allow the kolkhozes of the Zelenovskiy, Chapayevo, Furmanovo and Taypakskiy rayons to double or treble the numbers of their cattle. Work began on the first part of the network in 1957 - the Dungulyukskiy "hydro-knot" with a great reservoir on the Kushum and the Taypakskiy Canal, which will irrigate 300,000 ha. (See also CAR, Vol.V, No.3, p.279.)

Arys-Turkestan Canal

No mention of the progress of this canal has been seen in the Central Asian press since the first section of the Bugun' dam was completed in 1957. (See CAR, Vol.III, No.3; Vol.V, No.3, p.282, and Vol. VI, No.2, p.200.)

Reservoirs

In the Dzhambul oblast in 1957 work started on a reservoir which will irrigate 50,000 ha. of waste land, mainly for sugar-beet. The Ters-Ashchubulak reservoir on the river Ters will hold 150m. cubic metres of water; its dam is 2 km. long and 32 metres high. It will feed the irrigation network of the rivers Asa and Talass.

Water from the river Churbay-Nura started to flow into the great reservoir of the Karaganda hydroelectric power-station in September 1959; the dam across the river is 3 km. long and its capacity 375m. cubic metres. It will provide with water the new coal-mining centres Tentekskiy and Shakhanskiy, and irrigate 25,000 ha. of reclaimed land which is to be put under vegetable crops.

Sources

1. Central Asian Press, 1957-9.
2. "Vozvrashcheniye Dzheykhun", by Yu. Polkovnikov. VOKRUG SVETA, No.6, 1959.
3. VESTNIK AN/SSSR, No.1, 1960, pp.53-54.

Note

For additional information on irrigation in Central Asia see:

- CAR, Vol. II, No.3, The Kara-Kum Canal Project
 Vol.III, No.3, The Arys-Turkestan Canal
 Vol. IV, No.1, Irrigation Scheme for Central Kazakhstan
 (The Irtysh Project)
 Vol. V, No.1, The Golodnaya Step'
 Vol. V, No.3, Irrigation in Central Asia
 Vol.VII, No.1, Progress of the Kara-Kum Canal.

FOOD TRADE AND PUBLIC CATERING IN CENTRAL ASIA*

I. Changes in Eating Habits - II. Food Consumption,
Supply and Distribution - III. Supply and Sale of
Alcohol - IV. Public Catering.

I. Changes in Eating Habits

Russian influence on Central Asian diet and eating habits is perhaps less than on some other aspects of life; it is none the less considerable, particularly in the larger towns. Part of the growing demand for such foodstuffs as potatoes, noodles (lapsha), various kinds of porridge (kasha), and tinned foods is partly attributable to the great increase in the number of Russian and non-Asian settlers. There is no doubt that these foods are becoming part of the staple diet of the indigenous population. In the towns mass produced bread from the "bread factories" (khlebokombinat) is beginning to replace the traditional flat bread-cakes baked in primitive clay ovens heated with cattle dung. Another sign of the times is that the Muslims' religious objection to alcohol seems to have disappeared; there is at any rate no mention of any such objection in the source material used for this article.

Although the native housewife adheres to the traditional dishes, she adapts the available Russian foods to suit Central Asian taste and in some places, particularly in the towns, she prepares them on the modern gas cooker instead of the old-fashioned clay stove or open fire outdoors. But national dishes themselves are threatened with extinction and, although some grocery shops keep Central Asian delicacies, complaints are made in the press that they are not nearly as numerous as they should be.

* The reader is also referred to "The Food Industry in Central Asia", CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, Vol.IV, No.1.

The main danger to traditional cooking is represented by the considerable development of all sorts of canteens, domovyye kukhni producing hot meals to be taken home, and prepared foods. All this is of considerable importance since, according to Lenin, it greatly assists the emancipation of women by making them equal to men in political, social and economic life. (TI. 13.8.59.)* The result is that the native student and worker, particularly in town, eats in canteens attached to his place of work, which more often than not cook only Russian food and where he must eat at the table and use cutlery. There are catering establishments where he can feel more comfortable but his working hours make it difficult to use them frequently. One may infer from the available source material that Central Asian eating places, with the exception of the chaykhana (tea house) are far less numerous than the various Russian establishments: restaurants, canteens (stolovyye) and a host of minor places like kafe, bufety, zakusochnyye, chaynyye, pel'mennyye and others. Central Asian food is prepared in shashlychnyye specializing in shashlyk (mutton roasted on a spit) and "restaurants of national dishes", but the most popular place is the omnipresent chaykhana whose watchword is the Central Asian proverb declaring that a man must drink tea in order to be strong. (PV. 14.8.58.) The chaykhana, particularly in the countryside, is the centre of local social life from which women are excluded by an unwritten law. If it has not been "cultured" by the introduction of tables and chairs, wireless, newspapers and portraits of notables, the Central Asian can feel at home there, sit on the ground with his legs folded underneath him and pour bitter green tea from a brightly decorated china pot into a shallow cup without a handle.

II. Food Consumption, Supply and Distribution

Consumption

Consumption keeps growing throughout Central Asia. In Uzbekistan during the seven years before 1958 the sales of meat had grown 2.1 times, sugar - 2.7, porridge - 5.1. (PV. 22.5.59.) In Turkmenistan increased sales of meat, butter, milk and dairy products are particularly marked: on 23 October 1958, compared with the same day in 1955, 85 per cent more of these goods were sold. In the first half of 1959, compared with 1958, 81 per cent more meat was sold. (TI. 25.10.58, 18.8.59.) In the Karaganda oblast in Kazakhstan two years of the Sixth Five-Year Plan witnessed a spectacular growth of sales, as against 1955: milk

* List of abbreviations will be found at beginning of CAR.

3.5 times, butter twice, sugar - 75, meat products - 60, vegetable fats - 30, potatoes and vegetables - 25. (KP. 13.5.58.)

In practice, however, this progress is far less impressive but it is only in the field of retail trade that the anomalies of "planned economy" become evident. Thus in Uzbekistan, a country with a very well developed agriculture, the sale of potatoes and vegetables per head of the population are one half, and of fruit 5 times less, than the other republics. (PV. 22.5.59.)

Kazakhstan is an agricultural and cattle-breeding supply and distribution country and borders upon two seas, but frequent complaints are made in the press that bread, fish, milk and dairy products are very hard to obtain - for example, milk is very irregularly supplied and in insufficient quantities to the shops of the big, industrial city of Leninogorsk while the presence of white cheese in them has been recorded only once and even then the cheese was mouldy and expensive. (KP. 13.12.58.) At Vishnevka (Akmolinsk oblast) the dairy was closed in 1957 with the result that the inhabitants are forced to keep cows. Instead of organizing milk supplies, even local notables like the secretary of the rayon committee of the Party, the public prosecutor, the judge and the director of the oil mill are found among the cow and goat owners. (KP. 28.9.58.) Shortage of bread affects not only the virgin land dwellers, but the inhabitants of many long-established settlements, like those of Zhilaya Kosa on the Caspian shore: there are a bakery and a shop in the village but their staff get drunk and neglect their duties, with the result that the people have to abandon their work and travel many kilometres in search of bread. (KP. 13.11.58.) As for fish, in many shops and canteens it is a very rare delicacy - even at Gur'yev, a fish-canning centre on the Caspian shore, fresh fish is obtainable only from the "speculators". The manager of the No.82 shop declared in April 1958 that he had received no fresh fish since the previous October. In other shops there are salted herrings from the Atlantic but no Caspian fish. This is because the trading organizations regard the retail fish trade as unprofitable: they either sell fresh fish outside the oblast in order to save trouble or send it away to be salted since fresh fish is 50 per cent cheaper. (KP. 17.4.58.) In Turkmenistan the situation is very much the same: fish dishes are difficult to obtain in the canteens of the rayons near the Caspian, and also in the Chardzhou and Mary oblasts bordering upon the Amu-Dar'ya and the Murgab. (TI. 13.8.59, 1.4.59.)

The shortage of milk and occasionally of bread, as well as the bad quality of the latter cause frequent complaints in the Central Asian press. In the new sovkhoses of the Bukhara, Fergana and Kashka-Dar'ya oblasts there are "frequent stoppages" in bread supplies (PV.

16.5.58), while in Kirgizia (Tonskiy rayon) bread and bread products supplied by the Naryn and Przheval'sk bread kombinats are in fact shapeless pieces of raw or burnt dough. (SK. 26.4.58, 8.7.59.) In Ashkhabad the quality of and trade in bread products needs improvement: in the first four months of 1959 alone the food inspectors rejected over 14 tons of bread and the same happened to 24 tons of stale bread rolls and bread at the No.3 "bread factory", the total loss being 70,000 rubles. Bread in the shops is always stale because its dispatch from the bakeries is delayed and transport is bad. There are only three specialized bread shops in the city, but on the day they were inspected by a team sent by TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA, there were no bread rolls at the No.1 shop, while on the counter of the No.51 shop a dry and misshapen "spring-time cake" was displayed. (TI. 24.5.59.)

In these circumstances the isolated cases, when foodstuffs are not only available without difficulty but even delivered to the customers' homes, are regarded as the last word in progress and reported in the press: thus in the northern suburb of Frunze a special van delivers milk while in May 1959 bread deliveries started in the southern suburb. (SK. 27.5.59.)

Fresh vegetables and spring greens are difficult to obtain. In June 1959 they were still unobtainable from the State shops in Turkmen towns and the authorities of the vegetable-growing regions blamed it on "autumn errors" and promised to supply them in 1960, but only in the spring, although in Turkmenistan they can be grown almost all the year round. The greengrocery trade is badly organized and even in Ashkhabad itself there is no proper greengrocer's shop, while small vegetable shops sell only dried potatoes, dried fruit and tomato puree. (TI. 2.6.59.) The kolkhozes round Tashkent grow only cabbage, so that in 1958 there was so much that nobody knew what to do with it.

"Speculators"

In such circumstances the "speculators" have a large field of activity. They provide Naryn, where there is a shortage from official sources, with vegetables which they bring from Tokmak, Bystrovka and Przheval'sk and, naturally, they charge higher prices than the inefficient trading organizations. Free enterprise of this kind obviously has certain advantages for people who might otherwise be entirely deprived of such commodities as milk, fresh fish and vegetables. The authorities, however, are quite uncompromising in their condemnation of "speculators" as exploiters and parasites.

III. Supply and Sale of Alcohol

Although it is officially stated that drunkenness is a survival of the past, the need to open "sobering-up stations" (vytrezviteli) throughout the Soviet world testifies to the contrary. With the help of the Soviet trade network, the Central Asians seem to have developed a strong taste for alcohol and, together with the European settlers, are found among the patients of the vytrezviteli - in spite of the "prophylactic action of the police against drunkenness". Thus the Ashkhabad city vytrezviteli counts some lecturers of the State University and the Medical Academy, as well as musicians from the State Orchestra among its patrons. This seems hardly surprising when it is learnt that an agitator, sent to the Geok-Tepe wine factory to lecture against drunkenness, got drunk after the lecture and had to be carried away as a result. (TI. 23.3.58.) In Alma-Ata, Baykadamov, a composer, gets drunk almost every day and starts trouble, but the police regard this as an "innocent joke" and the Ministry of Culture ignores the matter. (KP. 9.7.59.) It can be said without exaggeration that the retail trade system encourages drunkenness. In Kirgizia, for instance, many public catering establishments do not trouble to prepare good food, since the sale of vodka is an easier way of achieving their sales target. In 1958 the plan of public catering in the republic was carried out by 105.4 per cent, of which "food" sales constituted 95 per cent and only 33.7 per cent of this represented cooked dishes. (SK. 8.7.59.) In Alma-Ata some grocery shops have been converted into wine shops and until late in the evening they are besieged by crowds of thirsty patrons who consume their purchases just outside the shops and create disturbances into the bargain. (KP. 9.7.59.) At Kansay in Tadzhikistan the soft drinks stalls sell alcohol. (KT. 11.7.59.) In some parts of Khorezm unofficial bars seem to be strangling the chaykhanas: at Khazarasp there are three eating places which stock only vodka and wine as does the local chaykhana. The authorities do not object to this and Karimov, the secretary of the rayon committee of the Party, declares that "the day of the chaykhana is over in Khorezm". Khazarasp is the oblast centre of the vodka trade: the managers of the canteens say that they seldom provide cooked meals; it is inconvenient and when the plan needs pushing up, they deal exclusively in vodka.

In Kazakhstan the situation has become so bad that in July 1959 the passing of a special law against drunkenness and the home-brewing of alcohol was considered. In the Dzhambul, Alma-Ata, Akmolinsk, Kokchetav and North-Kazakhstan oblasts the number of those prosecuted for home-brewing is over two-thirds of those dealt with by the republican courts for this offence, while the Dzhambul oblast alone boasts the majority of all the republican home-brewers amongst its

inhabitants. Cases of death following consumption of home-brews are recorded. The "industry" flourishes particularly in the countryside and various local dignitaries engage in it. The head of the loading department at the Atrasab railway station, literally "irrigates" the neighbouring villages with his produce at 60 rubles per litre. Sometimes the trading authorities cooperate in home-brewing - for example, a watchman of the Urnek sovkhoz cooperative shop was given a quota of sugar fixed at 70 kg. per 200 litres of home-brewed beer; the same proportion was used by the deputy manager of the rayon consumers' cooperative. (KP. 11.7.59.) It is not clear why this risky home-brewing should be necessary if trade in alcohol is among the most efficient branches of the official retail trade.

IV. Public Catering

General complaints

Although there are efficient grocery shops and public catering establishments whose suggestion books are full of praise poured out by the appreciative customers, they gain far fewer mentions in the press than the bad ones. This is natural enough since bad service always attracts more attention than good. But the frequency of the complaints and the fact that they are very much the same in all the republics suggest that bad shops and canteens are by no means exceptional. The most common shortcomings are five in number: (a) in many towns there is a shortage of milk and fresh vegetables, even in summer; (b) bread and bread products are often of inferior quality; (c) it is very difficult to get cold, soft drinks in the hot season; (d) many canteens reach their sales target by selling vodka; (e) bad and "uncultured" service of the workers: many shop assistants and waitresses are discourteous and cheat the customers - they illegally raise prices, give wrong change or pretend to have none. They give short weight and reduced helpings in the canteens.

Plans for improvements

On 20 February 1959 the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers of the USSR passed a resolution concerning the further development and improvement of public catering. This affects also Central Asia where the number of restaurants, canteens etc., in spite of constant expansion, is stated to be still very inadequate, not only in the provinces but even in the republican capitals. In 1957 the Uzbek Consumers' Cooperative bought for its catering establishments as compared with 1953 four times more meat, 10 times more potatoes, five times more vegetables, 30 times more milk and over five times more eggs; at the same time the number of catering establishments

had grown by 79 per cent and 568 canteens and tea-rooms had been opened in the countryside. (PV. 16.5.58.) In Turkmenistan between 1957-9, 70 catering establishments were opened in country districts, and in October 1958 the republic had 820 such establishments - 150 more than in 1955. On 23 October 1955 they sold 10,000 meals and on the same day in 1958 - 17,000. (TI. 7.8.59, 25.10.58.)

The authorities believe there are five ways of carrying out the resolution of 20 February 1959: the consumers' cooperatives and individual catering establishments should devote more attention to producing their own foodstuffs, mechanization of labour, lowering the prices of meals and increasing their quality and variety, increasing the amount of foods produced by mechanized "kitchen-factories" for the canteens and grocery trade and finally, introducing "progressive methods of trading".

The first point is regarded as an important step towards lowering the cost of meals and making them more varied, but it is not clear why, with all the kolkhozes and sovkhoses producing vast quantities of food for the State, the catering establishments should have to extend their activities to horticulture, cattle-, pig- and poultry-breeding and even to fish-ponds. In all the republics complaints are made that very many canteens do not prepare fish, vegetable and milk dishes - i.e. they suffer, like the grocery trade, from a shortage of these foods. Whatever the reason may be, the result is that more and more canteens begin to keep pigs, rabbits and poultry while the republican trading organizations do the same on a large scale. The Tadzhik Ministry of Trade has founded a cattle-breeding and horticultural sov-khoz which supplies the catering network of Stalinabad (KT. 6.5.59); and the Uzbek Consumers' Cooperative in 1958 had 26 cattle and poultry farms and a number of orchards. (PV. 16.5.58.)

Mechanization and "progressive methods"

Mechanization of labour and efficient "kitchen-factories" will decrease the cost of preparing meals, reduce the numbers of staff employed by individual catering establishments and so lower the prices of meals and attract people to the canteens. But the "kitchen-factories" are few in number and still do not produce enough, and in some cases the larger catering establishments themselves produce prepared foods not only for their own use but also for smaller canteens and grocery shops. Their kitchens are being mechanized by the introduction of modern labour-saving devices, but here, as in other branches of trade, the authorities are very inefficient. Although refrigerators are essential in the Central Asian climate, many canteens have to do without them while they are either held up in the

central warehouses or stand useless in the kitchens because there is nobody to repair them.

The progressive methods are three in number: selling in advance coupons for meals in order to avoid queues in the canteens, opening "buffets without a salesman" where the customers take the food they want and leave the money, and self-service canteens made even more attractive by the introduction of slot-machines selling food and drink. Self-service is enthusiastically described in the press as the last word in progress. TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA of 23.9.59 in an article called "Quickly, Comfortably and Well" describes the work of the Firyuza, the new "automatic café" in Ashkhabad. The article describes in detail the working of this self-service café from its "fully mechanized" kitchen to the hot-counter, pointing out the advantages to the customer of having hot food and no waiting. PRAVDA VOSTOKA of 27.2.58 describes another self-service restaurant in the Kuybyshevskiy rayon of Tashkent and also emphasizes that meals are obtained there without waiting. This latter article, which is illustrated to show precisely how the system works, adds that since self-service was introduced the daily turnover has increased from 2,500-3,000 to 4,500-5,000 rubles. The publicity given to the first appearance of these "progressive" canteens and restaurants shows the justifiable pride taken in the arrival of self-service in Central Asia.

The "progressive methods", however, are as yet not widely used, as one can gather from the attention devoted to such individual canteens by the press. But there are also old-fashioned eating places whose work is very efficient. For example, in Tadzhikistan the hungry man's paradise is not, it seems, the capital whose catering system is freely denounced by KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA, but the small town of Kulyab. Its catering workers are so eager to please that they even invite passers-by to enter their canteens and tea-rooms, which, the reader is told, is by no means contrary to the "dignity of the employee of Soviet trade" but even a "symptom of esteem for man". And there is good reason to invite him in since the catering establishments have a wide selection of good food. Kulyab's Turkmen counterpart is not Ashkhabad, where there is much to criticize, but Deynau, a small town in the Chardzhou oblast, whose canteen, it seems, can satisfy even the most fastidious taste. (TI. 8.5.59.)

. . .

As can be seen from the foregoing, complaints about the food trade and catering arrangements in Central Asia are numerous and bitter. They relate to mismanagement, short supply, overcrowding in canteens, bad

service, poor cooking, excessive sales of alcohol, dirt, and speculation of various kinds. The curious complaint was even made that in the Tashauz oblast of Turkmenistan "there is not a single cook with higher or middle school education" (TI. 7.8.59). In spite of all these shortcomings - and perhaps to some extent because of them - it cannot be denied that food is becoming more varied and plentiful and that public catering is expanding and possibly growing more efficient. Regret at the passing of the old, simple diet and eating habits may be natural and even justifiable and the apparent increase in the use of alcohol is to be deplored. But the importance now attached to good management, nutrition and cleanliness cannot but be beneficial to the people. There may be some doubt about the speed with which the Soviet Union as a whole will achieve the highest standard of living in the world, but there can be no question that considerable progress has already been made in Central Asia.

French honour for Mr. Kh.M. Abdullayev

Kh.M. Abdullayev, President of the Academy of Sciences of the Uzbek SSR has been elected a member of the French Geological Society.
PV. 1.1.60

Branch of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences opened in Nukus

A Kara-Kalpak branch (filial) of the Academy of Sciences of the Uzbek SSR was opened in Nukus on 20 February 1960. There are departments of economics and of botany, laboratories of chemistry and the technology of building materials, of ichthyology and parasitology, an institute of history, language and literature, and a department of ethnography and archaeology.
PV. 21.2.60

Officials of Central Asia to visit the USA

The governors of the States of the USA who visited the USSR last summer have invited a Soviet group to make a return visit beginning at the end of January 1960. Included in the Soviet delegation are D.A. Kunayev, First Secretary of the Kazakh CP, M.A. Iskenderov, Chairman of the Azerbaydzhan SSR Council of Ministers, and Kh. Dzhalilov, Chairman of the executive committee of the Council of Workers' Deputies of the Tashkent oblast.
PV. 23.1.60

B O O K R E V I E W

PAN-TURKISM AND ISLAM IN RUSSIA. By Serge A. Zenkovsky.
 Harvard University Press (London: Oxford University Press),
 1960. 345pp. Maps; Bibliog.; Index. Price: 54/-.

CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW does not normally review books of other than Soviet origin, but it occasionally makes an exception for books of outstanding quality which bear closely on the Muslim republics of the Soviet Union. Mr. Zenkovsky's study clearly comes within this category: it is by far the most comprehensive and best documented account which has so far appeared in English of the struggles of the Turkic Muslim peoples of Russia for some kind of national expression.

The author has obviously encountered some difficulty in determining the factors common to the various movements, apparently aiming at political, judicial and cultural freedom, which developed among the Turkic peoples of Russia spread as these were over a vast area from the Volga to the Chinese frontier. There are in fact only two potential bonds of union among the Turkic peoples whether inside or outside Russia - the remarkable inter-resemblance of their languages (apart from such aberrant forms as Chuvash and Yakut) and Islam. The strength of the linguistic bond was limited before the Revolution by its restriction to the spoken tongues, since many of the languages had anyway no developed written form and the great majority of the people were illiterate. The bond of Islam, too, was barely operative among large sections of the Kazakh and Kirgiz nomads.

In his preface, the author explains that while his earlier opinion had been that "Turkic nationalism or 'Pan-Turkism' seemed to be the main force animating the minds and political efforts of Russian Turks", it later became evident to him that "their common attachment to the religion and culture of Islam" was "in many instances" a more important factor. In his Conclusion, he arrives regretfully at the opinion that whatever the coordinating factors might or should have been, they were in the event ineffectual. Indeed, he suggests that what he regards as the two parallel factors of pan-Turkism and Islam operated against each other - "the feeling of affiliation with the Moslem community obscured that of national identity."

Mr. Zenkovsky is unquestionably right in thinking that although Turkic national (if that is the correct word) efforts did not come to an end in 1920, the period of relatively free expression of political opinion did. He does not express an opinion on whether these efforts are still continuing today. Other writers on the subject maintain that they are, and the Soviet authorities themselves continue to inveigh not only against "bourgeois nationalism" or what they nowadays more often call localism (mestnichestvo) among the Turkic Muslims, but also against pan-Turkism and pan-Islam. By Western experts, however, the last two are generally thought to have lost all or nearly all their significance, at any rate for the Turkic peoples of the Soviet Union.

Mr. Zenkovsky speaks of the creation of autonomous republics as "an attainment for which a whole generation of Turkic patriots had fought". Although he adds that the actual status of the present republics could only frustrate Turkic national feelings, he makes no mention of the possibility of a united Turkestan which many Turks have always regarded as an alternative preferable to the parcelling out of the various peoples according to artificially contrived linguistic principles. Some readers may indeed feel that the treatment of the admittedly complicated question of Turkic nationalism is too vague to serve any useful purpose. Even so, no one interested in the history of Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Volga region will be other than grateful for Mr. Zenkovsky's skilful and objective marshalling and handling of such a wide range of source-material, much of which is difficult of access and has so far escaped scrutiny.

Restoration of Bukhara's ancient monuments

Under the current Seven-Year Plan over 21m. rubles will be spent on restoring Bukhara's ancient monuments, apart from sums allocated by local government offices or contributed by the Muslim Religious Board for Central Asia and Kazakhstan. The Ismail Samani Mausoleum (late ninth to early tenth centuries), the earliest of all burnt-brick structures in Central Asia, has been completely restored, and restoration work is being carried out on the Mir-i-Arab and Kukeldash madrasahs and the Khodzha Zaineddin mosque. SU. 1960, No.121

N E W S D I G E S T

The following items are taken from newspapers and periodicals received during the period 1 January - 31 March 1960. A list of abbreviations used will be found at the beginning of the Review.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND TERRITORIAL CHANGES

Administrative changes

Administrative changes are recorded in the following appointments only: First and Second Party Secretaries, Chairmen of the Councils of Ministers (Prime Minister), Chairmen of the State Planning and State Security Committees, and Ministers of Communications.

Turkmenistan

F.A. Grisnayenkov appointed Second Secretary of the Central Committee in place of V.K. Akulintsev. TI. 19.2.60

L.P. Gladkov appointed Chairman of the State Planning Committee. TI. 6.2.60

Uzbekistan

G.F. Naymushin appointed Chairman of the State Security Committee in place of A.P. Byzov. PV. 27.2.60

Kirgizia

V.F. Stepkin appointed Second Secretary of the Central Committee in place of V.N. Churkin. SK. 28.2.60

V.D. Kulakov appointed Chairman of the State Planning Committee in place of B. Dyushaliyev. SK. 26.2.60

Kazakhstan

A.A. Arstanbekov appointed Chairman of the State Security Committee in place of K.F. Lunev. KP. 10.3.60

Territorial changes

Uzbekistan

By decree of 14 December 1959 the following rayons have been enlarged:

Namangan oblast (see below)

The Zadar'inskiy rayon has been attached to the Tyurya-Kurgan rayon, part of its territory being transferred to the Kassan-Say and Namangan rayons. The name Tyurya-Kurgan has been retained for the new rayon, the centre of which is now the village of Dzhamashuy.

Tashkent oblast

The Ordzhonikidze and Karasuy rayons have been combined under the name of Ordzhonikidze; the centre is the settlement of the same name.

Fergana oblast

The Yaz'yavan and Tashlak rayons have been combined. The name of the new rayon is Margelan (decree of 31.12.60), and the rayon centre is the village of Yaz'yavan.

By decree of 14 December 1959 the following rayons have been abolished:

Tashkent oblast

The Bayaut rayon, the territory being subordinated to the Yangi-Yer town soviet.

Fergana oblast

- (a) Buvaydin rayon, the territory being transferred to the Leningrad and Bagdad rayons. The centre of the Bagdad rayon has been transferred from Serovo station settlement to the village of Yangi-Kurgan.
- (b) Vuadil' rayon, the territory being transferred to the Fergana and Alty-Aryk rayons.

- (c) Gorskoye rayon, the territory being transferred to the Uzbekistan and Kirovo rayons.

The centre of the Fergana rayon has been transferred from the town of Kuvasay to the village of Aval'.

VVS. 21.1.60, 28.1.60, 25.2.60

By decree of 25 January 1960 the following oblasts have been abolished:

- (a) Kashka-Dar'ya oblast, the territory being transferred to the Surkhan-Dar'ya oblast with the exception of the settlements of Mubarek and Karakum in the Kassan rayon which have been transferred to the Kagan and Navoi rayons respectively in the Bukhara oblast.
- (b) Namangan oblast: the town of Namangan, the Namangan, Naryn, Uychi, Uch-Kurgan and Yangi-Kurgan rayons have been transferred to the Andizhan oblast, while the Pap, Chust, Tyurya-Kurgan and Kassansay rayons have been transferred to the Fergana oblast. VVS. 18.2.60

By decree of 5 February 1960 the Shumanay rayon of the Kara-Kalpak ASSR has been abolished, the territory being divided between the Kungrad and the Khodzheyli rayons.

VVS. 10.3.60

Kirgizia

By decree of 17 December 1959 the settlement of town type Chauvay of the abolished Uch-Korgon rayon, Osh oblast, has been transferred to the Frunzenskoye rayon in the same oblast.

VVS. 7.1.60

By decree of 5 February 1960 the workers' settlement of Oktyabr'skiy has been brought within the boundaries of the town of Tokmak with which in fact it merges.

VVS. 25.2.60

Kazakhstan

By decree of 16 December 1959 the inhabited point of the enterprise (sic) of Kokterek rayon, Dzhambul oblast, has been put into the category of workers' settlements and given the name of Aksuyek.

VVS. 7.1.60

By decree of 16 February 1960:

- (a) The Burlyu-Tobe rayon of the Alma-Ata oblast has been abolished, its territory being divided between the Aksu, Andreyevka, Kapal and Karatal rayons.
- (b) The inhabited point at the Druzhba railway station, Alakul rayon, Alma-Ata oblast, has been made into a workers' settlement and named Druzhba.

VVS. 10.3.60

COMMUNICATIONS

Lanchow - Aktogay "Friendship" railway

A long article entitled "The Road of Head Winds" by A. Bragin on the construction of the "Friendship" railway between Sinkiang and Kazakhstan (see CAR, Vol.V, No.2, pp.153a-5, and Vol.VI, No.1, p.84) appeared in SOVETSKIY KAZAKHSTAN, No.10 of 1959. It is a "human interest" account and as such as concerned mainly with the life and difficulties of the railway's constructors; facts about the railway itself are few and there is no map.

According to Bragin there were two possible routes to Urumchi for the railway, one from Alma-Ata via Ili and Sayram-nor, the other from Aktogay. The first route led through mountainous country and was more than twice as long as the second. The second route, through the Dzhungarian Gates, was level and short but swept by strong winds capable of blowing down buildings and embankments and had the further disadvantage of by-passing Alma-Ata. The second route, however, was chosen; the prevailing winds blow along the line and so do not threaten the embankments while special wind-resisting buildings have been designed for the workers' settlements of Alakul', Koktuma and Dzhalanash.

Traffic along the Aktogay - Druzhba section of the line will be controlled from a centralized signal-box in Aktogay. The controller will be in constant radio contact with all trains in the section.

Kazakhstan

A section of the new Central Siberian Railway (see also CAR, Vol.VIII, No.1, p.59), that from Barnaul via Kamen'-na-Obi, Karasuk and Irtyshskoye to Kulomzino, a suburb of Omsk, is to be completed in

1960. Then the Irtyshskoye - Kustanay line is to be finished. The Peski - Kurgan branch is at present under construction. KP. 5.1.60

A new motor-coach service is to start shortly on the Alma-Ata - Frunze - Tashkent highway. The journey time is 16 hours, which is half the time taken by train. The new service will link the three republican capitals, Dzhambul and Chimkent. A taxi-cab service will also cover the same route. KP. 30.1.60

Hard-surface roads totalling 211 km. are to be built in 1960 in the Akmolinsk oblast. This includes an 86-km. Akmolinsk - Kurgal'-dzhino road, 71 km. from Yesil' to the grain sovkhos "Alma-Atinskiy", and 54 km. from Astrakhanka to Makinsk. KP. 20.2.60

Kirgizia

Starting on 1 February 1960 eleven-seater passenger helicopters have been covering the journey between Frunze and Lugovaya, the station on the main Novosibirsk - Tashkent, Akmolinsk - Tashkent railway. Flying at a speed of between 100 and 170 km. p.h., they do the trip in 50 minutes for 55 rubles. Before they were instituted it was necessary to wait nearly 24 hours at Lugovaya for train connections. SK. 31.1.60

DELEGATIONS

Afghanistan

A delegation of Afghan educationalists visited Tashkent in February. PV. 26.2.60

Young Afghan industrial workers have been gaining experience at a Baku motor-car repair works. BR. 5.3.60

China

A delegation of Chinese Turcologists spent ten days in Kirgizia and over a week in Kazakhstan during January. They were led by the Deputy Director of the Institute of Languages of National Minorities of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and included specialists in Uyghur and Kirgiz phonetics and in the publication of national literatures. They paid particular attention to reforms of Kirgiz and Dungan script, problems of translating and publishing in the local languages the literature of other peoples, the study of the Kazakh and Uyghur

languages, the production of dictionaries, the development of a national terminology, of the languages themselves and of their literatures. SK. 21.1.60; KP. 28.1.60

A delegation of the Chinese-Soviet Friendship Society, headed by Lyu Chan-shen, a member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, spent five days in Baku during February. BR. 18.2.60

Indonesia

An Indonesian trade delegation paid a visit to Tashkent and Baku during March. PV. 13.3.60; BR. 18.3.60

Iraq

A delegation of Iraqi trade union workers visited Uzbekistan in January. PV. 21, 23.1.60

Mongolia

A delegation of Mongolian Party workers visited Kazakhstan and Kirgizia during March. KP. 17, 23.3.60; SK. 24.3.60

A delegation of journalists from young people's newspapers in Mongolia spent six days in Baku on their way to Moscow during March. BR. 20.3.60

Vietnam (North Vietnam)

A Vietnamese political scientist was included in a North Vietnamese-East German delegation to Uzbekistan during February. PV. 7.2.60

FINE ARTS

Many unique manuscripts have recently come into the possession of the Firdousi Republican Library at Stalinabad, among them an original encyclopaedia, TARIKH-I-FARISHTA (The History of an Angel) compiled in the eleventh or twelfth century by an Indian writer, Mulla Muhammad Qasim Hindshah (?); a 1352 manuscript, well-preserved, containing the Indian writer Ziyai Birini's work on the Indian emperor and writer Fizuz Shah and his eight successors; a geometry in Arabic by the Persian astronomer Khwaja Nasreddin Tusi; Persian texts dating from 1585 of five complete works of Nizami Gandzhevi; and a copy of the poem YUSUF ZULAYKHA in the hand of the author Junaid Ullah Makhdom and dating from 1919. TI. 12.2.60; KT. 24.2.60

IRRIGATION

A 300-metre high dam is to be erected across the River Vakhsh halfway along its course at Nurek, Tadzhikistan. It will be the highest dam in the world, forming a lake 47 km. in length holding eight thousand million cubic metres of water. A hydroelectric power-station will be built there. P. 13.1.60

NATIONALITIES POLICY

T. Ul'dzhabayev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Tadzhik Communist Party, addressed the XIIIth Congress of the Party on 4 February 1960. The text of his speech appeared in KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA of 5 February from which the following brief extract is taken:

"The rapidly developing industry and agriculture require a large number of technically educated and trained personnel with wide qualifications, and this increase ought to be met chiefly by the native population. This question has great political significance and requires constant attention on the part of Party organizations. It is necessary to say that in some places this is not understood, and they do not do enough to promote the increase of native trained personnel. In the Leninabad Silk Kombinat, for example, there were in 1958, 1,800 workers of local nationality, but today there are only 1,100."

ORIENTAL STUDIES

Striking evidence of the wide scope of Soviet oriental studies can be found in two recent announcements about forthcoming publications. The first is in a catalogue issued by the Oriental Literature Publishing House (Izdatel'stvo Vostochnoy literatury) associated with the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, Moscow. This catalogue lists a total of 35 works divided into three series.

The first or "big" series, consists of critical editions and commentaries (sometimes with translations) of 19 major works in the Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Mongolian, Arabic, Persian, Egyptian, Sogdian, Turkish and Kurdish languages. These include a nine-volume critical edition of Ferdousi's SHAHNAMEH, and the text and translation of a recently discovered anonymous eleventh-century manuscript on the

Abbasid caliphate. The second or "small" series contains six works which include Khorezmi's MUHABBAT-NAMEH, Omar Khayyam's RUBAIYAT and MATHEMATICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL TREATIES, and some editions of Chinese and Korean works. The last series consists of translations of six works including Evliya Chelebi's SIYAHATNAMEH and the LAWS OF MANU.

All these 35 works are to be completed by 1964 and the majority of them by the end of this year.

The second project was announced in PROBLEMY VOSTOKOVEDENIYA, No. 6 of 1959. It is a series of brochures to be published by the same Oriental Literature Publishing House on the languages and groups of languages of Africa and non-Soviet Asia. Brochures on the following subjects are to appear by the end of 1961: Amharic, Ancient Uygur, Arabic, Arabic dialects of Central Asia, Aramaic, Assamese, Avestic, Baluchi, Burmese, Chinese, Chuang (Kwangsi Province), Hausa, Hindi, Indonesian, Japanese, Khmer (Cambodian), Korean, history of the Korean language, Kurdish, Languages of India, Languages of South China and South-East Asia, Luganda, Malayalam, Marathi, Mongolian, Mongolian languages and dialects of China, Pahlavi, Pali, Panjabi, Pashtu, Persian (Modern), Sanskrit, Siamese, Sogdian, Swahili, Tagalog (Philippines), Tamil, Telugu, Tibetan, Urdu, Uygur, Yagnobi (Pamirs) and Zulu.

Booklets on Soviet Muslim Asia

A series of booklets in English, each about 24 pages in length and with 12 pages of photographs (those on Azerbaydzhan and Tadzhikistan have only 8 pages of photographs), has been published by Soviet Booklets of London. The series is entitled "The Fifteen Soviet Socialist Republics Today and Tomorrow", and those which deal with the six Muslim republics, as presumably the other nine, are written by the chairman of the Council of Ministers in the republic in question. The author of KAZAKHSTAN, published in December 1959, is D.A. Kunayev, who has since been elected First Secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party.

Ed.- CAR

T H E B O R D E R L A N D S O F S O V I E T
C E N T R A L A S I A

A F G H A N I S T A N

The following analysis deals mainly with articles contained in a symposium called NEZAVISIMYY AFGANISTAN (Independent Afghanistan) edited by R.T. Akhramovich and published in Moscow in 1958. This is the most comprehensive work on Afghan affairs and history which has appeared in the Soviet Union of recent years and as such merits the detailed treatment here given to it. The Editors of CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW have aimed at showing not only the special approach of Soviet writers to Afghan history and problems, but also the extent of Soviet research and use of original source material, even if this latter aim may occasionally result in the inclusion of generally known facts.

For the convenience of readers, details of previous articles in CAR dealing with Afghan affairs are listed below:

Afghanistan: History, Current Affairs, Literature and Linguistics. Vol.IV, No.2.

India & Pakistan: II. The North-West Frontier Province - The Pathan Tribes. Vol.V, No.3, pp.295-312.

Relations between Britain, Russia and Afghanistan, 1872-80. Vol.VI, No.2.

British Policy in Central Asia in the Early Nineteenth Century. Vol.VI, No.4, pp.388-92ff.

Afghanistan: The Pashtunistan Problem. Vol.VII, No.3.
Afghanistan. Vol.VIII, No.1.

I. The Herat Rising of 1716-32 - II. Afghan Society under the Durrani - III. The State of Ahmad Shah Durrani - IV. The Finances of the Durrani Empire - V. Afghan-British Relations - VI. The Reign of Nadir Shah - VII. Soviet-Afghan Relations, 1917-58.

I. The Herat Rising of 1716-32

M.R. Arunova's article with the above title deals with what Soviet historians of Afghanistan regard as one of the first attempts at the formation of an Afghan State.

Before the formation of the Afghan State under Ahmad Shah Durrani, Arunova writes, the Afghans had been forcibly incorporated into various State formations, the last of which was the Persian Safavi State which at the beginning of the eighteenth century was in decline. A wave of dissatisfaction and revolt swept the country, affecting especially the conquered peoples. The Afghans not only had to acknowledge the supreme power of the Shah, pay taxes and supply soldiers but were also subject to religious oppression at the hands of the Shi'i clergy.

There were two attempts to set up independent Afghan principalities, writes Arunova, in Kandahar and Herat. In Kandahar, whose territory was inhabited by Gilzais and Abdalis, disturbances began in the first years of Husain's reign (1694-1722). In 1704 Gurgin Khan was sent to suppress the disorders. He did so with a brutality which still further alienated the people. In the revolt which followed, organized and led by Mir Wais who represented the interests of his tribe, the Gilzais, and of the Sunni clergy, Gurgin Khan was killed. Two military expeditions sent by the government in 1710-11 and 1713 to recapture Kandahar ended in disaster for the Safavi forces.

The following is a summary of Arunova's treatment of the Herat rising.

The territory of Herat was inhabited by Abdalis, many of whom had been deported there from Kandahar by Gurgin Khan. After his death they invited Abdullah Khan Sadozai and his son Asadullah to Herat to lead their rising. Abdullah and Asadullah were arrested, however, by Abbas Quli Khan Shamlu, the Safavi Governor of Herat. The resulting riots, in which not only Afghans but Uzbeks and Tajiks also took part, so alarmed the Safavi Government that they recalled Abbas Quli Khan and replaced him with Ja'far Khan Ustajlu.

Meanwhile Abdullah escaped, gained adherents and in 1717 besieged Herat. Ja'far Khan lacked reinforcements and the city was taken. The army sent under Fath 'Ali Khan Turkman to recapture it was destroyed by the rebels.

Between 1717 and 1719 the liberation movement spread to the tribes of Dagestan and to Kerman and Khorasan. The Arabs captured Bahrain.


In 1719 the Government made another attempt at retaking Herat. The 35,000 Government troops with artillery under Safi Quli Khan met 15,000 rebels at Kafir Qal'a and were routed. Disorder spread to all parts of the Safavi Empire. The Gilzais took Isfahan after an eight months' siege. Kerman, Fars and Persian Iraq fell. The Turks occupied the northern parts of the Empire.

Meanwhile within Herat a battle for power was taking place. Abdullah Khan had been succeeded as head of the Abdali tribe first by Zaman Khan and then by Muhammad Khan Afghan. After Muhammad Khan had failed to take Mashhad in 1722-3 power was seized by Zulfiqar Khan. He was opposed by Rahman Khan whose father he had killed. Their feud was so bloody that they were both forced to leave Herat and Muhammad Khan's brother, Allah-Yar Khan, was elected leader of the Abdalis.

At the Safavi court Nadir Quli Beg Afshar had obtained the favour of Shah Tahmasp (1722-32) and was preparing to fight the Turks and the Gilzais. In order to secure his rear, however, he had first to take Herat. Revolts in Astarabad and Mazandaran forced him to postpone his campaign against Herat for a year. The Abdalis used the time to close their ranks: Zulfiqar Khan was made Governor of Farah. In Herat they repaired defences, collected food and fodder and recruited men.

Nadir advanced against Herat in May 1729 with a force of 20,000 men with artillery. The Afghans met him outside the city. In the battle the Afghans had the advantage but had to retreat because Nadir called up fresh forces. The Afghans in their turn summoned Zulfiqar Khan from Farah and in order to gain time until his arrival pretended to treat for peace. On Zulfiqar Khan's arrival another battle lasting two days took place in which the Afghans were defeated. They were forced to sue for peace.

Nadir, on his part, was willing to make peace because of the threat of the Gilzais in Khorasan. His terms, therefore, were lenient as he did not want to drive the Abdalis, who had not been completely subdued, to a fresh rebellion and as he wanted their help against the Gilzais. The Abdalis had to pay tribute and free their prisoners. Allah-Yar Khan remained Amir but as Nadir's deputy. The Jamshid tribe, who were Shi'i Muslims, were removed to North Khorasan.



In 1730, however, there were fresh disorders. The people were unable to pay the new taxes, the clergy were enraged at the favour shown to the Shi'is, and the feudal chiefs were enraged at being forced to share with Nadir the proceeds of their exploitation of the Abdali tribesmen. Husain, ruler of Kandahar, promised them support.

Allah-Yar Khan tried to restrain the Abdalis and was replaced by the more extreme Zulfiqar Khan who declared Herat independent and advanced on Mashhad. On the approach of Nadir, however, he retreated to Herat followed by Nadir who arrived in May 1731.

Saidal Khan Gilzai had come from Kandahar with a detachment of men and was in charge of the defence of Herat. The defenders made constant raids on the besiegers while all Nadir's attempts to take the city by storm were unsuccessful. He therefore decided to surround Herat and reduce it by starvation. Although the defenders' raids continued Saidal Khan lost hope of success and left for Kandahar taking his men with him. At this the Abdalis opened up negotiations with Nadir who was represented by Allah-Yar Khan. The Abdalis, however, still hoped for reinforcements from Kandahar and frequently broke off the negotiations which were terminated when Nadir's representative, Allah-Yar Khan, deserted and joined them.

Shortage of food within Herat was now critical and the defenders began to send out heavily armed foraging expeditions to collect food and fight their way back into the city with it. Although there were some successes the food shortage grew. Nadir, who had failed to bribe the leaders of the rebellion or to coerce Allah-Yar Khan by arresting his family, finally starved Herat into surrender in March 1732. The terms of surrender promised the defenders their lives and Nadir contented himself with exiling Allah-Yar Khan, nominating all the members of the city council, giving the post of governor to Muhammad Khan Mervi, one of his adherents, and deporting thousands of Abdalis to Khorasan.

The story of the Herat rising, Arunova writes, shows (a) the opposition of the Afghan people to foreign rule, and (b) that the people were the motive force of the rising. The feudal rulers, of course, also wanted independence but only because they would then be more free to exploit the Afghan people.

It is perhaps noteworthy that in this article Arunova, although she does not omit to point out that a class struggle was taking place among the Afghans or that the interests of the feudal rulers were not those of the people, yet puts a different emphasis on the Herat rising from that given in a book of which she and K.Z. Ashrafyan are joint authors - GOSUDARSTVO NADIR SHAKHA AFSHARA, Moscow, 1958. Here the

authors write: "In the period under discussion there frequently flared up, together with popular uprisings, feudal revolts of the nobility of a number of tribes", and go on to say that in these revolts the tribal leaders were making use of popular discontent with the political and economic situation. They further write: "It was in these years that the revolts of the feudal leadership of the Abdali tribe of Afghans took place in Herat under the leadership of Zulfiqar Khan (1730-31)."

II. Afghan Society under the Durrani

There recently appeared in Moscow a book entitled AKHMAD SHAKH - OSNOVATEL' AFGANSKOGO GOSUDARSTVA, a translation from the Persian of the Afghan historian Mir Ghulam Muhammad Gubar. The Russian edition was prefaced by a long and interesting article by I.M. Reysner.

Reysner welcomes Gubar's book because it gives a different point of view from that of such British historians as Sykes, Macmunn and Malleson who tend to ignore eastern sources and who "were first of all practical participants in British colonial policy who occupied themselves with the history of Afghanistan with quite definite aims in view. Hence their neglect of those pages of the history of this country which, although so important to the Afghans themselves, had no connexion with the three Anglo-Afghan wars or with British policy in the Middle East." Reysner, however, praises earlier British works, especially Mountstuart Elphinstone's "An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul. . ."

Owing to the comparative youth and inexperience of Afghan historical scholarship, Reysner writes, Gubar has not managed to give a complete analysis of his material. He has not given enough space to the history of Central Asia, India and Persia in the eighteenth century, when their history was closely connected with that of Afghanistan. Finally, he has assumed in his Afghan readers a general knowledge of the facts of the history and economy of Afghanistan in the eighteenth century, especially of the structure and inter-relations of the tribes, which the non-Afghan reader will not possess. In his introductory article, therefore, Reysner makes good these omissions. His sketch of the history of Central Asia, Persia and India in the eighteenth century has been omitted. A summary of his account of the social and economic structure of Afghanistan in this period follows.

The original cradle of the Afghan race was the Sulaiman Mountains. Over a long period the Afghans spread out over the right bank of the

Indus and the Ghazni plateau, assimilating a number of non-Afghan tribes such as the Turkic Gilzais (who were originally called Khiljis). During this process, which was accelerated by the Mongol invasions, some nomad tribes took to a settled way of life. This process of expansion was mainly finished by the sixteenth century. In eighteenth century Afghanistan there was a strong distinction between the full citizens - the members of the free Afghan tribes - and the dependent non-Afghan population (Tajiks, etc.) who were generally called hamsayas (vassals) or faqirs (subjects). The number of hamsayas on the territory of a tribe differed from tribe to tribe. They were a minority but not an insignificant one. They were, however, the most exploited section of the population and therefore economically the most valuable. The free Afghans owned inherited plots of land and paid few or no taxes. The hamsayas, on the other hand, were prevented from owning land and paid heavy taxes. They had limited rights and in some cases were serfs. They mainly worked on the land as share-croppers but were also craftsmen, traders and money-lenders. Some hamsayas were originally Afghans who had been defeated and subjected by other tribes. The free Afghan lived on his land or as a nomad. To trade (with the exception of the transit trade carried on by the powindahs, or nomads) was a disgrace. Any member of a free tribe who lost his plot of land (daftar) became a hamsaya. With the growth of property inequality among the Afghans, this began to happen more and more frequently and the term "hamsaya" ceased to denote the dependent, non-Afghan, population and came to have a class (soslovnny) connotation. This was the situation in the middle of the eighteenth century. But the tribal system survived because, in spite of a sharp class struggle among the tribesmen, the tribe as a whole continued to face the hamsayas as collective owner of the land on which the latter worked. The position of the hamsayas among the nomad tribes is still unclear. In general it may be said that the Afghan tribal system was based on the exploitation of the hamsayas.

Among the Durrani (Abdalis) the land was the property of the tribe but, with the exception of the common pastures, was shared out among the members of the clan (rod), the lowest subdivision of the tribe (plemya). The shares were originally equal in size but came to be different with the passage of time as some were subdivided more than others. Chiefs and members of the clergy received larger shares than the other clan members. Vesh, or periodic re-allotment of land among clan members, had already ceased among the Durrani. By the middle of the eighteenth century land could be sold and had become private property.

The power of the Durrani tribal chief depended on his wealth (derived from war plunder) his success as a leader in war and on the support of his dependents. The chief had some judicial power in

competition with the tribal jirga. The members of the tribe, however, still kept their economic independence and their pride and they controlled the jirga, which had a democratic character. Among his own tribesmen, in fact, the chief was merely primus inter pares. His power was much greater over the hamsayas. This dual character of the power of the tribal chief had its counterpart in the power of Ahmad Shah who had much more authority in conquered territory inhabited by non-Afghans than at home.

Although the clergy were a privileged class whose land was tax-free and was worked by hamsayas or poor Afghans, they were not all favoured and the standard of living of the poor clergy was hardly any different from that of the ordinary tribesman.

Durrani society, therefore, had formed classes. The feudal, or exploiting, class had two sections, the gentry and the clergy. The mass of the peasantry were farmers or nomads and their poorer sections merged with the hamsayas.

Among the Gilzais the situation was little different. The power of their khans was less, there were fewer crafts and less trade. The other tribes also, although less developed than the Durrani and Gilzais, were at different stages of the development of a class society.

The Afghan State which was founded in 1747 was a feudal State. Although the leading role in its foundation was played by the Durrani it also answered the interests of the other khans who "needed a State apparatus, both to crush resistance within the country and to use in the conquest and plunder of neighbouring peoples. It was not by accident that the choice of the Durrani khans and clergy fell on the twenty-five-year-old Ahmad Khan who, in spite of his youth, had already shown himself to be a distinguished general and organizer, especially in the critical days after the death of Nadir Shah and during the return from Persia to Kandahar of the Afghan auxiliary force. The candidature of Ahmad Khan suited the Durrani khans not only because he was a well-known general and popular with the troops - he [also] belonged to the Sadozai clan [the clan from which the Durrani Khan was always chosen]. . . which was extremely weak and few in numbers by comparison with the other clans and subdivisions of this tribe. Thus in the person of Ahmad Khan Afghanistan acquired a Shah who, although distinguished by the most noble birth, was of a clan which could not give him great support and who was therefore not dangerous to the leaders of the more powerful Durrani clans." Ahmad Shah could not retain his throne without the support of the Durrani khans and this is the reason for his "mildness" towards them which Gubar praises as condescension and mercy. The Durrani were free of taxation and had only to supply soldiers. The tribal leaders were "the real masters of the

situation in the districts and their only important obligation was military service", and even this obligation they fulfilled only in so far as was profitable to them. As Ahmad Shah could not control the khans or defeat them (since they provided the overwhelming part of his forces) he had to compromise and woo them.

III. The State of Ahmad Shah Durrani

"The Independent Afghan State of Ahmad Shah Durrani and his Successors", Yu.V. Gankovskiy. Gankovskiy quotes numerous sources. Of these (excluding the Russian sources) the most important, especially as regards the comparative power of Ahmad Shah and the Afghan tribal khans, are given at the end of this article.

Gankovskiy asserts that Ahmad Shah's Empire was not the first Afghan State formation; there had been the principalities of Akora and Teri in the sixteenth century and of Kandahar and Herat in the eighteenth. Only Ahmad Shah's Empire, however, covered the whole area inhabited by Afghans.

On the question of the stage of feudal development reached by Afghan society and on the dual nature of the Shah's power in Afghan and conquered territory Gankovskiy agrees with Reysner (above). He points out also the fact that the power of the Durrani khans was further reinforced by the hereditary nature of their appointments in the State administration, in the Army and the Court. The Shah still had the right to appoint officers but only from among the members of the appropriate clan (rod). The Shah also had the right to nominate the tribal khans, but here too his choice was limited to the khan-khel (i.e. the khans of the khel or tribe).

Although later, Gankovskiy writes, Ahmad's personal authority and the strength of his Guard grew to such an extent that he could afford to pay less attention to the Durrani nobility, he still never decided an important affair of state without consulting his jirga. The Shah's own authority derived largely from his being head of the Sadozais, the Khan-khel of the Durranis, so that it is possible to say that his power was supported and hallowed, and at the same time limited by "survivals of the tribal system".

After Ahmad Shah's death, when the military and economic basis of his power had been undermined by his failures against the Sikhs, feudal decentralization took place. Revolts occurred of the khans against the central power. Timur Shah (1773-93) tried to rule without considering or consulting the khans and was finally poisoned.

During the reign of Shah Zaman (1793-1801) the sardars (tribal leaders) plotted to limit his power by acquiring the right to elect and depose the Shah. Neither Ahmad Shah nor his successors was able to subdue the tribes and their khans. Even the Afghan lands, Gankovskiy concludes, did not compose a firm State unit.

Gankovskiy next gives a sketch of the administration of the Court, of the State and of the Army. A summary appears below.

The Court (Darbar)

All posts within the Court were hereditary to the Durrani khans. The Court ceremonial was modelled on that of the Court of Nadir Shah Afshar. There were many Persians and Indians (kyzylbash) among the courtiers of middle rank.

State Administration

(a) Central. The Administration was headed by the Shah's vazir or Chief Minister whose duties included control over the various departments and provinces, the maintenance of public order and security, and the selection of candidates for high office. This office was hereditary in the Bamizai khel of the Popolzai subdivision of the Durranis. Under the vazir were the departments of finance, justice and intelligence and the Shah's secretariat.

The last department (dar-al-insha, or divan-i-insha) is easily described. It was responsible for issuing the Shah's decrees (firman) and for carrying on the Shah's correspondence. It was headed by the Shah's secretary.

The Ministry of Finances (headed by the divan-begi or mustaufi) was responsible for the collection of taxes, both direct and indirect, the management of the Shah's domain (khalise), the control of the mint, the treasury and the stores of goods paid as taxes in kind, and for all State expenditure. The divan-begi was also responsible for irrigation and public works.

Although the Shah's privy purse and the State Treasury were not kept separate every effort was made to put as much as possible of income into funds in case of future need.

The Intelligence Section was headed by the kharkara-bashi who was also responsible for the postal services. "Various sources note that especially in the provinces conquered by Ahmad Shah and his successors all classes of society swarmed with spies."

Shariat justice was in the hands of the Muslim clergy. The capital and provincial judges were chosen by the Shah on the recommendation of the Court Imam.

(b) Provincial. The provinces (vilayet) were usually arranged on a tribal basis. There were three classes of province:

- (i) Those under the direct rule of the Shah, who appointed their governors. These were usually conquered territories not inhabited by Afghans.
- (ii) Vassal khanates and amirates. The Shah had no right either to appoint or to remove the rulers.
- (iii) The Afghan tribal areas which were considered independent and were ruled by the tribal khans and maliks.

The province was organized like the State. Its most important commanders were: the military commander (amir lashkar), the treasurer (divan), the administrator of khalise lands (mamur-i khalisejat), and the head of the customs service (mudir-i-gumruk). In the majority of provinces there were also fortress commanders (galadar), chiefs of police (mirshab), irrigation officials (mirab), etc. The control of the centre over the provincial governor was loose. While the governor continued to pay his share of taxes to the central treasury he was allowed to do more or less as he pleased.

The power of the provincial governors was greatest in the third class of provinces, the Afghan tribal areas, which were ruled by the tribal khans. Here the khans were not only representatives of the Afghan State but were also members of the tribal feudal ruling class and thus "received the opportunity of using the whole might of the State apparatus of the young Afghan power for the enslavement of the free rank-and-file members of the tribe". The khans were responsible for the defence of their territory and so began to change from mere tribal rulers to territorial rulers. The tribal khan was nominated by the Shah from the khan-khel of the tribe and received a royal firman and the title of khan, sultan, sarkarda or malik.

In the vassal khanates the administrative system remained as it had been before subjection. The rulers of these states were usually bound to supply troops to the Shah's army and to pay a small tribute.

In all except the first class of provinces the control of the centre was weak. "So even in an administrative sense the territories conquered by Ahmad Shah did not represent a firm unit."

The Army

The Army was composed of the regular units, the khans' cavalry and the tribal levies. The regular units were: the Guard, a corps of Persian musketeers, the Shah's personal bodyguard, a detachment of field-police (nasakchi) and ancillary arms including artillery. The nucleus of the regular units was the Guards Cavalry. This unit was formed of non-Afghans who, as they had no connections with the Afghan population, were more likely to be faithful to the Shah. Seventy per cent of the armed forces, however, were irregular, i.e. the khans' cavalry and the tribal levies who, as noted above, owed allegiance primarily to their tribal rulers.

Although the Shah was Supreme Commander, executive command was in the hands of a Commander-in-Chief (sipahsalar).

The numbers of the Army varied. In 1748 Ahmad Shah led 30,000 men against India. At Panipat he led an army of approximately 80,000 men plus 250-300,000 irregulars. The tribal levies were loosely linked and sometimes did not obey the Shah's orders at all. The tribal system meant that the Shah's army was in effect a collection of small tribal armies.

The loss of the Panjab had a bad effect on the armed forces and Ahmad Shah's successors were much weaker than he. This, together with the growth of large feudal land-holdings among the khans and the process of feudal decentralization, caused the State to break up.

IV. The Finances of the Durrani Empire

Almost simultaneously with the above article Gankovskiy published a book, IMPERIYA DURRANI, Izd. vost. lit., Moscow, 1958, covering the same ground. Chapter 5 of this book, "Taxes and the Tax System: The State's Income and Expenditure", is here condensed.

The income of the Afghan State was derived from direct and indirect taxation, usually paid in kind. As the most important taxes were those on land, the various categories of land-holding in Afghanistan in the second half of the eighteenth century must be considered. State lands formed a large category which grew by conquest. By the end of the eighteenth century, however, they had mostly been given as jagirs to Durrani khans and their adherents. There was also the growing category of waqf lands granted by the Shah or other individuals to religious foundations. There were the privately-owned mulk lands which did not oblige the owner to carry out any kind of civil or

military service. He could bequeath or sell them or dispose of them as he pleased. Tax on these lands was paid by the owner who received rent from the peasants. Finally there were the lands of the village communities (Russian obshchina) and the tribal lands. The Afghan tribes had been freed by Ahmad Shah from many of the taxes imposed by Nadir Shah and both Durranis and other tribes paid only nominal taxes if any at all. This category of land, therefore, did not contribute much to the income of the Afghan State. In law the Shah was ultimate owner of the land and by virtue of this position levied a rent/tax from all the territory in his control with the exception of the jagirs and the land of some tribes which gave military service in lieu of taxes.

The most important taxes were the salesat, a tax of one-third of the harvest on irrigated land, and the kharaj, a tax of one-tenth of the harvest on non-irrigated land. Both these taxes applied to all categories of land with the exception of waqf and Afghan tribal lands. In the case of irrigated lands, if the irrigation installations had been built not by the State but by private persons or by communities, then the salesat also could be reduced to one-tenth of the harvest. There were also taxes on water, paid either by the owner of the canal or, if the canal were State owned, by its users, and on orchards, paid either according to area or to the number of trees, vines, etc. Other taxes were the hearth tax, the cattle tax, the mill tax and taxes levied to maintain the army, the mirabs, the headmen and the kazis. All non-Muslims paid a "ransom tax" (jiziya). In the towns tradesmen and shopkeepers also paid special taxes. The State derived additional income from the exploitation of mineral resources, the farming of taxes and from customs duties and tolls. The taxes were farmed out sometimes to provincial governors but usually to Hindus. The original farmer would farm the taxes out in his turn until finally the collection of the taxes from each sub-district had been farmed. The evils of this system are well-known. There was a popular couplet in the Panjab which said: 'What we have eaten and drunk is our own, the rest is Ahmad Shah's.' The balance of the State's income was derived from the sale of offices, tribute from vassals, the income of the Shah's estates and of various State monopolies, the issuing of money, fines, confiscations and war-booty.

According to Dow in THE HISTORY OF HINDOSTAN, Vol.II, p.382, the total annual income at the end of Ahmad Shah's reign was 30m. rupees. Under Timur Shah it fell to 10m. rupees and under Shah Zaman to 6.7m. Under Shuja, however, it rose to 9m. rupees. The eastern, or Indian, provinces were both taxed more heavily and contributed a greater share of that tax to the central treasury than the western: on the basis of material collected by Gulam Sarvar in 1793-4 (H.R. Gupta, STUDIES IN THE LATER MUGHAL HISTORY OF THE PANJAB (1707-1793), Lahore, 1944,

pp.272-5) it can be shown that while the eastern provinces of Kashmir, Multan, Dera Ismail Khan, Dera Ghazi Khan, Shikarpur, Muzaffarabad, Attock, Indian Hazara and Sukkur paid a total of 7,120,000 rupees of which 3,801,000 or 53.3 per cent, were paid to the central treasury, the western provinces of Kabul, Peshawar, Jelalabad, Gorbend, Bangashat Ghazni, Kalat-i Gilzai, Charikar and Panjshir, Kandahar, Farah, Herat, Bamyan and Hazarajat paid only 5,338,000 rupees, of which the central treasury received 1,748,000 - 32.7 per cent.

Expenditure fell under the two heads of Army and Administration, the Army taking the lion's share. Gubar (AKHMAD SHAKH - OSNOVATEL' AFGANSKOGO GOSUDARSTVA, p.263) estimates Ahmad Shah's total military expenditure per year at 19m. rupees. This seems exaggerated. Shah Zaman's direct military expenditure did not exceed 1,850,000 rupees. Even if the income from the jagirs granted to maintain officers (4,200,000 rupees) is added, the total is still no more than 6,050,000 rupees. It is unlikely that military expenditure was any greater under Ahmad Shah.

Shah Zaman's administrative expenditure amounted to 5m. rupees annually. 2,370,000 rupees were spent on the upkeep of the Court (this sum does not include the contributions made in kind by the provinces and vassal states for this purpose). So called "charity" accounted for 283,000 rupees, most of which found their way into the hands of the Muslim clergy. On public works 210,000 rupees were spent. When these and other expenses are taken into account total expenditure at the beginning of Shah Zaman's reign was at the most 14.1m. rupees. Of this sum, however, only 4,610,000 rupees fell to the account of the central treasury; the remainder (67 per cent) was covered by the provincial budgets.

Gankovskiy quotes the following table to account for expenditure from the central treasury. His source is H.R. Gupta, op.cit., p.268.

<u>Object of expense</u>	<u>thousands of rupees</u>	<u>percentage of total</u>
Military expenditure	1,460	31.6
Shah's stables	150)	
Elephant houses	50)	
Mules	80)	8.4
Camels	110)	
Court expenditure	1,170	25.3
incl.harem 560, kitchen 220		
Shah's personal expenditure	1,200	26.0
Construction	210	4.5
Subsidies to Balkh and Akcha	185	4.2
	<u>4,615</u>	

Gulam Sarvar's figures, collected in 1793-4 (see above), give the total income of the central treasury at this time as 5,549,000 rupees. It was possible, therefore, to put away large sums in case of an emergency. According to Gulam Sarvar (H.R. Gupta, op.cit., p. 526) under Shah Zaman out of 6.7m.rupees 2.1m. were saved in this way.

Towards the end of the Durrani Empire, war, revolt and feudal disintegration brought about a decrease in the State's income. Trade was disrupted and the customs which had brought in 600-700,000 rupees at the end of the eighteenth century brought in only 25,000 rupees at the beginning of the nineteenth. Also the Durrani khans had been filching the State khalise lands; seventy-five per cent of these lands in the Kandahar province was in the hands of Durrani khans by the end of Ahmad Shah's reign. Thus the growth of the jagirdars' wealth took place at the expense of that of the State. This hastened the fall of the Empire.

V. Afghan-British Relations

The First Afghan War (See CAR, Vol.IV, No.2, pp.164-6.)

N.A. Khalfin, "British Expansion in Afghanistan and the Liberation Battle of the Afghan People in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century".

Afghanistan was important to Britain, Khalfin writes, from the point of view of both strategy and trade as it lay on the cross-roads of the routes joining Persia, Central Asia, India and western China. The British wanted "to turn Afghanistan into. . . an object of colonial exploitation and a military-political springboard for penetration into Central Asia". In pursuit of this aim British policy passed through three stages:

- (a) 1801-30, reconnaissance, spying and diplomatic intrigue;
- (b) 1830-9, as a result of an economic crisis in Britain intrigue was replaced by military action, leading to
- (c) the First Afghan War.

These activities were camouflaged by "all sorts of demagogical arguments and by a falsification of historical facts and documents which at times assumed quite crude forms". The "French threat" which was the original excuse soon gave way to the "Russian threat". Khalfin dismisses this theory in the normal Soviet style, arguing that it was

beyond Russia's power to threaten India and that the British knew this and only used the "threat" as a pretext. What the British wanted, he alleges, was to expand their Empire and "to extract immense profits from the exploitation and plunder of the peoples of the East".

As examples of British tactics during the first stage Khalfin gives the 1809 treaties with Persia and Sind, Mountstuart Elphinstone's mission to Kabul, the travels in the East of the "British agent" Mir Izzat-Ullah in 1812 and Moorcroft and Trebeck's travels in Afghanistan in 1820-5.

The 1809 treaties are characterized as a typical British application of the tactic of "divide and rule", since they made Persia an ally of Britain in case of a war with Afghanistan and gave Ranjit Singh full freedom of action to the north and west of the Sutlej, i.e. against Afghanistan.

Elphinstone's mission, writes Khalfin, was obviously not prompted by any possibility of an alliance between France, Persia and Russia. With Persia trying to subdue Transcaucasia any alliance between Russia and Persia was impossible. The treaty concluded by Elphinstone was "the first of a series of one-sided (kabal'nyy) agreements foisted by Britain on Afghanistan" and bound the Afghans "to defend the British invaders in India". The fact that at this time Britain had a treaty with Persia which enlisted Persian support against Afghanistan in case of war proves British duplicity, Khalfin asserts. Khalfin alleges that Elphinstone intrigued with the Afghan clergy while he was at the Amir's court. The researches of his staff into the economy, geography, etc., of Afghanistan are taken as proving aggressive intent.

With a crisis of overproduction in Britain, British policy in Afghanistan entered its second phase. The British manufacturing bourgeoisie wanted new markets in India, Afghanistan and Central Asia and a sign of their mood was their insistence on "the liquidation of the East India Company". [In 1833 the East India Company lost its monopoly of the China trade, having lost its monopoly in India, as Khalfin notes, in 1813. It continued to exist, however, and to collect revenue. - Ed. CAR.]

As examples of continued British reconnaissance in Afghanistan and its approaches, Khalfin gives Alexander Burnes' missions in 1831-3 to collect information on the navigability of the Indus and on the Panjab, Afghanistan and Central Asia, Carless and Wood's mission to the Indus, and Masson's journey to Afghanistan in 1835, and finally Burnes' mission in 1836.

The pressure of the British bourgeoisie at home, however, caused the British to support the attempt of Shuja, ex-Amir of Afghanistan, to regain the Afghan throne in alliance with Ranjit Singh (in 1832-4). This attempt was carried out, Khalfin writes, in accordance with a plan worked out by the British Political Agent at Ludhiana, Captain Wade, and was financed by Britain. In 1837 Britain intervened in the war between Persia and Herat and in 1841 captured the Persian market by means of a one-sided treaty which she forced on Persia.

Lieut. Vitkevich was sent to Dost Muhammad, the ruler of Kabul, as Russia's representative in answer to an appeal which Dost Muhammad had made to Russia, Britain and Persia to mediate between him and the Sikhs on the question of Peshawar, captured by the Sikhs in 1834. Alexander Burnes, who was already on his way, was made Britain's representative. Burnes' mission was both commercial and political in aim, Khalfin alleges: of his staff, Lieut. Leech of the Bombay Engineers had the task of carrying out military reconnaissance, Lieut. Wood of the Indian Navy of reconnoitring the rivers, and Percival Lord of investigating Afghanistan's natural resources.

Britain's determination to fan the flames of Afghan-Sikh enmity is shown, Khalfin writes, by the fact that although Burnes supported Dost Muhammad's claim to Peshawar he was rebuked by Macnaghten in a letter of 20 January 1837 and instructed to deliver an ultimatum that Dost Muhammad should give up his claim to Peshawar and break off all relations with Russia. Dost Muhammad's refusal meant the diplomatic failure of Burnes' mission, but this failure, alleges Khalfin, was deliberate and did not mean any failure in basic British policy.

Khalfin quotes Vitkevich's official instructions as follows: "Your main obligation. . . is to pacify the Afghan rulers (Dost Muhammad of Kabul and Kukhendil Khan of Kandahar), explain to them how useful for them personally and for the safety of their dominions it is for them to be in agreement and close connexion with each other in order to protect themselves against external enemies and internal revolts. [You must then] explain to them. . . the necessity of making use of the favour and protection of Persia." Khalfin goes on to recount how Vitkevich (whom he calls a "semi-official agent of Russia") promised Dost Muhammad Russia's help in a battle for the return of Peshawar. He says nothing, however, about Vitkevich's repudiation and suicide. Britain, he writes, made use of the episode to raise the "Russian bogey" and prepared to "force a war on the Afghan people". With this British policy entered its third phase.

In spite of the official British version of events which accused Dost Muhammad of intriguing with Russia against Britain and alleged that Burnes had advised invasion, a version which Palmerston supported

by falsified and forged documents, in fact, writes Khalfin, nothing could be further from the truth. Britain merely wanted to turn Afghanistan into a vassal state by installing a British puppet on the Afghan throne.

The original plan of attack, according to which Ranjit Singh was to provide the bulk of the troops, is represented by Khalfin as an attempt to weaken Sind. Khalfin quotes Sir Kerr Fraser-Tytler (AFGHANISTAN, p.107) as his authority for asserting that Ranjit "demanded" that "sugar be added to milk", i.e. that British troops also should take part, although Fraser-Tytler mentions no demand and represents the change of plan as being due to British initiative.

[Khalfin's account of military operations has been omitted.]

Khalfin ends his article by emphasizing the unanimous desire of the Afghan people to rid themselves of the British invaders, a factor in the British defeat which, he alleges, "British bourgeois historians" have "forgotten or not recognized at all".

The Second Afghan War (See CAR, Vol.IV, No.2, pp.167-9; Vol.VI, No.2, pp.205-28.)

M.A. Babakhodzhayev, "Britain's Aggressive Policy in Afghanistan and the Battle of the Afghan People for Independence in the Seventies of the Nineteenth Century".

Babakhodzhayev quotes numerous British and two Afghan sources. These are listed at the end of this analysis.

An article by F.Kh. Yuldashbayeva published in 1955 in TRUDY SAGU, No.LXVIII and entitled "The Russo-Afghan Demarcation and the Intensification of British Aggression in Central Asia and Afghanistan (1872-1880)" (see CAR, Vol.VI, No.2, pp.205-28) had as its theme the statement that "during the period 1869-80 the British Government's policy in Asia, from its base in India, was to absorb Afghanistan with the object of using that country as a base for aggression against Russia." Babakhodzhayev's article makes no mention of a projected British attack on Russia and considers that British actions in Afghanistan were simply part of the natural (although reprehensible) process of "imperial expansion". In other words the main aim of British policy was to reduce Afghanistan to the status of a vassal. Babakhodzhayev mentions the possibility of British aggression against Russia only as an explanation of Kaufman's rapprochement with Afghanistan and the Stoletov mission in 1877.

Whereas Yuldashbayeva's article made hardly any reference to Russian "imperial expansion" north of Afghanistan, Babakhodzhayev mentions the successive stages of the Russian advance in Turkestan and alleges that the British regarded this advance as a threat, not to India as they pretended, but to their own expansion into Turkestan. Babakhodzhayev carries no brief for the Tsarist Government, which by his own evidence having first declared that Afghanistan was outside its sphere of influence, then made use of Sher Ali in pursuit of purely Russian interests and abandoned him to the British. However, like Yuldashbayeva, he represents Tsarist imperialism as being in respect of Afghanistan less rapacious and more reasonable than British imperialism. In connexion with Abdurrahman's exit from Turkestan to Afghanistan in 1880 he writes: "The Tsarist Government, preferring to see as a neighbour to [Russian] Central Asia an independent Afghan State rather than a British colony. . . at the beginning of 1880. . . allowed Sher Ali's relative Abdurrahman to leave Turkestan for Afghanistan. . . The Tsarist authorities calculated that Abdurrahman, if he were confirmed on the Afghan throne, would hold to a Russian course or at least carry out a foreign policy which would be independent of Britain."

From 1869 to 1873, Babakhodzhayev writes, the British were forced by the aftermaths of the Indian Mutiny temporarily to renounce their aggressive plans in Central Asia. Instead they followed a policy of "friendship with the de facto Afghan ruler" which implied supporting now one, now another of the claimants to the throne in order to keep the country weak and divided. For this reason Mayo [appointed Governor-General of India in 1868] refused to conclude a treaty with Sher Ali at Ambala in 1869. At the same time the British favoured Afghan aspirations on the south bank of the Oxus (the aspirations, Babakhodzhayev hastens to add, not of the Afghan people but of "Afghan ruling circles"). They did this, he writes, because they wanted Afghanistan to expand as much as possible before annexation so as to make annexation more worth while.

On Russian expansion in Turkestan and on the delimitation of Afghanistan's frontiers Babakhodzhayev writes: "It is not surprising that the incorporation by Tsarist Russia of Tashkent (1865) and Samarkand (1868) and her further penetration deep into Central Asia called forth the disquiet of British ruling circles. In Russia's policy Great Britain discerned a direct counteraction to her own expansionist plans in the Middle East which counted on the maximum expansion of British colonial domains. These circumstances moved the British to begin negotiations with the Tsarist Government on the demarcation of spheres of influence between Britain and Russia in the Middle East.

"Tsarist Russia was occupied with the assimilation of the newly acquired territories in Central Asia and was not planning any annexation of Afghan territory. Therefore she proposed that Russia and Great Britain should combine to guarantee the independence of Afghanistan (more accurately, of the regions over which Amir Sher Ali's power spread) and should consider this territory a neutral zone.


"The British did not wish to renounce the idea of subduing Afghanistan and rejected Russia's proposal, declaring that it was essential to extend the border of the neutral zone 'to the north'."

Babakhodzhayev obviously regards the final settlement in 1873 as being brought about mainly by Russia who agreed to consider Afghanistan outside her sphere of influence and "in order to bring about a rapid solution of the Afghan problem agreed to recognize the power of the Amir of Afghanistan over the semi-independent areas of Badakhshan, Maimana and some other territories on the left bank of the Amu-Dar'ya."

Now that an agreement with Russia had been achieved, Babakhodzhayev writes, the British went over from polite assurances of "friendship" to diplomatic pressure on the Afghan Government. Northbrook's [Governor-General of India 1872-6] attempt to induce Sher Ali to receive a British representative in Kabul to receive information on the results of the Anglo-Russian negotiations and on the Seistan award failed, but Sher Ali agreed to send a representative to Simla. Here the British demanded the establishment of British representatives in Kandahar, Herat and Kabul. Sher Ali's representative, Sa'id Nur Muhammad refused, but Northbrook did not give up and in a letter reminded Sher Ali of the "Russian threat" and offered him aid against Russia in return for his acceptance of British control over Afghan foreign policy and of British agents in Afghanistan to watch the northern frontiers.

The failure of the Simla Conference, the Seistan award and the British refusal to recognize Sher Ali's younger son Abdullah Jan as the heir apparent made the Amir doubtful of British goodwill.

In 1874 Disraeli replaced Gladstone as Prime Minister and the "forward policy" replaced that of the "closed frontier". Salisbury, Secretary of State for India, wrote to Northbrook about the necessity of gathering information on Afghanistan of interest to the British Government, and proposed that he should "without delay. . . find some pretext to send a mission to Kabul" and insist that the Amir should receive it. Northbrook demurred and was replaced by Lytton who had full powers to defend the Indo-Afghan frontier by whatever means the circumstances demanded without considering the wishes of the Amir or the interests of his dynasty. In fact, writes Babakhodzhayev, this



meant that he could put into execution Britain's aggressive plans in Afghanistan and camouflage his actions by reference to the non-existent "Russian threat".

Lytton demanded that Sher Ali should receive Sir Lewis Pellew in Kabul, and when the latter refused, pleading the impossibility of guaranteeing his safety, tried to frighten the Amir by references to a possible alliance between Britain and Russia who could then with impunity "wipe Afghanistan off the map". He gave the Amir the "choice between a voluntary acceptance of a British protectorate over Afghanistan or a British military attack", Babakhodzhayev writes.

Simultaneously the British began to encircle Afghanistan: in 1876 Chitral was subdued and in the following year Gilgit. The occupation of Quetta (1876), wrote John Lawrence [Governor-General of India 1863-8] in THE TIMES, was "the first step on the path to the occupation of Kandahar and Herat".

The draft treaty of 14 articles and seven secret articles which the British intended to propose to the Afghan side at Peshawar in 1877 gave Britain control over Afghan foreign policy, trade rights and the right to station British representatives on Afghan territory and thus, alleges Babakhodzhayev, "was not at all different from the one-sided agreements which Britain by threats, intrigue and every kind of trick forced on the Indian principalities, depriving their peoples of independence and sentencing them to colonial slavery." Negotiations broke down on the question of British representatives, and the Viceroy seized the occasion of the death of the Afghan representative Sa'id Nur Muhammad to break off negotiations. The report that Sher Ali had at the last moment sent an emissary with instructions to accept the British demands is dismissed by Babakhodzhayev who considers that Sher Ali was only manoeuvring to gain time.

It was at this time that a "lively correspondence" began between Sher Ali and General Kaufman, the Governor-General of Turkestan. Alarmed at this the British "decided to make use of the authority of the Sultan of Turkey who was considered the Caliph of all Muslims" to isolate Afghanistan from Russia. In 1877 the Sultan's emissary, Ali Hamid, proposed that Sher Ali should join Turkey, Britain and the khanate of Bukhara in an anti-Russian bloc. [As authority for the statement that this mission was sent on British initiative Babakhodzhayev quotes Girs' letter to Lord Derby of 12 September 1877 and the Afghan historian Fayz Muhammad, SIRAJ AT-TAVARIKH.]

The casus belli against Afghanistan which the British were looking for came when in 1878 "Tsarist Russia in circumstances of a sharp

aggravation of Anglo-Russian contradictions in the Near East and on the eve of the Congress of Berlin decided on a rapprochement with Afghanistan who was seeking Russia's support at that time against the approaching menace of British aggression". On 29 July 1878 the Stoletov Mission arrived in Kabul "to reinforce the friendship between Russia and Afghanistan and conclude a Russo-Afghan alliance in case of the occurrence of a war between Britain and Russia. It was planned simultaneously to send 20,000 Russian troops to the Afghan frontier." Russia hoped thereby to exert pressure on Britain during the Congress of Berlin and to keep the privileges received by her by the Treaty of San Stefano. However, by 29 July the Treaty of Berlin had already been signed and the Tsarist Government "... not wishing further to exacerbate its relations with Britain. . . refused to ratify the project of a Russo-Afghan alliance which had been approved by the Amir Sher Ali during the negotiations, and dispersed the Russian detachments which it had originally been planned to move to the Afghan border." In spite of this the British declared war.

Babakhodzhayev admits that the Russian Mission left Afghanistan only in February 1879, after Sher Ali's death [for differences of opinion in Russian sources on the dates of arrival and departure of the Stoletov Mission see CAR, Vol. IV, No. 2, pp. 167-9] and stresses that although the Russians did not give Sher Ali military support they tried to regularize the conflict. Kaufman wrote to the Amir begging him not to leave his country as the British had promised to preserve Afghanistan's independence.

Babakhodzhayev's account of the fighting is omitted. He accounts for the early Afghan failures by references to lack of numbers, bad leadership and equipment and the fact that the popular masses had been set against the Amir by feudal exploitation and high taxation. Only after they had seen their country occupied did they rally against the British.

The Third Afghan War

L.R. Gordon-Polonskaya, "Afghanistan's War for Independence and the Part Played by the Pashtun Tribes of the Border". L.R. Gordon-Polonskaya's non-Russian sources (mainly British) are listed at the end of this article.

Gordon-Polonskaya's account of British aims and policy in Afghanistan does not differ from that of other Soviet writers. Afghanistan was important to Britain "as the cross-roads of the most important strategic and trade routes between Central Asia, Persia, India and China". Only fear of Pashtun valour and of embroilment with Russia

prevented Britain from making war on Afghanistan in the 'nineties of the nineteenth century. The Durand agreement of 1893, however, was a continuation of British colonialism by non-warlike means since it separated large numbers of Pashtuns from Afghanistan.

Gordon-Polonskaya's article deals with the "national-liberation struggle" in three areas: Afghanistan, and the tribal and administered districts of the North-West Frontier Province. She notes that differences grew up between the two sections of the NWFP: while the settled tribes came under the influence of their more advanced neighbours in British India and passed into the period of the development of capitalist relations, developed a bourgeoisie, intelligentsia and proletariat and were influenced by the Indian National Congress, the independent tribes preserved such feudal survivals as the tribal system, periodic redistribution of land (vesh), the jirga, the tribal levies (lashkar), etc. and hindered tribal unity. On the other hand the presence of democratic traditions within some tribes, especially the Wazirs, gave a popular character to their battle against the British colonizers. The independent tribes, the author writes, caused trouble on the frontier from 1895 to 1914 because they were opposed to the Durand line which cut them off from Afghanistan. Both the administered and the independent Pashtuns supported Afghanistan's battle for independence as was shown by the disorders of 19 April 1919 in Peshawar.

In Afghanistan at the end of the nineteenth century great changes had been taking place: the development of capitalist relations had brought the formation of new classes, the growth of trade, the formation of an all-Afghan market and an increase in the urban population. The net result was the consolidation of the Afghan nation. There was an Afghan bourgeois-landowning intelligentsia which expressed the interests of "the new forces of Afghan society" and of Afghan nationalism. The influence of the Russian revolution of 1905 led to the Young Afghan movement which, although it was still far from the people and was expressed in religious forms, yet reflected the growing Afghan national consciousness. The October Revolution of 1917, which caused a wave of national liberation to spread over the East, brought the Afghan fight for liberation also into a new phase.

The Young Afghans, and even some of their ideological opponents, demanded full Afghan independence. Both Habibullah and, after his murder, Amanullah who was progressive and had the support of the Young Afghans, declared Afghanistan free and independent. Amanullah distributed leaflets in north-west India in which he declared himself against the Rowlett Laws and said that the peoples of India were right to revolt. He renounced all previous treaties with Britain but

expressed himself willing to sign new ones "based on the genuine equality of both sides". The British Government, however, refused to recognize Afghan independence. On 19 April there were disturbances in Peshawar (see above) and on 3 May a skirmish in the Khyber area. On 6 May British declared war on Afghanistan and what Gordon-Polonskaya calls a "general mobilization" began in India.

The Afghan plan was calculated on the help of the frontier tribes. Without this help, the revolutionary situation in India, and finally the friendly position of Soviet Russia, the Afghans would not have been able to carry the war on to British territory.

There were two fronts. On the first, that of Waziristan, the Afghan General Nadir Khan with the help of the tribes by 25 May had taken all the British military posts in North Waziristan and "in June 1919 in fact Waziristan was completely in the hands of the Pashtun insurgents and of Afghan regular and irregular forces". Operations on this front were facilitated by mass desertions of Pashtuns in British service.

On the Peshawar front, where the Afghan General was Saleh Muhammad Khan, the troops' poor state of readiness and level of equipment (both caused by Afghanistan's past semi-colonial status), lack of liaison between the regular forces and the tribes and the separatist tendencies of some tribes gave the British the advantage. They concentrated their forces against Jelalabad, won a battle against numerically inferior forces, destroyed Jelalabad from the air and bombed Kabul. At this point neither Britain nor Afghanistan wanted to continue the war, Britain recognized Afghanistan's independence and on 3 June 1919 an armistice was concluded. The status of the frontier Pashtuns was not affected by the terms of the armistice.

In Waziristan, however, operations continued. Nadir Khan continued to appeal to the tribes to help Afghanistan "to fulfil the tasks of the nation and Islam". In August a tribal deputation was received in Kabul and a jirga of Wazirs of North Waziristan and Wana, and of Mahsuds of South Waziristan decided on a large-scale assault on the settled districts.

[There follows a description of the effect of these events on the Pashtuns of the administered districts and on their national liberation struggle, here omitted.]

Finally, Gordon-Polonskaya repeats that Pashtun resistance in the NWFP and the participation of the independent tribes in the Afghan war was both a people's war and a war of liberation, and goes on to describe military operations in Waziristan in 1920-1. The story is told

in terms of brave, badly armed and outnumbered tribesmen who, although pitted against tanks and aeroplanes, forced the British to renounce their intention of including the tribal area in the administered districts.

VI. The Reign of Nadir Shah

N.I. Smirnov, "An Important Stage in the Independent Development of Afghanistan: the Home and Foreign Policy of the Government of Muhammad Nadir Shah, 1929-1933." (See CAR, Vol.IV, No.2, pp.177-84.)

Smirnov, like all the other Soviet writers whose works have been examined above, considers that Britain wanted to annex Afghanistan, which was needed as a base for aggression against the USSR. The British were concerned also because the existence of an independent Afghanistan threatened their position in India. The first part of Smirnov's article describes an alleged British attempt to overthrow the Afghan Government (Bachha-i-Saqao's rebellion) and the second part tells how Nadir Shah's economic reforms together with Soviet friendship strengthened Afghan independence.

Smirnov's treatment of the Bachha-i-Saqao incident does not differ from the normal Soviet line, which has already been fully described in CAR, Vol.IV, No.2, pp.177-84. Like the authorities cited there he regards the collusion or complicity of the British Government as "proved" by the arrival in the area on the eve of the rebellion of Col. Lawrence, "a specialist in the organization of all sorts of revolts and coups", who was (allegedly) masquerading under the name of Aircraftman Shaw. On the authority of the DAILY MAIL of 28 January 1929 Smirnov alleges a connection between the British envoy in Kabul, Sir Francis Humphrys, and Bachha-i-Saqao.

Bachha-i-Saqao, writes Smirnov, never united the country, and a continuation of his rule would have led to the disintegration of Afghanistan into a number of small autonomous states, which was what the British wanted. Bachha-i-Saqao alienated all classes in Afghanistan: the peasants because he had not reduced taxation, the merchants because home and foreign trade had almost ceased and they were subject to forced loans and requisitions, the intelligentsia because he had closed all secular schools, shut down the newspapers and recalled students studying abroad, and finally the southern khans, who lost some privileges to his supporters who came from the north.

The last straw, however, according to Smirnov, was the fact that he allowed the Basmachis to attack the USSR from Afghanistan; the

Afghan people saw in the USSR their friend and protector.

Nadir Shah's reign, in spite of the fact that it confirmed the role of the nobility and clergy, was beneficial, writes Smirnov, because it united Afghanistan under a central government, allowed Soviet-Afghan relations to develop in a spirit of friendship and collaboration (the Soviet Government confirming agreements between the USSR and Afghanistan and the Afghan Government expressing its willingness to expand Soviet-Afghan relations and disbanding those Basmachis who were on Afghan territory), and finally because it brought a measure of economic reform.

In 1929 the main cities of Afghanistan were damaged, the currency was inflated, the treasury almost empty. In 1930 Nadir Shah had recourse to a small interest-free British loan of £175,000 which served only to cover current expenses and provide for the keep and equipment of the Army.

The slump of 1929-33 hit Afghanistan hard. In 1932 the price of karakul was 30-50 per cent lower than in 1928, the price of livestock 40-60 per cent lower. Afghan traders in India, who dealt mainly in agricultural produce which made up 70 per cent of Afghanistan's exports, were being forced to sell at below market price.

The Afghan currency, which was on the silver standard, was badly affected when India went on the gold standard and dumped large amounts of silver on the market: the Afghani, which stood at 40 to the pound in 1929, fell to 53 to the pound in 1931 and 71 to the pound in 1933. The position was made worse by the Afghan Government's adulteration of the coinage and the growing trade deficit with India which caused a drain of currency abroad.

In this crisis the USSR helped Afghanistan by buying her products at higher prices than those offered by the capitalist countries. Afghanistan had a credit balance with the USSR.

The deficit with India, however, Smirnov points out, grew from 7.8m. rupees in 1923-4 to 38m. in 1933-4. This happened because the key positions in Afghan foreign trade and banking were in the hands of representatives of Anglo-Indian capital.

The Afghan Government, therefore, began to create a national trading capital by setting up joint-stock companies (sherkat). The sherkats had exclusive rights both in the importing and selling of industrial goods and in the production and export of agricultural raw-materials. The State had an interest in all of them and a controlling interest in the most important. The sherkats could and did deal direct

with foreign markets, by-passing India. State control allowed funds to be directed into light industry. The "Askhami" banking sherkat was reorganized into the Afghan National Bank, with a capital of 35m. Afghanis and 30 per cent of its shares State-owned. The Afghan National Bank had a monopoly in the buying of gold, silver and foreign currency for the State, the production and export of karakul and the import of sugar. By 1934 there were 20 sherkats with a total capital of 70m. Afghanis.

In 1931 Afghanistan received a constitution which Smirnov on the whole approves, although it concentrated all power in the hands of the Amir and preserved the power of the clergy and the shariat law, because it confirmed the advances made since 1919: "Although it established only a limited parliamentary system, nevertheless the changes in the structure of central and local organs of power witnessed to the gradual dying out in Afghanistan of out-of-date feudal institutions and the perfecting of State control."

Smirnov's conclusion is that during Nadir Shah's reign Afghanistan reinforced her independence, mainly because of the disinterested friendship of the USSR which, "faithful to the principles of Leninist foreign policy. . . respected Afghan sovereignty".

VII. Soviet-Afghan Relations, 1917-58

L.B. Teplinskiy, "Soviet-Afghan Relations during the 40 Years of the Existence of Independent Afghanistan".

This article is a list of the agreements, treaties, meetings, etc. of which Soviet-Afghan relations over the past 40 years have been composed, together with a commentary on them in the light of the contemporary situation both within and outside Afghanistan.

In the commentary two main aims can be discerned:

(a) to represent the relations of the Soviet Union with Afghanistan as having been from the beginning based on the Five Principles, as they later came to be called;

and (b) to show that Russia's friendly position has been of use to Afghanistan vis-à-vis Britain and later Pakistan.

All the examples of Soviet material aid to Afghanistan help Teplinskiy to achieve his first aim. It is sufficient here to quote such other examples as the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk which bound both signatories to respect the political and economic independence and

territorial integrity of Afghanistan and Persia; the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of 28 February 1921 of which Teplinskiy writes, "in all the history of international relations one can hardly find such an example of good will in a great power for a small state"; the negotiations for concluding an Anglo-Afghan Peace Treaty in 1921 and the Soviet rejection of the Curzon ultimatum of May 1923, of which Teplinskiy writes, "so, supporting each other and together resisting the attacks of the imperialists the Soviet and Afghan peoples strengthened their relations and gave an example of the peaceful co-existence of states with differing social and political systems"; the return of the island of Urta-Turgay (see CAR, Vol.IV, No.2, pp.176-7); and finally the Paghman Treaty of 31 August 1926 - "an example for the governments of those countries which really have the firm intention of living in peace and friendship with other countries".

On Soviet aid (mainly moral) to Afghanistan against British imperialism Teplinskiy refers to the Third Afghan War when ". . . the moral aid given by the Soviet Republic to the Afghan people and. . . its willingness to give the Afghan Government all aid, including military, reinforced the Afghans' faith in victory;" the Curzon ultimatum (already referred to); the Bachha-i-Saqao incident; and alleged British pressure on Afghanistan through Pakistan aimed at driving Afghanistan into the Baghdad Pact - economic pressure, which was countered by the Soviet-Afghan Transit Treaty of 28 June 1955. Teplinskiy's comments on Pakistan are largely confined to the problem of Pashtunistan. He contrasts the position of Britain and Pakistan on this issue with that of the Soviet Union on the question of the Amu-Dar'ya frontier: "This shows the Afghan people once again who is their real friend. . ."

The more important treaties, trade agreements, meetings etc., made between 1917 and 1953 listed by Teplinskiy are given below. Details of similar contacts made since 1953 have already appeared in CAR (see Vol.IV, No.2, pp.182-3, Vol.VI, No.1, pp.90-94 and the "News Diary" in subsequent numbers) and are therefore omitted here.

- | | |
|---------------|---|
| 1917 December | "The Address of the Soviet Government to all Muslim Workers of Russia and the East" recognized Afghanistan's right to independence and offered help against the British. |
| 1918 March 3 | The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (see above). |
| 1919 March | Note of the Government of the RSFSR to the Paris Peace Conference, calling on all states to bind themselves not to attempt to overthrow the Government of Afghanistan by force. |

- 1919 March 27 The Soviet Government recognizes the full independence of Afghanistan.
- 1919 Diplomatic relations established between Afghanistan and the RSFSR.
- 1920 May 8 The Afghan Government requests aid from the RSFSR and offers in exchange a trade agreement and a military alliance.
- 1920 September 13 The first draft of the Soviet-Afghan Friendship Treaty initialled.
- 1921 February 28 Treaty signed. The signatories agreed to respect each other's independence and not to enter into military or political agreements with third parties prejudicial to each other's interests. The RSFSR offered financial aid and free transit of goods bought by Afghanistan abroad.
- 1920 September 20 Soviet Note to Afghanistan on Afghan support of the Amir of Bukhara in his fight against Soviet forces.
- 1921 January 21 Afghanistan officially declares that she is ceasing to support the Amir of Bukhara.
- 1926 Return of the island of Urta-Turgay (Amu-Dar'ya) to Afghanistan.
Soviet specialists help to build the Kushka - Herat - Kandahar - Kabul - Mazar-i-Sharif telegraph line.
- 1927 November 28 Agreement signed on a Tashkent - Kabul air service.
- 1926 August 31 The Paghman Treaty of Neutrality and Mutual Non-Aggression.
- 1928 May Visit of King Amanullah to the Soviet Union.
- 1928 June Soviet and Afghan missions given the status of embassies.
- 1928 - 1929 (Bachha-i-Saqao rebellion and the accession of Nadir Shah.)

- 1930 April 1 A meeting of the Soviet All-Union Chamber of Commerce attended by the Afghan Ambassador. The meeting was devoted to Soviet-Afghan trade relations.
- 1931 June 24 Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression. This treaty was the same in spirit as the Paghman Treaty but contained some new provisions: the necessity was stressed for a peaceful solution of problems and the freedom was emphasized of either side to enter into relations with third parties so long as those relations were not prejudicial to the agreement.
- 1932 April 3 Agreement on postal, telephone, telegraph and radio communications. Exchange of notes on the appointment of Border Commissioners to regulate border disputes.
- 1934 Autumn Soviet organizations take part in the Second International Trade Fair in Kabul.
- 1935 May 6 Soviet-Afghan agreement on locust control.
- 1938 May 26 Soviet-Afghan agreement on the control of agricultural pests and the diseases of cotton. During these years also Soviet equipment was sold to Afghanistan and Soviet foreign trade organizations cooperated with Afghan sherkats.
- 1936 April 26 A general agreement between Sovafgantorg and the Afghan National Bank.
- 1936 May 20 Agreement on corresponding relations between the Soviet Foreign Trade Bank and the Afghan National Bank.
- 1936 March 29 The Treaty of 24 June 1931 was prolonged for a further 10 years, "a new proof of the vigour and firmness of Soviet-Afghan friendship". (After the German attack on the USSR German and Italian agents in Afghanistan, writes Teplinskiy, began an anti-Soviet campaign.)

- 1941 October 11 A "friendly" Soviet Note to Afghanistan in which the USSR, relying on the 1931 treaty, demanded the cessation of anti-Soviet activity on Afghan soil and the expulsion of all German and Italian nationals.
- 1941 October 16 Answering Note in which the Afghan Government stated that it had decided to follow the advice of the Soviet Government.
- 1941 November Decision of the Loe Jirga that Afghanistan should maintain complete neutrality.
- 1946 July 13 The Amu-Dar'ya Afghan-Soviet frontier redrawn along the thalweg and not, as previously, along the Afghan bank.
- 1953 September Muhammad Daud's Government gives a fresh impetus to Soviet-Afghan relations.

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


Scenes from life in Afghanistan today—drawn by Anatoliy Kokorin during a recent visit and reproduced in *Inostrannaya Literatura*, No. 4 of 1959.





Scenes from life in Afghanistan today—continued.



P A K I S T A N

The Soviet Union's political and economic interest in Pakistan has hitherto been much less than its interest in India. This probably accounts for the comparative scantiness of Soviet writing on the former. Recently, however, two substantial publications have been received, on the basis of which it is possible to arrive at an estimate of current Soviet thinking on Pakistan's political and economic affairs. These are:

PAKISTAN: ISTORIYA I EKONOMIKA, Moscow, 1959, edited by A.M. D'yakov. This is a symposium of articles by different authors on political and economic problems of Pakistan.

PROBLEMY EKONOMIKI PAKISTANA by V.G. Rastyannikov and S.A. Kuz'min, Moscow, 1958. This solid and well-documented book consists of three chapters: two by Rastyannikov on the development of agriculture and industry, and one by Kuz'min on the positions of foreign capital and imperialist "contradictions" in Pakistan.

Both of these books are based almost entirely on English language source material.

Previous articles on Soviet views on pre-partition history of the Indian sub-continent appeared in CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, Vol.V, Nos.1 and 2, and Vol.VIII, No.1; and on the economy of Pakistan in Vol.V, No.2, pp.170-3 and Vol.VIII, No.1. The problem of Pashtunistan will be dealt with in the next number of CAR; Soviet writing on this subject from the point of view of Afghanistan was reviewed in CAR, Vol.VII, No.3.

. . .

I. Four Nations in West Pakistan - II. The Question of General Elections - III. The Awami League - IV. Problems of Economic Development- V. Agriculture - VI. The Situation of the Working-Class.

I. Four Nations in West Pakistan

In his article "The National Composition of West Pakistan", in PAKISTAN: ISTORIYA I EKONOMIKA, Yu.V. Gankovskiy queries the official Pakistani "theory that all the citizens of Pakistan form one nation". Using the Marxist definition of a nation as "a historically established, stable community of people which has arisen on the basis of community of language and territory, a common economic life and also a common culture" (Stalin, SOCHINENIYA, Vol.2, p.296) Gankovskiy seeks to prove that the Pashtuns, Baluchis, Sindhis and Panjabis are four separate nations. He admits that they are in different stages of the development of capitalism and are affected to different degrees by "survivals" of feudalism and so are in different stages of development as nations.

Gankovskiy argues that, although 20 languages are spoken in West Pakistan, 97 per cent of the population speaks either Panjabi, Pashtu, Sindhi, Baluchi or Urdu. Of these languages the first four are spoken mainly in well-defined geographical regions, which shows that within these areas there is, besides community of territory, a common language and therefore a common culture. The fourth essential feature of a nation, a common economic life, occurs only during the process of the development of capitalism, that is to say in the case of Pakistan, at the present time.

Gankovskiy is in favour of the formation of four autonomous republics in West Pakistan organized on a linguistic basis - Sind, Pashtunistan, Baluchistan and the Panjab. He describes the nationalist movements in West Pakistan which have this as their aim as a "reaction against the fossilized administrative and feudal barriers left over from the time of British rule", i.e. as a continuation of the "national liberation struggle". The enemy now, however, is the Pakistani Government which has unified the four nations, no less arbitrarily, into a single province of West Pakistan. (On the national minorities of West Pakistan, see also CAR, Vol.V, No.2, pp. 174-85.)

Pashtuns

Gankovskiy's position on the question of Pashtunistan is shown by the fact that he calls them "Afghans" with "Pashtuns" in brackets and treats them as a part of the Afghan people. He does not carry this point of view to its natural conclusion, however, by suggesting that they should be joined to Afghanistan, presumably because he does not consider that the Pashtuns of Afghanistan and Pakistan have a common economic life. The following is a summary of what he writes on the Pashtuns.

According to the 1951 census there are 5,002,285 Pashtuns in Pakistan, living mainly in the former North-West Frontier Province and in the Zhob, Loralai and Quetta-Pishin districts of Baluchistan. They are also to be found in the Panjab, Sind, etc. Their language, Pashtu, although it has two main dialects, is a single language spoken by 10-11m. people in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

During the second half of the nineteenth century part of the east Afghan lands was "forcibly included by the British colonizers in their colonial empire". The Durand Line arbitrarily divided many Pashtun tribes into two. When the North-West Frontier Province was formed in 1901 the Pashtuns were further divided, some finding themselves in Baluchistan, while the Pashtuns of the hills and the plains were divided by the boundary between the administered and tribal areas. "All this definitely complicated the process of the formation of the Afghan nation", as did also "the separatist aspirations of some khans and the scattered nature and uneven level of the social and economic development of independent tribal groups of Afghans who inhabited enclosed mountainous regions with poor communications". The Pashtun tribes, therefore, entered the capitalist era accompanied by many survivals of the communal-clan system (obshchinno-rodovaya sistema).

Nevertheless in both Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier Province from the end of the nineteenth century capitalism began to develop, while in the latter area a national bourgeoisie and a proletariat appeared at the beginning of the twentieth century. At this time also the formation of the Afghan nation began, aided by the revolutions in Russia and by the 1919 war. This war, "in spite of the . . . treachery of individual feudal leaders who were in British service", displayed the solidarity with Afghanistan of the Pashtuns who rose as one man "from Chitral to Quetta". This rising was also a national liberation movement which was continued after the war by the Redshirts.

During the Second World War Pashtun nationalists demanded the creation of an independent Pashtun state - Pashtunistan "including all the north-western regions of British India inhabited by Pashtuns". The Pashtuns of the administered areas boycotted the 1947 referendum and were followed by the Pashtuns of the tribal areas also. The tribes which were willing to join Pakistan did so because of the influence of khans, maliks and large landowners who had "always been connected with the British colonial administration". [The same explanation is given of the tribes' participation in the invasion of Kashmir. Ed.-CAR.]

Abdul Gaffar Khan's "People's Party" (founded in 1948) demanded autonomy for the linguistic groups of West Pakistan and the creation of three "Socialist Republics". The Peasants' Party (Kisan Jirga) also

demanding Pashtunistan, together with the abolition of large estates. During agrarian disturbances this party was supported by the Pashtun proletariat by means of strikes. This worker-peasant movement was crushed with the arrest of 12,000 nationalists (including Abdul Gaffar Khan) and the centre of resistance shifted from the administered to the tribal areas. In 1949-50 "regional governments" were formed in the territories of the Afridis and Wazirs and in North Baluchistan. Recently there has been a tendency for the individual centres of the national movement to merge into one all-Pashtun national organization.

Among the Pashtuns of Baluchistan the movement for union with the Pashtuns of the North-West Frontier Province was expressed by the Vror Pashtun Party, which also demands political, economic and cultural equality for the Pashtuns of Baluchistan.

Both the Redshirts and the Vror Pashtun Party opposed the formation of the province of West Pakistan and demanded a "zonal federation on a cultural and linguistic basis" of the four autonomous units dealt with by Gankovskiy.

In the creation of a national market the Pashtuns are behind the Sindhis. They are hindered by the political and economic fragmentation of their territories and by survivals of their tribal organization. The Pashtun bourgeoisie and working-class are weak and few in numbers.

As a result of their past position of colonial dependence the Pashtuns are culturally backward. In 1951 there were 27,776 people able to read and write Pashtu. In 1956 only 17 magazines were published in Pashtu. In the tribal areas in 1955 there were only 310 schools with 25,000 pupils for a population of 2.6m.

However, concludes Gankovskiy, Pashtun national consciousness is well developed.

Baluchis

Gankovskiy begins his section on the Baluchis with a short description of their tribal organization and way of life. According to the 1951 census there were 943,049 Baluchis in Pakistan, mainly nomads. They are divided into 18 tribes (tuman), subdivided into clans (phara) and lineages (phalli). The power of the tribal chieftains (tumandar) is hereditary. The territory of the tribes is strictly defined and the tribal land is held in common and redistributed every 10 years. Gankovskiy hastens to add that "in fact, of course. . . this collective ownership only masks the omnipotence of the tribal leaders who have long been the largest landowners."

On the question of economic, cultural and territorial unity Gankovskiy according to his own testimony is on weak ground. The territory of the Baluchis, he says, is scattered, while they are in a minority of 34 per cent even in Baluchistan. The formation of a nation is hindered by the survival of nomadism. Between 1941 and 1951 the number of schools increased only from 80 to 230 with 18,276 pupils. According to the 1951 census only 5.6 per cent of the population was literate in Urdu or English and only 169 persons in Baluchi. Baluchi has been ousted as a literary language by Urdu, Persian or English and this has hindered the growth of a national consciousness. At the present rate of progress, notes Gankovskiy, "decades will be needed to liquidate illiteracy".

Economic development is in little better case. Insufficient money is being spent by the State. Nevertheless the development of class-differentiation among the Baluchis has begun. In the villages the growth of the exploitation and ruin of the peasants has brought about a peasant movement. A Baluchi proletariat has appeared in the towns (most of the 103,200 Baluchis in Karachi are workers). There is a Baluchi trade union, the Baluchistan Federation of Labour.

The Baluchi intelligentsia is weak and few in number; the national organizations contain also representatives of the bourgeoisie and landowners. However, the existence of a Baluchi national consciousness and a national movement was proved, Gankovskiy considers, by the demand, put forward in 1953 by the All-Pakistan Conference of Baluchis, for the liquidation of Baluchi cultural backwardness and the creation of a province of Baluchistan to include all the areas of West Pakistan inhabited by Baluchis.

Sindhis

In the case of Sind, Gankovskiy is on firmer ground since, as he notes, during its long history until its annexation by the British in 1843 Sind was frequently independent. This promoted the growth of the cultural unity and the consolidation of the Sindhi people. Sindhi literature appeared in the seventeenth century and was preceded by a rich folklore.

The British conquest, Gankovskiy writes, created the conditions necessary for the development of capitalist relations. Between 1843 and 1881 the population of Karachi grew from 14,000 to 68,000. Between 1847-8 and 1856-7 the turnover of the port of Karachi increased from 4,430,000 rupees to 14,210,000 rupees. At the beginning of the twentieth century irrigation works began to increase the production of cotton. By 1921, 11.4 per cent of the population of Sind lived in

the towns and a bourgeoisie, proletariat and intelligentsia had appeared. According to the 1951 census there were 3,990,000 Sindhis in Pakistan, living in Sind, Baluchistan and Karachi. 85 per cent of the population is occupied in agriculture.

The Sindhi nation, therefore, according to Gankovskiy, consolidated itself even further during the British period. Modern Sindhi prose appeared at the end of the nineteenth century and Sindhi has ousted the languages of the immigrant Baluchis, Rajasthanis, Arabs and Persians as a literary language as these immigrants themselves have been absorbed by the Sindhi community.

However, the development of the Sindhi nation was hindered by artificial administrative boundaries imposed by the British (Sind was part of the Bombay Presidency until 1935), by survivals of feudalism and by Hindu-Muslim hostility, which, again, was fostered by the British. Nevertheless the national movement grew until in 1935 it was able to force the British to make Sind an independent administrative unit.

The partition of India in 1947 harmed the Sindhi national movement by causing many Sindhi Hindus (9.5 per cent of the population) who predominated in the towns to emigrate to India. In 1941 of the town population 64 per cent had been Hindus, 33 per cent - Muslims; in 1951 the proportion had changed to Hindus - 4 per cent, Muslims - 93.7 per cent.

As examples of the discrimination of the Central Government against the Sindhis Gankovskiy cites the help given by the Panjabi group of the Muslim League to the Sindhi landowners against peasant demands for land reform, the separation of Karachi from Sind and the attempt to oust Sindhi in favour of Urdu in State institutions. In the last case, he notes, popular agitation resulted in the acknowledgment of Sindhi as a regional language to be used in courts, State institutions, etc. In 1956 it was agreed that 60 per cent of the programmes of Hyderabad Radio should be in Sindhi. In 1951 in Sind 300,000 people were literate in Sindhi.

Summing up Gankovskiy concludes that the people of Sind have a high level of national consciousness and that the process of the consolidation of the Sindhi nation is basically complete.

Panjabis

The West Panjab is ethnically mixed. The population in 1951 was 18,828,000 plus 1,823,000 in Bahawalpur. Of this total of 20,651,000,

20,200,000 are Muslims. Prior to partition the Panjab could be divided linguistically into two parts along the 74 degree line of longitude. To the east of this line the main language was Panjabi; to the west the numerous lahnda dialects (from the Panjabi lahand - "west") were spoken. The lahnda dialects, while related both to Panjabi and to each other, differ sharply from it and each other. As a result of population migration at the time of partition both lahnda dialects and Panjabi are spoken at the present time in West Panjab. Pakistani statistics make no distinction between them.

Gankovskiy quotes these facts to explain the slowness with which the peoples of the Panjab are merging into one nation. He gives as further reasons the fact that all the invaders of India came down through the Panjab bringing wars and frequent changes of rulers and hindering economic and cultural development, together with religious hostility between Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs and the preservation by the British of 13 Princely States.

There is still, he notes, no single literary language for the Panjab: because of "religious survivals and general economic and cultural backwardness" Panjabi, in spite of its rich literature, has been ousted by Urdu and Persian. Urdu is the language of the schools, universities and State institutions. In 1951, 1,514,386 people were literate in Urdu as against 35,554 literate in Panjabi. In 1956, 124 Urdu, 14 English and one Panjabi magazines were published. Consequently, Gankovskiy concludes, the Panjab lacks cultural unity.

On the other hand, in spite of its backward state prior to 1947, the West Panjab is at present one of the economically advanced areas of Pakistan. Modern industry and a bourgeoisie and intelligentsia are emerging. The bourgeoisie and intelligentsia have organized a Panjabi Culture Society to defend Panjabi against Urdu and to demand the use of the native languages of the Panjab in Panjabi schools.

Gankovskiy concludes: "Whether the people of the Panjab will merge into a single nation. . . or whether Pakistan's further economic and political development will lead to the national consolidation on the territory of the Panjab of a series of smaller nations, only the future will show."

In his summing up Gankovskiy emphasizes that the national movements of Pakistan are democratic and peace-loving in character because the national bourgeoisie which leads them is not only not connected with foreign capital, but wants to defend itself against its competition and is therefore interested in the creation of a national market. Gankovskiy

ends with the hope that the National Party and the National People's Party (founded in 1956 and 1957 respectively) will promote the development of the nationalist movements in Pakistan, and will bring about an increase in national self-consciousness and the liquidation of feudalism in economic and political life with the consequent rapid completion of the formation of the nations of West Pakistan.

II. The Question of General Elections

In his article "The Political Situation and the Problem of General Elections in Pakistan (1947-57)", in PAKISTAN: ISTORIYA I EKONOMIKA, V.N. Moskalenko examines the reasons for the deferment of general elections in Pakistan. During this period, he writes, the political situation in Pakistan was characterized by "frequent changes of government, party splits. . . intrigues, machinations, unprincipled compromises. . . and their repudiation at the first convenient opportunity, and by corruption in the State apparatus." The battle of the parties reflected the country's growing social and economic "contradictions". Nevertheless the bourgeois-landowner parties "had no programmes which would really correspond with the country's national interest and provide measures for improving the position of the masses" and they therefore "resorted to the most shameful demagoguery". The situation was influenced also by "the increasing penetration of foreign, in the first place American, capital". In such circumstances, writes Moskalenko, some political problems acquired exceptional significance. One such problem was that of the general elections.

Moskalenko begins his account of the problem with an explanation of why general elections were necessary. The country's law-making organ (the Constituent Assembly) he writes, was controlled by the Muslim League with more than 60 seats. There was a Hindu opposition with 12 seats. The other religious communities were not represented.

The Constituent Assembly had been formed in 1947 by the expedient of splitting the All-India Constituent Assembly into Indian and Pakistani portions. It had, therefore, been created in a non-democratic way. Moreover it was reactionary in composition. For these reasons popular demand for a general election with full adult suffrage was growing.

However, the results of the provincial elections in 1951, 1953 and 1954 showed the Muslim League that they might lose a general election. In the 1954 provincial election in East Bengal, for example,

the Muslim League received 10 places out of 309. In the same year the East Bengal Legislative Assembly was dissolved and the Communist Party proscribed. However, the Government was forced to make concessions also and on 24 October 1954 the Constituent Assembly was dissolved.

Although the Constituent Assembly had existed for seven years, Moskalenko notes Pakistan was still without a constitution and without representative government. The Muslim League had aroused so much opposition by its move to unite West Pakistan into one province that it did not dare to hold elections, and the second Constituent Assembly, which came into existence in summer 1955, was elected not by the people of Pakistan but by the provincial Legislative Assemblies. Even so the Muslim League received only 25 out of 80 seats. When the Muslim League was split in April 1956 by the formation of the Republican Party it fell to third place.

The Government had announced that elections would take place after a Constitution had been worked out. Although the Constitution was introduced on 2 May 1956 still no elections followed, allegedly because of the difficulty of compiling voters' lists. Moskalenko, while admitting the difficulty of this task, argues that there was sufficient time between 1947 and 1956 for it to have been completed and points out that the Census, which was a much more complicated task, had been completed by 1951. In fact, he writes, the real reason for the delay was that the ruling parties and "their foreign patrons" were afraid that they would lose power.

Preparations for a general election began in the second half of 1956 but were hindered by the "artificially created and artificially aggravated problem of the form of the elections". The question was should there be common voters' rolls or separate rolls on the basis of religion. Between 1956 and 1958 this question aroused passions which, writes Moskalenko, "were being fanned by certain circles who aimed to profit by [them]".

The "democratic forces" of the country (the Communist Party, the Azad Pakistan Party, the Ganatantri Dal, the National Congress, the Federation of Untouchables, the United Progressive Party, the Awami League and the Republican Party) were for common voters' rolls. The question, however, even divided the bourgeois-landowner parties and consequently reflected a "contradiction" within this class.

The supporters of separate rolls, writes Moskalenko, held that the "Two Nations" theory was valid within Pakistan also and that the Muslims of Pakistan needed protection against the "Hindu peril". They also argued that separate rolls would safeguard Hindu and minority rights. The opponents of separate rolls asserted that there was only

one Pakistani nation and that the rights of religious minorities should need no protection against the Muslims of Pakistan.

In fact, Moskalenko considers, the "Two Nations" theory, which considers all Muslims to be one nation, is no more than an ideological justification of continued discrimination by the ruling classes of the Panjab against the national minorities of West Pakistan and East Bengal, since it regards them all as one homogenous nation of Muslims and deprives them of separate consideration of their social and national interests. It was also, he adds, an attempt to drive a wedge between the Hindus and Muslims of East Pakistan in order to weaken that province and keep it in its subordinate status. For this reason the people of East Pakistan rejected separate voters' rolls, although (Moskalenko admits) "it has been proved in practice that in common elections [the religious minorities of East Pakistan] receive fewer seats than with communal rolls with reserved seats."

Moskalenko stresses that although the parties which headed the nationalist movement mainly expressed the interests of the bourgeoisie and of a part of the landlord class they nevertheless enjoyed the support of the masses in so far as they made democratic demands, supported the free development of national languages and cultures and opposed national discrimination.

The bourgeois-landowner parties, Moskalenko writes, made use of the question of the electoral system in order to strengthen their own positions; the Muslim League tried to rally the Muslim majority behind it; the People's League in East Bengal supported the common roll in order to gain the support of the Hindus (it was for this reason that it had changed its name in 1955 from the People's Muslim League). Moskalenko scolds the Republican Party for showing a lack of principle and making use of the question in order to reinforce the positions of certain groups of landowners and trading and industrial bourgeoisie in West Pakistan.

The military coup d'état of October 1958, Moskalenko alleges, was planned because the constitution had not given Pakistan's ruling circles the chance of carrying on their anti-national policy of membership of SEATO, the Baghdad Pact and acceptance of American aid under a smokescreen of parliamentary democracy, and they calculated that a military dictatorship would be more appropriate for this purpose.

III. The Awami League

In "The People's League Party", in PAKISTAN: ISTORIYA I EKONOMIKA, S.F. Levin describes the activity of the Awami League (the more usual title of the party) between 1951 and 1957. Special emphasis is laid on the period from September 1956 to October 1957 when the party was in office. The article is based almost exclusively on the contemporary Pakistani press.

Levin's article, which is factual and dispassionate in tone, gives an impression of the Awami League as of an ad hoc coalition of diverse elements which only worked tolerably in opposition. Besides the "contradictions" between the League's left and right wings Levin sees another in that the League was primarily a Bengali party and was at a disadvantage on the national stage.

From its foundation in 1951 to its prohibition in 1958, Levin writes, the Awami League had no official programme. Prior to 1953, in spite of its leaders' popular and superficially democratic demands, it was not a serious political force.

In 1953-4, however, Pakistan went through an economic crisis. The Awami League seized this opportunity to put forward a wide programme of reform, including radical agrarian reform, thereby increasing its mass following.

At the end of 1953 the Awami League took part in the foundation of the United Front of the Opposition Parties of East Pakistan. The United Front embraced various elements from the Communists to the right wing opposition. Its programme, the "Twenty-One Points", became from 1955 the official programme of the East Pakistan Awami League. This programme aimed at creating favourable conditions for the development of capitalism in East Pakistan and therefore reflected the interests of the Bengali national bourgeoisie; at the same time, however, it attracted the support of the people of East Pakistan who were interested in the eradication of feudal survivals and national discrimination. For this reason the United Front won a victory over the Muslim League in the provincial elections of March 1954. The most popular United Front party, because the most radical, was the Awami League.

From 1954 the Awami League began to gain influence in West Pakistan also, where its local organizations supported the Pashtun and Sindhi national movements and opposed the administrative unification of West Pakistan. In both branches of the party a left wing appeared.

When, as a result of the June 1955 elections to the second Constituent Assembly, the Muslim League formed a coalition with the United Front, the Awami League took no part as the terms of the coalition did not guarantee the "Twenty-One Points". Also, Levin adds, it was tactically advantageous to be in opposition at a time of growing economic crisis.

The Awami League's position in the 1956 debates on the Constitution was such as to secure it even further popular support. The speeches made by the League's leaders at this period are important because they played the part of the programme with which the party came to power. This "programme" comprised the following elements, among others:

1. "Islamic socialism", rather vaguely defined as "the liquidation of the capitalist economy", "the ending of the oppression of the workers", "a good life for all". Nothing was said about means. The demands which affected the interests of the ruling classes were capable of various interpretations.
2. Agrarian reform. The Awami League spokesman proposed to abolish the zemindari and jagirdari systems, mainly because they hindered the development of agriculture and caused absentee landlordism. These reforms, obviously, reflected the interests of the bourgeoisie and of those landowners who wished to develop their estates themselves. In order to gain peasant support they were represented as a liquidation of the landowning class in general, not merely of its privileged upper layer.

The League was supported by peasants because they hoped for a redistribution of land, lower rents and taxes, and guarantees of tenants' rights; by workers who had been promised the recognition of trade unions and the revision of pay-scales; by craftsmen who hoped for economic help from the State; by Bengali, Sindhi and Pashtun nationalists who expected that the Awami League would satisfy their demands; and finally by the bourgeoisie and the landowners who hoped that the Awami League would improve the food situation, widen the home market, defend the interests of the national industries against foreign monopolies, deal with the nationalities problem and overcome the political crisis.

The party itself was as varied as its supporters. The right wing, for example, regarded the party's more extreme demands as mere political stratagems, to be abandoned once power had been gained. These and other inconsistencies, however, remained hidden while the party was in opposition.

[Levin's description of the circumstances in which the Awami League came to power in East Pakistan and formed a coalition central government with the Republican Party is omitted.]

The Awami League was compromised by the coalition with the Republican Party which expressed the interests of the landowners of West Pakistan. The Republican Party opposed the proposals for agrarian reform contained in the "Twenty-One Points" and were joined in this by the right wing of the Awami League. Consequently practically no agrarian reforms were carried out.

The Awami League's most important failure in this field was its failure to do anything to improve the lot of the peasants. Not only did rents not fall, in some areas, as, for example, in Sylhet, they even increased. Suhrawardy's Government took steps to propagate improved farming methods and granted credits to encourage their use, but these methods could interest only the hereditary tenants and those few landowners who were developing their estates themselves. In spite of good weather and the absence of floods at the end of 1957 there was a food deficit in East Pakistan of 460,000 tons. As there was a food crisis in West Pakistan also food had to be imported. The price of foodstuffs and with it the cost of living rose. This rise in the cost of living caused the home market for the products of Pakistan's industry to shrink. Increased expenditure on food imports meant that the Government could not afford to increase its investment in industry, as planned, and led also to a decrease in exports of industrial machinery and raw materials.

Suhrawardy's Government was driven to invite foreign investment in Pakistani industry and to promise not to nationalize the property of any foreign company. This policy of dependence on foreign monopolies and American "aid" made it impossible for Suhrawardy to protect the interests of Pakistani industry against foreign capital. Foreign capital was not invested, as Suhrawardy had hoped, in heavy industry but, as before, in light industry, agriculture, transport and irrigation.

Finally it should not be forgotten, Levin writes, that Pakistan's economic difficulties were aggravated by her continued membership of SEATO and the Baghdad Pact which involved military expenditure beyond her means.

On the question of the national movements Levin writes that, although they are basically democratic (since they are opposed to national discrimination), they are also used by bourgeois-landowner elements for their own purposes. So, although the left wing of the Awami League was more interested in satisfying the democratic demands

of the nationalist movements, the right wing, led by Suhrawardy, was guided by the interests of the Bengali bourgeoisie. Consequently after the Awami League's accession to power the Bengali bourgeoisie received State credits, more import licences, increased economic autonomy and the recognition of Bengali as a State language. They did not, however, receive complete regional autonomy nor was discrimination against Bengalis in the State service ended. These concessions did not satisfy the mass of Bengalis or the Awami League provincial organizations. The left wing of the party continued to agitate for complete autonomy with only the armed forces, foreign relations and currency left to the central government. While the left wing remained firm the right wing, in order to maintain the coalition, was inclined to yield. This was one of the main reasons for the split in the party.

The Awami League was divided also over the question of national autonomy in West Pakistan, for, although only a minority of the party were opposed to national autonomy, they were supported by the land-owners, traders, industrialists and bourgeoisie, all the Islamic parties, the Republican Party, a large part of the Muslim League, a majority of the Army officers and the civil servants, and finally by the USA. Suhrawardy was faced with a choice between splitting the Awami League or breaking with the Republican Party. He tried for a time to sit on the fence and, while not coming out openly either for or against the administrative unification of West Pakistan, to prevent his provincial organizations from taking part in the Sindhi and Pashtun national movements. But finally in March 1957, he was forced to come out in favour of the unification. He thereby lost the support of the masses of West Pakistan.

Levin concludes his article with an account of the circumstances of the League's fall from power. He gives the following reasons:

The Awami League fell from power because it had lost popular support. The peasants were dissatisfied because there had been no redistribution of land, the workers because not only "Islamic socialism" but even an increase in the standard of living had failed to materialize, and the craftsmen because they had not received the economic aid which the "Twenty-One Points" had promised. The League had been inconsistent in its treatment of the nationalities question in West Pakistan and had lost the support of the national movements. It had also aroused great resentment by its foreign policy. "To sum up, the Awami League had lost the support of the masses of the people."

Finally in 1957 it lost also the support of the national bourgeoisie, "that class on which it had mainly depended". The party's fall was made certain when sectional quarrels developed inside it, mainly on grounds of foreign policy.

IV. Problems of Economic Development

In PROBLEMY EKONOMIKI PAKISTANA, V.G. Rastyannikov and S.A. Kuz'min examine the problems facing the development of industry and agriculture in Pakistan. The authors maintain that the acquisition of State power by the landowners and trading classes in Pakistan has not ended Pakistan's subservience to foreign imperialism and the basic "contradictions" between imperialism and the people of Pakistan.

During the British period, the authors say, the areas of India which now form Pakistan were an appendage of Britain's economy, producing agricultural raw materials, and consequently inherited from the colonial period a weakly developed industry and a national economy in which agriculture, although extremely backward, occupied a disproportionate share. The new State of Pakistan had no economic basis for its independence and its first task, therefore, was to increase its productive forces as quickly as possible by industrializing the country and solving the agrarian problem. This is the only way open to Pakistan of creating a self-sufficient economy which could serve as a foundation for the preservation and reinforcement of the country's independence. "The transfer of State power into the hands of the ruling classes of the country, weakened the positions of British imperialism in Pakistan and created the objective conditions necessary for the solution of this problem." With independence imperialism lost its monopoly over the soil and mineral resources of Pakistan and its exclusive right of owning the largest irrigation installations, railway transport and communications. Imperialism also lost its monopoly in the fields of taxation, State credit and customs. The State apparatus ceased to be an instrument for the colonial plunder of the country. The new Government had the chance of carrying out an economic policy in the interests of the local ruling classes. The transfer of State power into the hands of these classes at the same time made it possible to set up effective control of foreign capital.

However, the authors' estimate of the extent to which the Government of Pakistan has succeeded in solving its problems is unfavourable.

The ruling classes of Pakistan, they write, are holding back change in agriculture, although the existing system of feudal land-tenure is the main impediment to the development of Pakistan's productive forces. By restricting the development of capitalism in agriculture, feudalism deprives industry of a market for the means of agricultural production and prevents the capital made by agriculture from being used in production. It moreover brings the rural masses to extreme poverty and prevents the growth of a home market for Pakistani consumer goods. Finally it is inefficient and is responsible for shortage of food.

During the 10 years of independence, the authors admit, there has been some development of industry and this has to a certain extent helped to overcome Pakistan's dependence on the developed capitalist countries for supplies of consumer goods. Pakistan is now supplying her own home market with, for example, cotton cloth and jute products. Cement, chemical and shipbuilding industries have been founded together with industries for processing local raw materials, and this has allowed the Pakistani bourgeoisie to acquire that part of the surplus value in these industries which was formerly the prey of foreign, mainly British, capital.

However, they add, industrial development has been lopsided. There has been no corresponding development of the basic industries - metallurgy, machine-tool construction and power. This has objectively increased the country's dependence on the imperialist powers for the means of production, industrial raw-materials, etc. Consequently the development of Pakistani industry along the lines followed to date cannot solve the basic problem of underdeveloped countries - the "contradiction" between imperialism and the people.

The power supply of Pakistan's industry, Rastyannikov and Kuz'min point out, is lagging more and more behind the processing industries. In spite of increasing industrial demand for metal and machine-tools there is no metallurgical or machine-tool industry. The agricultural system cannot satisfy the demand for food. Thus Pakistan's industry is growing, but disproportionately, which makes her economic situation not less but more complicated.

Because of the shortage of food an ever-growing share of the State's finances has to be spent on food imports, which leads to a reduction in State investment in industry. Thus industry and agriculture are closely connected.

The authors note that financial difficulties have led to the proposal that the Five-Year Plan should either be reduced in scope or spread out over a longer period.

They conclude that the basic problem is that of agriculture. The first thing to be done is to liquidate feudal landownership. This will undermine the positions of imperialism and facilitate Pakistan's liberation from imperialist dependence.

The authors admit that the bourgeoisie, with Government help, has ousted British capital from many spheres of Pakistan's economy, but point out that this has been compensated for by increased foreign investments in such spheres as, for example, insurance and credit. This, they write, is due to the general weakness of Pakistan's economy and

of its national bourgeoisie which is at present assimilating only the most profitable economic spheres, such as light industry and distribution. Consequently the Government has been forced to put even so important a branch of industry as oil into the power of foreign capital. The Government is prevented from making full use of the profits made in agriculture and trade because it depends on the support of the landowners and bourgeoisie. Consequently it has to turn for help to foreign countries.

The American monopolies, allege Rastyannikov and Kuz'min, dictate the conditions on which American aid is given and try to increase Pakistan's dependence on the imperialist plans of the USA.

Foreign aid, they conclude, although it may allow Pakistani ruling circles to solve some financial problems and to put off dealing with the agricultural problem, at the same time involves military collaboration and thus lays a fresh burden on Pakistan's economy. The experience of the past 10 years, they hold, has proved that Pakistan's economy cannot be propped up by resources from outside.

V. Agriculture

V.G. Rastyannikov's "The Technical Base of Pakistani Agriculture", in PAKISTAN: ISTORIYA I EKONOMIKA, is mainly concerned with analysing a basic dilemma which the author sees in Pakistani agriculture.

Agriculture, Rastyannikov points out, is Pakistan's most important industry, employing 75.5 per cent of the population. Most of the land, however, belongs to a small number of large landlords. Little land is owned by peasants and what there is is concentrated mainly in the Panjab and the former North-West Frontier Province. The existence of large landlords and the long period of British domination retarded the development of the productivity of Pakistani agriculture and kept it at a level characteristic of feudalism.

This is not to say, Rastyannikov goes on, that there have been no technical advances. The development of capitalist relations began during the British period and is continuing. Although the number of metal ploughs has probably decreased (Report of the Pakistani Agricultural Inquiry Committee 1951-2, p.20), such modern instruments as haycutters, sugar-cane presses, water-pumps and tractors have begun to appear (although East Pakistan is more backward in this respect than West). An industry for the manufacture of agricultural implements has also appeared, although it is still at the level of collectives of craftsmen working by hand. However, a considerable proportion of the

agricultural implements used, including all the machines and tractors, is imported. These machines are only used on peasant holdings when they are large enough and the peasants sufficiently wealthy, i.e. in the Panjab. Elsewhere they are mainly used by the large landowners. Even the large landowners, however, Rastyannikov notes, frequently make inefficient use of their tractors. One landlord, for example, used his tractor to plough all his land (which was rented out on the batai system to more than a thousand tenants) once every three years to get rid of weeds (Report to the President of the Board of Trade by the United Kingdom Industrial Mission to Pakistan 1950, pp.32-34). If the landowner does use them efficiently he puts out of work by expropriation more people than a capitalist agriculture can use as hired labourers. This leads to comparative over-population on the land. This same mission reported (p.36) that in order to plough a quarter of the farmed land of Pakistan at least once every three years more than 10,000 tractors would be needed. Pakistan has 4,000 of which no more than a third or a quarter are employed at any one time.

In fact, Rastyannikov states, Pakistani agriculture is still primitive. In 1945 only 2.2 per cent of all the ploughs used were metal. By 1957 the percentage had risen to four at the most. As the number of ploughs used grows, so the proportion of metal to wooden ploughs falls. In general in the "capital" of Pakistani agriculture, which is composed of land, seeds, draught-animals, machines and manual labour, even in large-scale capitalist holdings the last item still accounts for more than 50 per cent of the whole. The reason for this, the author points out, is to be found in the fact that in conditions of comparative agrarian over-population manual labour is so cheap that it becomes uneconomical to replace it with machines. Pakistani industry is developing too slowly to keep pace with both growing agrarian unemployment and the natural increase in population and therefore cannot alleviate the position.

Hence the dilemma facing the Pakistani Government, Rastyannikov writes. To allow the development of a capitalist agriculture by means of mechanization and the creation of large holdings would increase agrarian unemployment; to hinder such a development means to hinder the growth of the productivity of agriculture. It is for this reason that the Pakistani Planning Committee is opposed to the use of tractors except on virgin and fallow land and in protecting the land against erosion, etc., while the Government limits itself to publicizing chemical fertilizers, catch crops and improved seeds and to developing irrigation. Rastyannikov points out that an alternative is to hand in the example of Communist China where rural overpopulation was worse than in Pakistan and where "the liberation of the great revolutionary enthusiasm of the Chinese people" had increased

productivity. He describes the attempts of the Pakistani Government to increase productivity as "attempts to cure the disease without liquidating its causes".

VI. The Situation of the Working-Class

L.R. Gordon-Polonskaya in "The Position of the Working Class of Pakistan (1947-57)", in PAKISTAN: ISTORIYA I EKONOMIKA, touches the same ground as Rastyannikov and Kuz'min in the above article and book and gives an interesting analysis of the conditions of work and standard of living of the urban and rural workers of Pakistan.

The period, she writes, is characterized by the aggravation of "contradictions between the various classes which are striving to strengthen the country's economic independence and those forces which are objectively acting in the direction of preserving and reinforcing colonial dependence on the imperialist powers." As the working-class is the "most consistent and decided fighter for the country's independence" the path of Pakistan's eventual development will depend first and foremost upon the degree of development and unity of the working-class and peasants.

Pakistan, Gordon-Polonskaya writes, suffers from unemployment and a shortage of skilled workers. In 1955 out of 770,000 workers and employees of 5,000 undertakings 329,000 were unqualified(1) She inherited from the British a backward agrarian economy, and what industrial development has taken place since partition has been one-sided and has increased Pakistan's dependence on the imperialist powers. The foreign monopolies are preventing Pakistan from developing a heavy industry, and foreign investments, loans and "so-called 'aid'" are being directed by foreign powers, especially the USA, into the private sector since "the objective tendency [of the public sector] is to weaken economic dependence." It is for this reason that in 1957 the State owned an insignificant part of industry.

The structure of the working-class

According to the PAKISTAN STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, 1955, pp.25 and 183, writes Gordon-Polonskaya, the number of workers in small industries in 1955 was 1,175,707 and in factories approximately 400,000. In 1953, 46 per cent of the industrial proletariat worked in textile factories and a further 29 per cent in factories for the initial processing of agricultural raw materials. Only 15 per cent worked in heavy industry (the metallurgical and chemical industries and transport maintenance workshops, etc.)(2) Most factories are small. Workers

frequently change their place of employment. Agrarian unemployment means that the majority of poor peasants have to find seasonal employment in the towns. In 1950 seasonal workers formed 30 per cent of the total, being employed mainly in the tea, cotton and tobacco industries and in jute and sugar mills.(3) In 1953 of all workers in small enterprises 33 per cent were women and 11 per cent children. Women are to be found in especially large numbers among the seasonal workers; in 1950 women formed only 1.5 per cent of all adult workers with steady employment, but 18 per cent of all seasonal workers.(4)

The employment of seasonal workers and women and children drives down the wages of the permanent working-class and testifies to the comparative over-population existing on the land.

The agricultural crisis and the working-class

Gordon-Polonskaya accounts for the comparative agrarian over-population which she detects in Pakistan in the same way as Rastyannikov (see above). The expropriated peasants, whom industry cannot absorb, stay on the land as debt-ridden share-croppers. Even the peasants of East Bengal who had been given by British reforms hereditary rights to rent their land at a fixed cash rent were mainly poor peasants with 2-3 acres, insufficient to feed a family for a year. Even they can lose their rights and then become share-croppers on the same land. In both East and West Pakistan, writes Gordon-Polonskaya, the share-cropping system has become the main form of the exploitation of the peasantry. In its most usual form the peasant hires land, live-stock, tools and seeds and thus becomes little better than an agricultural labourer receiving his wage in kind.

The agricultural labourer is in an especially difficult position and, in fact, forms a semi-proletariat. It is he who seeks seasonal work in the towns.

So, according to Gordon-Polonskaya, the great majority of the peasants of both East and West Pakistan are miserably poor and, whether hereditary tenants or share-croppers, are little better off than the agricultural labourers whose ranks they will soon join as the process of the expropriation of the peasantry continues. This process is going on much faster than Pakistani industry can absorb the labour it sets free. This reserve of cheap labour naturally forces industrial wages down. Gordon-Polonskaya emphasizes that foreign capital is trying to preserve the semi-feudal features of the agricultural system which make this state of affairs possible.

Plantation workers

Plantation workers form a special class and Gordon-Polonskaya devotes a special section to them. She notes that a large number of the plantations belong to foreign monopolies.

There are, the author writes, three classes of plantation worker: the contracted worker, the worker who lives in a neighbouring village where he rents land, and the seasonal worker. The contracted worker is most numerous and Gordon-Polonskaya concentrates on him.

Before 1947, she writes, he was in fact enslaved by the terms of his contract. He is still enslaved, not now by the contract itself so much as by debt. To be allowed to leave the plantation the worker must first pay his employer the advance he received on recruitment plus the cost of recruitment (the money paid to the recruiting agent as commission and expenses). In 1947 this latter sum came to 100-120 rupees - a year's pay.(5) Not only is the contract system unfair and oppressive to the worker, writes the author, but it is economically undesirable since it ties the worker to his employer and prevents the creation of a free labour market.

Workers are paid piece rates, the author continues, all work done over the daily norm being paid for at higher rates. The norms, however, are excessively high and there is no limit to the length of the working day. The piece rates are extremely low, a man receiving seven annas per day plus food at a reduced rate of two annas, a woman six annas per day and a child four.(6) The workers are paid according to the truck system, receiving for part of their wage not cash but tickets which can be used only at their employer's store where, the author writes, the goods are dear and of poor quality. As the worker cannot leave the plantation his cash also has to be spent there. Fines and a charge for accommodation are deducted from his wage. Holidays and days lost through sickness are not paid and the work is so hard that sickness is frequent. In 1947 in the plantations of Silhet 24 per cent of the workers were absent daily. In Bengal the percentage was as high as 30.(7)

Consequently, concludes Gordon-Polonskaya, an adult plantation worker can barely feed and clothe himself but cannot keep his family. The death rate among the plantation workers is higher than among the surrounding population and their children are smaller and weaker than normal. Even when the workers are given small plots of plantation land to farm at a rent of from 10 to 15 per cent of the gross harvest this only serves to bind them closer to the plantation.

In the plantations also, therefore, feudal relations persist, although mixed with capitalist relations, and are diligently preserved by the planters, a great number of whom, Gordon-Polonskaya reminds us, represent foreign capital.

The industrial workers

As has already been noted the industrial workers live in conditions of falling wages and standard of living caused by comparative agrarian over-population. Between 1939 and 1947, writes Gordon-Polonskaya, the cost of living of qualified workers rose by 484 per cent, while wages rose only by 200-300 per cent. The comparable figures for unqualified workers were 350-400 per cent (cost of living) and 150-200 per cent (wages).(8) After Partition prices continued to rise. Wages, however, did not increase comparably. The wages of railway workers have not been reviewed since 1949. Gordon-Polonskaya quotes from the PAKISTAN TIMES of 7 May 1957 the statement that the official figures are misleading since their cost-of-living index takes into consideration only the bare minimum of goods and services, whereas if its scope is extended it shows an even sharper rise in the cost of living.

In 1950, the author writes, the average wage of an unqualified worker was 25-30 rupees per month, that of a qualified worker 60-100 rupees.(9) From this sum deductions were made which often came to 30 per cent of the total.(10) The same source gave a typical monthly budget of a worker's family containing the following items (all prices in rupees): food - 60, rent - 10, heating - 10, the rest (transport, education, clothing, etc.) - 15.8, total - 95.8. However, even a family two or three of whose members are working seldom earns more than 90 rupees per month. It is obvious that the average wage of an unqualified worker is not sufficient even to maintain his ability to work. A qualified worker can keep his family but not apprentice his children or give them any education above elementary level. The qualified railwayman or miner cannot do even this much.

From the above, Gordon-Polonskaya concludes that the wage of Pakistani industrial workers is down to the minimum, while that of agricultural workers is below it. Low wages lead to a shortage of qualified workers since the workers cannot afford to apprentice their children. "Such a wage-rate is possible only in conditions of dependence on the imperialist powers, which hinders the growth of the national economy and the solution of the agricultural problem, of comparative agrarian over-population and of a huge constant reserve of unemployed."

Nevertheless "the tendency is increasing in Pakistan for a new value of labour to be formed, one more appropriate to an independent country." Any increase in the value of labour would depend first of all on the character of the class war, and on the class-consciousness of the Pakistani proletariat. This tendency, however, is opposed by the influence among the workers of such bourgeois ideologies as "Muslim socialism" and "healthy trade-unionism" whose task is made easier by the scarcity of qualified workers, the small size of industrial enterprises, the fact that many workers maintain their connexion with the village and the constant influx into industry of former peasants. The trade union movement embraces only a small section of the workers and is very much affected by reformist tendencies.

"Pakistan's significant dependence upon the imperialist powers does much to determine the hard lot of the working-class. The enslaving forms of the USA's so-called aid and the competition of foreign capital and goods impels Pakistani businessmen to increase the exploitation of their workers in defence of their own profits. The proletariat of Pakistan also experiences its dependence on the imperialist powers directly in the form of military loans and expenditure. Also a part of the workers is subject to cruel exploitation in those industrial undertakings and plantations which continue to belong to foreign capital."

Notes to L.R. Gordon-Polonskaya's article

- (1) THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN, 1955-1960, Vol.II, p.463.
- (2) PAKISTAN STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, 1955, pp.28-31.
- (3) PAKISTAN LABOUR YEARBOOK, 1954, p.4.
- (4) Ibid.; PAKISTAN STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, 1955, p.24.
- (5) LABOUR INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE: REPORT ON AN ENQUIRY INTO CONDITIONS OF LABOUR IN PLANTATIONS IN INDIA. Government of India, 1950, p.27.
- (6) THE ECONOMY OF PAKISTAN (1950), p.134; PAKISTAN LABOUR YEARBOOK, 1954, p.31.
- (7) REPORT OF AN ENQUIRY. . . , pp.40-41, 83.
- (8) THE PAKISTAN TIMES, 14 August 1950.
- (9) Ibid.
- (10) Ibid.

THE BORDERLANDS IN THE SOVIET PRESS

Below are reviewed reports on the Borderlands countries appearing in Soviet newspapers received during the period 1 January - 31 March 1960. The Editors regret that owing to the large amount of material it has been found impracticable to continue the coverage of Soviet reports on India.

AFGHANISTAN

Khrushchev's visit to Afghanistan

Khrushchev's visit to Afghanistan from 2 to 5 March was prominently reported in Soviet newspapers, which published the text of Khrushchev's speeches and of the Soviet-Afghan joint communique. In his speech of 2 March on arrival Khrushchev spoke not only of Soviet friendship and support for Afghanistan but also of the attitude of other countries towards Soviet-Afghan relations. He said that "malicious fabrications" about Soviet-Afghan relations had been spread in countries that were not cordially disposed towards the Soviet Union and Afghanistan; but the Soviet Union remained true to its Leninist policy of peaceful co-existence and international friendship, while Afghanistan resolutely pursued its policy of neutrality, strengthening its independence and cooperating with other countries in the interests of peace. In another passage Khrushchev said that Afghanistan was much concerned at the way in which certain circles in other States - States which had only recently acquired their own independence - were showing scant respect for the lawful national rights of other peoples, and were following a policy which differed little from the policy of those who had for centuries kept other peoples under the yoke of colonialism.

The Pushtunistan issue was directly referred to in the joint Soviet-Afghan communique issued on 4 March, in the following terms: "The two sides exchanged views on the fate of the Pushtun people and expressed their agreement that the proper and sensible way to lessen tension and to guarantee peace in the Middle East is to apply to the solution of this problem the principle of self-determination on the basis of the UN Charter."

Soviet newspapers gave a full account of the Afghan Premier's press conference of 7 March. In the course of this the Afghan Premier deplored Western reports that, in accepting aid from the Soviet Union, Afghanistan was falling under the influence of Communism. Afghanistan, he said, followed a neutral policy and accepted aid from any country provided that it was not accompanied by political conditions.

Soviet aid to Afghanistan

Soviet aid to Afghanistan was much in the news in connection with Khrushchev's visit, and in particular his inspection of two Soviet-built projects - the new Kabul airport, due for completion in 1962, and the Jangalak motor repair and spare parts works. The latter undertaking was the subject of an enthusiastic article in PRAVDA of 5 March by V. Mayevskiy, who called it "the firstling of Afghanistan's national industry" and explained how the first molten metal for castings was poured on the occasion of Khrushchev's visit.

In addition Soviet newspapers published articles on other aspects of Soviet aid to Afghanistan. BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY of 9 March published an interview with the geologist V.A. Frolov on Soviet oil prospecting activities in northern Afghanistan, in the Shibarghan and Maimana districts of Mazar-i-Sharif province. Frolov said that a test borehole in the Sar-i-Pul area, dug at the very outset of geological work in the area, had established the presence of oil of high quality, and a second borehole had yielded oil and gas; digging was continuing.

PRAVDA VOSTOKA of 12 March published an interview with A.V. Petrov, the chief engineer of the Jalalabad irrigation canal. Petrov explained how the canal, 70 km. long, will convey water from a dam on the Kabul river, at the Darunt gorge, and, passing through two tunnels one of which will be 7.5 km. long, will irrigate 32,000 hectares of land.

NEPAL

Soviet newspapers published in full the speeches made during the visit of Voroshilov, Kozlov and Furtseva to Nepal from 3 to 5 February 1960, and also the joint Soviet Nepalese communique issued on the conclusion of the visit (PRAVDA 6.2.60). This was a return visit for that of King Mahendra to the Soviet Union in June 1958.

On 18 February IZVESTIYA published an article by I. Klimov on the occasion of Nepalese National Day, under the heading "Sweeping away feudalism". Nine years ago, said Klimov, the Nepalese people had "swept away the despotic feudal regime of the henchmen of the British

imperialists which had ruled in Nepal for more than a century" and had set up a democratic State. Since then Nepal had made great strides in the development of her economy, under her first Five-Year Plan (1956-61). A law on agrarian reform passed in 1957 had the aim of liquidating the system of feudal land-ownership. During the past year a Constitution had been enacted and parliamentary elections had been held. The establishment of Soviet-Nepalese diplomatic relations in July 1957 had opened the way to political, economic and cultural co-operation between the two countries, and under a Soviet-Nepalese agreement signed on 24 April 1959 the Soviet Union afforded Nepal gratuitous aid to the sum of 30m. rubles for the construction of various undertakings, including a hydroelectric station, a sugar factory, a cigarette factory, etc. There were boundless possibilities for the further development of Soviet-Nepalese cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.

In an article in PRAVDA on 28 March entitled "The Spirit of Bandung Triumphs", V. Karimov acclaimed the results of the Sino-Nepalese discussions in Peking, which led to an agreement on frontier questions and an agreement on Chinese economic aid to Nepal. The peace-loving public, said Karimov, had welcomed the results of the Sino-Nepalese talks, as of the earlier Sino-Burmese talks; they showed that the spirit of Bandung continued to win new triumphs.

PAKISTAN

Two items concerning Soviet-Pakistani relations were reported during this period - the exchange of friendly messages between Khrushchev and President Ayub Khan during the former's flight over Pakistani territory (PRAVDA 3 and 5.3.60), and the gift of three Soviet tractors to the Pakistani Ministry of Agriculture at a ceremony in the Soviet trade agency in Karachi (IZVESTIYA 17.1.60).

IZVESTIYA of 13 January noted that the Afghan Foreign Minister Sardar Muhammad Naim had returned to Kabul after a two-day visit to Pakistan during which he had talks with President Ayub Khan, and that he had "said that no agreement had yet been reached on matters under dispute and no early solution of these questions is expected".

Reports of the CENTO meeting in Lahore - the discussions of the Heads of State of Turkey, Persia and Pakistan which opened on 24 February - were published in Soviet newspapers under such headings as "Scheming in Lahore" and "The partisans of the cold war in Asia intensify their efforts".

PERSIA

A sharp warning about Persia's foreign policy was voiced in PRAVDA of 14 February in an article signed "Observer". This contrasted Persia's recent attitude to the Soviet Union with her attitude to the Western powers, and depicted Persia as rapidly becoming a "semi-colony" and a military appendage of the USA. It said that military bases in Persia had no strategic value for the West: "The Soviet Union, as is well known, possesses all the necessary means to wipe these bases off the face of the earth if aggressors dare to unleash a war." The article concluded: "In his blind hatred of Communism, dreaming of leading an alliance of all reactionary forces in the Middle East against the national liberation movement and against all Persia's peace-loving neighbours, the Shah drags his country further down the road to the abyss. Should he not pull himself up before it is too late?"

The effects of Persia's military expenditure on living standards in Persia remained a constant theme in newspaper articles. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA of 27 March, commenting on the proportion of military expenditure in the Persian budget, said that the Persian Government seemed oblivious of the fact that a campaign for disarmament was in progress in the rest of the world.

New alphabets for the Turkic languages of Sinkiang

New China News Agency announced on 10.2.60 that the proposal to use for the Kazakh and Uygur languages a latin alphabet of 26 letters plus eight special letters designed to meet phonetic requirements has been ratified by the People's Council of the Sinkiang-Uygur Autonomous Region. This supersedes the project reported in CAR, Vol.VI, No.1, pp.81-82.

Ed. - CAR

THE SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
OF
KAZAKHSTAN, KIRGIZIA, TADZHIKISTAN,
UZBEKISTAN, TURKMENISTAN AND AZERBAIDZHAN

100 0 100 200 300 km.



- Borders of the U.S.S.R.
- Limits of Union Republics.
- Capitals of Union Republics.
- Railways.
- Canals.
- Canals under construction or projected.
- Sands.
- X — Main arterial road with pass.

Also published by Central Asian Research Centre

THE TURKIC LANGUAGES OF CENTRAL ASIA: Problems of Planned Culture Contact. A translation of an article entitled "The Turkic Peoples of the USSR: the Development of their Languages and Writing" by Professor N.A. Baskakov, with comments by Dr. Stefan Wurm. 52pp. large post quarto. Price: Six Shillings. (Reprinting)

TURKIC PEOPLES OF THE USSR: Their historical background, their languages and the development of Soviet linguistic policy, by Dr. Stefan Wurm. 51 pp. large post quarto. Price: Ten Shillings.

SOME FEATURES OF THE MORPHOLOGY OF THE OIROT (GORNO-ALTAI) LANGUAGE by C.G. Simpson, Reader in Turkish at the University of Durham. 68 pp. large post quarto. Price: Seven Shillings and Sixpence.

A concise description of the main features of the noun, pronoun, postposition and verb of the Oirat language spoken in the Gorno-Altai Autonomous Oblast of the USSR.

ISLAM AND RUSSIA: A detailed analysis of "An Outline of the History of Islamic Studies in the USSR" by N.A. Smirnov (Moscow 1954), with an introduction by Ann K.S. Lambton, Professor of Persian in the University of London. Bibliography. 87 pp. large post quarto. Price: Twelve Shillings and Sixpence.

THE TURKISH LANGUAGE OF SOVIET AZERBAIJAN by C.G. Simpson, Reader in Turkish at the University of Durham. 120 pp. large post quarto. Price: Twenty Shillings.

A summary of the grammar of the current literary language of Soviet Azerbaijan together with passages of contemporary literature and extracts from the press.

TURKESTAN IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: A Brief History of the Khanates of Bukhara, Kokand and Khiva, by Mary Holdsworth. 81 pp. large post quarto. Map. Price: Fifteen Shillings.

Based largely on Russian sources, both Tsarist and Soviet, this monograph describes the state of the Khanates before, during and after the coming of the Russians.

RUSSIAN WORKS ON AFGHANISTAN. 12 pp. large post quarto. Price: Five Shillings.

A bibliography compiled for the most part from bibliographies and references found in Russian publications in the course of the Centre's study on Afghanistan (CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, Vol. IV, No. 2). It does not claim to be exhaustive, but is believed to be the only one of its kind in existence.

RECENT SOVIET SOURCE MATERIAL ON SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA AND THE BORDERLANDS (including the Middle East): Issued as a biannual supplement to CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW. Approx. 50 pp. large post quarto. Price: Five Shillings.

This bibliography is limited to certain specific periodicals, about 50 in number, and to new books. Highly technical source material is not included.

MAP OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA & KAZAKHSTAN: In the form of four folded Sheets in booklet cover with Introduction, Gazetteer and Glossary. Price complete: Forty-two Shillings post free.

The Map is based on a Russian map on scale 1: 5M in the ATLAS MIRA of 1954. It has been brought up to date (1958) as far as possible. Scale: 1: 3,750,000. It is printed in six colours; heights, depths and contour values are given in metres.

THE MIZAN NEWSLETTER: A monthly review of Soviet writing on the Middle East (first issue January 1959), comprising articles on Soviet opinion about Middle East affairs, relations between the USSR and Middle East countries, and Soviet newspapers' presentation of Middle East developments. Subscription rate: Six Pounds per year, post free; single copies: Ten Shillings.

In preparation

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE TURKMEN LANGUAGE by G.K. Dulling.

Turkmen, while related to modern Turkish and Azeri in the south-western group of Turkic languages, differs from them in several important points of phonetics, morphology and syntax. This book describes these differences and also contains some notes on the unwritten Turkmen dialects spoken outside the Soviet Republic of Turkmenistan in Persia and Afghanistan.



The above map shows the area covered by *Central Asian Review* in relation to the rest of the world. The total area of the six Muslim republics is $1\frac{1}{2}$ million square miles, that is, about 23.5 per cent of the total area of Soviet Asia.

The total population of the Muslim Republics is 26,676,000 (1959 Census) or about 41.7 per cent of the total population of Soviet Asia now estimated at about 64 million. The figure of 26,676,000 includes 26,676,000 Muslims, 7,923,000 Russian, Ukrainian and Belo-russian settlers and a number of smaller non-Muslim communities such as Armenians, Koreans, Dungans and Jews amounting to a total of 832,000.

The total indigenous population of Soviet Asia is estimated at 25 million. Thus, whilst the six republics together occupy only one-fifth of the total area of the region, their indigenous (i.e. Asian) population amounts to about 66.5 per cent of the indigenous population of the whole of Soviet Asia.